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This dissertation consists of four essays that study topics in macroeconomics, finance and their interplay using
nonlinear quantitative equilibrium models and state of the art econometric techniques. Chapter 1 proposes a
general equilibrium model with financial intermediation and sovereign default risk to study the
macroeconomic consequences of news regarding a future sovereign default. The model, estimated on Italian
data, is used to measure the output losses of the 2010-2012 sovereign debt crisis, and to evaluate the effects of
credit policies implemented by European authorities. Chapter 2 proposes a new class of time series model that
can be used to measure nonlinearities in the data and to evaluate the fit of Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium (DSGE) models solved with high order perturbation. We first characterize this class, the
Quadratic Autoregressive (QAR) model. We then show how the QAR model can be used as a diagnostic tool
to assess whether a DSGE model is able to replicate the nonlinear behavior of a set of U.S. aggregate time
series. Chapter 3 studies the determinants of medium term movements in the market value of U.S.
corporations. We find that secular movements in the mean and volatility of TFP growth are strongly
associated with these medium term fluctuations in asset prices. These empirical findings are then interpreted
within a production based asset pricing model where the mean and volatility of aggregate productivity growth
varies over time. We show that the model can rationalize a sizable elasticity of asset prices to the drivers of
aggregate productivity. Chapter 4 proposes a method to identify Harrod-neutral technology shocks in the data
in presence of input heterogeneity in the aggregate production function. We prove that, in a wide class of
models, Harrod-neutral technology shocks are the only one consistent with a certain form of balanced
growth. We then use this property to identify Harrod-neutral shocks using a state-space model. Monte Carlo
simulations show that the proposed method performs very well in small samples.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON NONLINEAR MACROECONOMIC DYNAMICS
Luigi Bocola
Frank Schorfheide
This dissertation consists of four essays that study topics in macroeconomics, fi-
nance and their interplay using nonlinear quantitative equilibrium models and
state of the art econometric techniques. Chapter 1 proposes a general equilibrium
model with financial intermediation and sovereign default risk to study the macroe-
conomic consequences of news regarding a future sovereign default. The model,
estimated on Italian data, is used to measure the output losses of the 2010-2012
sovereign debt crisis, and to evaluate the effects of credit policies implemented by
European authorities. Chapter 2, co-authored with Borag˘an Aruoba and Frank
Schorfheide, proposes a new class of time series model that can be used to measure
nonlinearities in the data and to evaluate the fit of Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium (DSGE) models solved with high order perturbation. We first char-
acterize this class, the Quadratic Autoregressive (QAR) model. We then show
how the QAR model can be used as a diagnostic tool to assess whether a DSGE
model is able to replicate the nonlinear behavior of a set of U.S. aggregate time
series. Chapter 3, co-authored with Nils Gornemann, studies the determinants
of medium term movements in the market value of U.S. corporations. We find
that secular movements in the mean and volatility of TFP growth are strongly
associated with these medium term fluctuations in asset prices. These empiri-
cal findings are then interpreted within a production based asset pricing model
where the mean and volatility of aggregate productivity growth varies over time.
v
We show that the model can rationalize a sizable elasticity of asset prices to the
drivers of aggregate productivity. Chapter 4, co-authored with Iourii Manovskii
and Marcus Hagedorn, proposes a method to identify Harrod-neutral technology
shocks in the data in presence of input heterogeneity in the aggregate production
function. We prove that, in a wide class of models, Harrod-neutral technology
shocks are the only one consistent with a certain form of balanced growth. We
then use this property to identify Harrod-neutral shocks using a state-space model.
Monte Carlo simulations show that the proposed method performs very well in
small samples.
vi
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Chapter 1
The Pass-Through of Sovereign
Risk
1.1 Introduction
At the end of 2009, holdings of domestic government debt by banks in European
peripheral countries - Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain - were equivalent to 93% of
banks’ total equity. At the same time, these banks provided roughly three-quarters
of external financing to domestic firms. Prior research has established that the
sovereign debt crisis in these economies resulted in a substantial increase in the
borrowing costs for domestic firms.1 One proposed explanation of these findings
is that the exposure to distressed government bonds hurts the ability of banks
to raise funds in financial markets, leading to a pass-through of their increased
financing costs into the lending rates payed by firms.2 This view was at the core
1See, for example, the evidence in Klein and Stellner (2013) and Bedendo and Colla (2013)
using corporate bond data, the analysis of Bofondi et al. (2013) using Italian firm level data and
Neri (2013) and Neri and Ropele (2013) for evidence using aggregate time series. See also ECB
(2011).
2The report by CGFS (2011) discusses the transmission channels through which sovereign
risk affected bank funding during the European debt crisis. For example, banks in the Euro area
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of policy discussions in Europe and was a motive for major interventions by the
European Central Bank (ECB).
I argue, however, that this view is incomplete. A sovereign default triggers a
severe macroeconomic downturn and adversely affects the performance of firms.
Consequently, as an economy approaches a sovereign default, banks perceive firms
to be more risky. Because banks require fair compensation for holding this addi-
tional risk, firms’ borrowing costs rise. If this mechanism is quantitatively impor-
tant, policies that address the heightened liquidity problems of banks but do not
reduce the increased riskiness of firms may prove ineffective in encouraging bank
lending.
I formalize this mechanism in a quantitative model with financial intermedi-
ation and sovereign default risk. In the model, an increase in the probability
of a sovereign default both tightens the funding constraints of banks (leverage-
constraint channel) and raises the risks associated with lending to the productive
sector (risk channel). I structurally estimate the model on Italian data with
Bayesian methods. I find that the risk channel is indeed quantitatively important:
it explains up to 47% of the impact of the sovereign debt crisis on the borrowing
costs of firms. I then use the estimated model to assess the consequences of credit
market interventions adopted by the ECB and to propose and evaluate alterna-
tive policies that are more effective in mitigating the implications of increased
sovereign default risk.
My framework builds on a business cycle model with financial intermediation, in
the tradition of Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011, 2013).
extensively use government bonds as collateral, and the decline in the value of these securities
during the sovereign debt crisis reduced their ability to access wholesale liquidity. See also Zole
(2013) and Albertazzi et al. (2012).
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In the model, banks collect savings from households and use these funds, along
with their own wealth (net worth), to buy long-term government bonds and to
lend to firms. This intermediation is important because firms need external finance
to buy capital goods. The model has three main ingredients. First, an agency
problem between households and banks generates constraints in the borrowing
ability of these latter. These constraints on bank leverage bind only occasionally,
and typically when bank net worth is low. Second, financial intermediation is risky:
bank net worth varies over time mainly because banks finance long-term risky
assets with short-term risk-free debt. Third, the probability that the government
defaults on its bonds and imposes losses on banks is time-varying and follows an
exogenous stochastic process.
To understand the key mechanisms of the model, consider a scenario in which
the probability of a future sovereign default rises. The anticipation of a “haircut”
on government bonds depresses their market value and lowers the net worth of
banks.3 This tightens their leverage constraints and has adverse consequences for
financial intermediation: banks’ ability to collect funds from households decline,
lending to the productive sector declines and so does aggregate investment. This
is the conventional leverage-constraint channel in the literature.
However, even when the leverage constraints are currently not binding, a higher
probability of a future sovereign default induces banks to demand higher com-
pensation when lending to firms. This is the case because the sovereign default
triggers a deep recession characterized by a severe decline in the payouts of firms.
Thus, when the probability of a future sovereign default increases, banks have
an incentive to deleverage in order to avoid these losses. More specifically, if the
3In the model, a haircut is the fraction of the principal that is reneged by the government
in the event of a default.
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sovereign default happens in the future, bank leverage constraints tighten because
of the government haircut. This forces banks to liquidate their holdings of firms
assets. The associated decline in their market value leads to a further deteriora-
tion in bank net worth, feeding a vicious loop. Ex-ante, forward-looking banks
demand a premium for holding these claims because they anticipate that they will
pay out little precisely when banks are mostly in need of wealth. The resulting risk
premium is increasing in the probability of a sovereign default. This constitutes
the risk channel.
I measure the quantitative importance of the leverage constraint channel and
the risk channel by estimating the structural parameters of the model with Italian
data from 1999:Q1 to 2011:Q4 using Bayesian techniques. The major empirical
challenge is to separate these two propagation mechanisms since they have qual-
itatively similar implications for indicators of financial stress commonly used in
the literature (e.g., credit spreads). I demonstrate that the Lagrange multiplier
on bank leverage constraints is a function of observable variables, specifically of
the TED spread (spread between the prime interbank rate and the risk free rate)
and of the leverage of banks. I construct a time series for this multiplier and use it
in estimation, along with output growth, to measure the cyclical behavior of the
leverage constraint. In addition, I use credit default swap (CDS) spreads on Italian
government bonds and data on holdings of domestic government debt by Italian
banks to measure the time-varying nature of sovereign risk and the exposure of
banks to that risk.4 The structural estimation is complicated by the fact that the
model features time-variation in risk premia and occasionally binding financial
constraints. I develop an algorithm for its global solution based on projections
4A CDS is a derivative used to hedge the credit risk of an underlying reference asset. CDS
spreads on government securities are typically used in the literature as a proxy of sovereign risk,
see Pan and Singleton (2008).
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and sparse collocation, and I combine it with the particle filter to evaluate the
likelihood function.
Having established the good fit of the model using posterior predictive analysis,
I use it to answer two applied questions. First, I quantify the importance of the
leverage-constraint channel and the risk channel for the propagation of sovereign
credit risk to the financing premia of firms and output. I estimate that the increase
in the probability of a sovereign default in Italy during the 2010:Q1-2011:Q4 period
raised substantially firms’ financing premia, with a peak of 100 basis points in
2011:Q4. This increase reflects both tighter constraints on bank leverage and
increased riskiness of firms, with the risk channel explaining up to 47% of the
overall effects. Moreover, the rise in the probability of a sovereign default had
severe adverse consequences for the Italian economy: cumulative output losses
were 4.75% at the end of 2011.
In the second set of quantitative experiments, I evaluate the effectiveness of a
major unconventional policy adopted by the ECB in the first quarter of 2012 to
address the crisis, the Longer Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs). I model the
policy as a subsidized long-term loan offered to banks. Because of the inherent
nonlinearities of the model, initial conditions matter for policy evaluation. Thus,
I implement this intervention conditioning on the state of the Italian economy in
2011:Q4. I find that the effects of LTROs on credit to firms and output vary over
the 2012:Q1-2014:Q4 window, but they are small and not significantly different
from zero when we average over this time period. This is due to the fact that
risk premia were sizable when the policy was enacted. Banks, thus, have little
incentives to increase their exposure to firms and they mainly use LTROs to
cheaply refinance their liabilities.
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The lesson from the policy evaluation is that the success of unconventional
policies, such as LTROs, crucially depends on current economic conditions, in
particular on the relative importance of binding leverage constraints versus risk
premia. The former prevents banks from undertaking otherwise profitable invest-
ment. Policies that relax these constraints have sizable effects on bank lending
and capital accumulation. The latter, instead, signal that firms are forecasted to
be a “bad asset” in the future and bank lending is less responsive to refinancing
operations. In these circumstances, policies that insure banks from the downside
risk of a sovereign default (for example through a large injection of equity or a floor
on the price of government bonds) can achieve stimulative effects. These interven-
tions lower the risk associated with lending to the private sector because they limit
the contagion effects that occur in the event of a sovereign default through banks’
balance sheets. However, these stimulative effects should be weighed against the
increased risk taking behavior that these policies are likely to bring and that I do
not capture in my analysis.
Related Literature. This paper is related to several strands of the literature.
Empirical studies document a strong link between sovereign spreads and private
sector interest rates, both in emerging economies and more recently in southern
European countries.5 Several authors recognize the importance of this relation-
ship in different settings. For example, Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Uribe and
Yue (2006) suggest that sovereign spreads are a major driver of business cycles
in emerging markets, while Corsetti et al. (2013) study the implications of the
sovereign risk pass-through for fiscal policy. However, in these and related papers,
5For emerging market economies, Durbin and Ng (2005) and Borensztein et al. (2006) provide
an empirical analysis of the “sovereign ceiling”, the practice of agencies to rate corporations
below their sovereign. Cavallo and Valenzuela (2007) document the effects of sovereign spreads
on corporate bonds spreads. See footnote 1 and 2 for evidence on southern European economies.
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the reasons underlying the connection between sovereign spreads and private sec-
tor interest rate are not modeled. Part of the contribution of this paper to the
literature is to microfound this link in a fully specified dynamic equilibrium model.
In doing so, my paper also relates to the literature covering the output costs of
sovereign debt defaults, more precisely to papers studying the effects of defaults on
domestic bondholders. Motivated by robust empirical evidence, Gennaioli et al.
(2013b) and Sosa Padilla (2013) study the effects of sovereign defaults on domestic
banks, and the impact that the associated output losses have on the government’s
incentives to default.6 My research is complementary to theirs: I take sovereign
default risk as exogenous, but I explicitly model the behavior of private credit
markets when sovereign risk increases. The novel insight of my paper is that the
mere anticipation of a sovereign default can be recessionary because of its impact
on the perceived riskiness of firms and on the funding constraints of exposed
banks.7 While this exogeneity of sovereign default risk rules out important feed-
back effects between banks and sovereigns (Uhlig, 2013; Acharya et al., 2013), it
does allow for a transparent analysis of these transmission channels.8
This paper contributes to a growing literature on the aggregate implications of
shocks to the balance sheet of financial intermediaries. In particular, I build on
the modeling framework developed by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler
6Kumhof and Tanner (2005) and Gennaioli et al. (2013a) document that banks are highly
exposed to domestic government debt in a large set of countries. Reinhart and Rogoff (2011)
and Borensztein and Panizza (2009) show that sovereign defaults typically occur simultaneously,
or in close proximity, to banking crises.
7In an empirical study, Yeyati and Panizza (2011) point out that anticipation effects are key
to understand the unfolding of sovereign debt crises. See also Aguiar et al. (2009) and Dovis
(2013) for models where anticipation effects arise because of debt overhang problems.
8Pancrazi et al. (2013) and Mallucci (2013) are two contemporaneous papers studying the
effects of sovereign credit risk on the funding costs of firms. Even though these authors model
explicitly the incentives of the government to default on its debt, their production sector is static.
As such, their analysis abstract from the effects that a sovereign default has on the perceived
riskiness of firms, the key novel mechanism of this paper.
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and Karadi (2011, 2013), where the limited enforcement of debt contracts gen-
erates endogenous constraints on intermediaries’ leverage. Differently from these
papers, my analysis studies how changes in the expectation of these constraints
being binding in the future influence the choices of financial intermediaries re-
garding their lending behavior today.9 In my application, these phenomena arise
because of shocks to the the default probability of government bonds, but the
same logic could be applied to the study of other assets. My analysis uncovers
two important phenomena. First, these changes in expectations can induce quan-
titatively sizable variation in risk premia. Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2013), He
and Krishnamurthy (2012a,b) and Bianchi and Mendoza (2012) study related ef-
fects, but in the present context they emerge because of shocks to the volatility of
an unproductive assets’ payoff. Productive assets are affected because the balance
sheet of banks generates contagion (e.g., produces correlation among the payoffs
of different assets held by banks). Second, stabilization policies are state and
size dependent in this environment.10 As explained earlier, these nonlinearities
depend on the relative importance of currently binding leverage constraints and
risk premia.
The measurement of these two latter components is therefore a key aspect of
this paper. The construction of a model consistent indicator for the Lagrange
multiplier on bank leverage constraints is novel, and it is related to the measure-
ment of financial shocks in Jermann and Quadrini (2012). Methodologically, I
draw from the literature on the Bayesian estimation and validation of dynamic
equilibrium economies (Del Negro and Schorfheide, 2011a), more specifically of
9Technically, I capture these effects because I study the full nonlinear model rather than
local approximation around a deterministic steady state.
10There are a number of papers that study unconventional monetary policy in related envi-
ronments. See, for example, Curdia and Woodford (2010), Curdia and Woodford (2011), Del
Negro et al. (2012) and Bianchi and Bigio (2013).
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models where nonlinearities feature prominently (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Rubio-
Ramı´rez, 2007a). The decision rules of the model are derived numerically using
a projection algorithm. I use a Smolyak sparse grid (Krueger and Kubler, 2003),
which sensibly reduces the curse of dimensionality.11 I evaluate the likelihood
function tailoring the auxiliary particle filter of Pitt and Shephard (1999) to the
present application. To my knowledge, this is the first paper to estimate a model
with occasionally binding financial constraints using global methods and nonlin-
ear filters. However, there are other papers using related techniques for different
applications (see Gust et al., 2013; Bi and Traum, 2012, 2013).
Finally, the shock to sovereign default probabilities considered in this paper is
a form of time-varying volatility. As such, my research is related to the literature
that studies how different types of volatility shocks influence real economic activity
(Bloom, 2009; Bloom et al., 2012; Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al., 2011). In partic-
ular, Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006) emphasize the role of large macroeconomic
disasters in accounting for asset prices and Gourio (2012) studies how changes
in the probability of these events affect risk premia and capital accumulation.
The sovereign default studied in this paper can be seen as a potential source of
macroeconomic disasters.12
Layout. The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.3 presents the model,
while Section 1.3 discusses its main mechanisms using two simplified examples.
Section 1.4 presents the estimation and an analysis of the model’s fit. Section
1.5 presents key properties of the estimated model that are useful to interpret
11Christiano and Fisher (2000) is an early paper documenting the performance of projections
in models with occasionally binding constraints. See also Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2012) for
an application of the Smolyak sparse grid in a model where the zero lower bound constraint on
nominal interest rate bind occasionally.
12Arellano et al. (2012), Gilchrist et al. (2013) and Christiano et al. (2013) study the real
effects of a different form of time-varying volatility in models with financial frictions.
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the two quantitative experiments, which are reported in Section 1.6. Section 4.5
concludes.
1.2 Model
I consider a neoclassical growth model enriched with a financial sector as in Gertler
and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011). In this setting, I introduce
long term government bonds to which financial intermediaries are exposed. These
securities pay in every state of nature unless the economy is in a sovereign default-
an event that can occur every period according to an exogenous and time-varying
probability.
The model economy is populated by households, final good producers, capital
good producers and a government. Each household is composed of two types of
members: workers and bankers. Workers supply labor to final good firms in a
competitive factor market, and their wages are made available to the household.
Bankers manage the savings of other households and use these funds to buy gov-
ernment bonds and claims on firms. Bankers offer a risk free rate on households’
savings. The perfectly competitive non-financial corporate sector produces a final
good using a constant return to scale technology that aggregates capital and la-
bor. Firms rent labor from households and buy capital from perfectly competitive
capital good producers. Their capital expenses are financed by bankers. Finally,
the government issues bonds and taxes households in order to finance government
spending. In every period the government can default on its debt. This event is
modeled as an exogenous stochastic process.
The key friction of the model is the limited enforcement of debt contracts between
10
households and bankers: bankers can walk away with the assets of their franchise,
and households can recover only a fraction of their savings when this event occurs.
This friction gives rise to constraints on the leverage of banks, with bank net worth
being the key determinant of their borrowing capacity. When these incentive
constraints bind, or are expected to bind in the future, credit to the productive
sector declines. This has adverse consequences for capital accumulation. An
increase in the probability of a future government default is recessionary because
it adversely impacts the current and expected level of bank net worth, thereby
influencing their lending behavior.
In the remainder of this section I describe the agents’ decision problems, derive
the conditions characterizing a competitive equilibrium, and sketch the algorithm
used for the numerical solution of the model. In Section 1.3, I discuss the key
mechanisms of interest. I denote by S the vector collecting the current value for
the state variables and by S′ the future state of the economy.
1.2.1 Agents and their Decision Problems
Households
A household is composed of a fraction f of workers and a fraction 1−f of bankers.
There is perfect consumption insurance between its members. Let Π(S) be the
net payments that bankers make to their own household, and let W (S) be the
wage that workers receive from supplying labor to final good firms. Households
value consumption c and dislike labor l according to the flow utility u(c, l), and
they discount the future at the rate β. The problem for the household is that
of making contingent plans for consumption, labor supply and savings b′ so as to
11
maximize lifetime utility. Savings are deposited into financial intermediaries that
are managed by bankers belonging to other households, and they earn the risk
free return R(S). Taking prices as given, a household solves
vh(b; S) = max
b′≥0,c≥0,l∈[0,1]
{u(c, l) + βES[vh(b′; S′)]} ,
c+
1
R(S)
b′ ≤ W (S)l + Π(S) + b− τ(S),
S′ = Γ(S).
τ(S) denotes the level of lump sum taxes while Γ(.) describes the law of motion
for the aggregate state variables. Optimality is governed, at an interior solution,
by the intra-temporal and inter-temporal Euler equations
ul(c, l) = uc(c, l)W (S), (1.1)
ES[Λ(S′,S)R(S)] = 1, (1.2)
where Λ(S′,S) = β uc(c
′,l′)
uc(c,l)
. For the empirical analysis I will use preferences that are
consistent with balanced growth, u(c, l) = log(c)−χ l1+ν−1
1+ν−1 , where ν parameterizes
the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
Bankers
A banker uses his accumulated net worth n and deposits b to buy government
bonds and claims on firms.13 Let aj be asset j held by a banker and let Qj(S)
and Rj(S
′,S) be, respectively, the price of asset j and its realized returns next
period on a unit of numeraire good invested in asset j. The banker’s balance sheet
13A worker who becomes a banker this period obtains start-up funds from his households.
These transfers will be specified at the end of the section.
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equates total assets to total liabilities:
∑
j={B,K}
Qj(S)aj ≤ n+ b
′
R(S)
, (1.3)
where subscript B refers to government bonds and K to firms’ claims. A banker
makes optimal portfolio choices in order to maximize the present discounted value
of dividends payed to his own household. At any point in time there is a probability
1 − ψ that a banker becomes a worker in the next period. When this happens,
the banker pays back a dividend to his own household.14 Bankers who continue
running the business do not pay dividends, and they accumulate net worth. The
objective of a banker is that of maximizing the expected discounted value of his
terminal wealth. Net worth next period equals the difference between realized
returns on assets and the payments promised to households.
n′ =
∑
j={B,K}
Rj(S
′,S)Qj(S)aj − b′. (1.4)
Note that bad realizations of Rj(S
′,S) lead to reductions in bankers’ net worth
n′. This variation in net worth affects the ability of bankers to obtain funds from
the household sector and, ultimately, their supply of credit to the firm. This occurs
due to the limited enforcement of contracts between households and banks. At
any point in time, a banker can walk away with a fraction λ of the project and
transfer it to his own household. If he does, the depositors can force him into
bankruptcy and recover a fraction (1 − λ) of banks’ assets. This friction defines
an incentive constraint for the banker: the value of running his franchise must be
higher than its outside option, λ[
∑
j Qj(S)aj].
14When a banker exits, a worker replaces him so that their relative proportion does not change
over time.
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Taking prices as given, a banker solves the decision problem
vb(n; S) = max
aB ,aK ,b
ES {Λ(S′,S) [(1− ψ)n′ + ψvb(n′; S′)]} ,
n′ =
∑
j={B,K}
Rj(S
′,S)Qj(S)aj − b′,
∑
j={B,K}
Qj(S)aj ≤ n+ b
′
R(S)
,
λ
 ∑
j={B,K}
Qj(S)aj
 ≤ vb(n; S),
S′ = Γ(S).
The following result further characterizes this decision problem.15
Result 1. A solution to the banker’s dynamic program is
vb(n; S) = α(S)n,
where α(S) solves
α(S) =
ES{Λ(S′,S)[(1− ψ) + ψα(S′)]R(S)}
1− µ(S) , (1.5)
and the multiplier on incentive constraints satisfies
µ(S) = max
{
1−
[
ES{Λ(S′,S)[(1− ψ) + ψα(S′)]R(S)}N
λ[QK(S)AK +QB(S)AB]
]
, 0
}
, (1.6)
where N , AB and AK are, respectively, aggregate bankers’ net worth and aggregate
bankers’ holdings of government bonds and firms assets.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
15The problem is not well defined for negative values of net worth. When this happens, the
government steps in and refinance the bank via lump sum taxation. At the same time, it issues
a non-pecuniary punishment to the banker that is equivalent to the net worth losses.
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This result clarifies that limited enforcement of contracts places an endogenous
constraint on the leverage of the banker. Indeed, because of the linearity of the
value function, the incentive constraint becomes
∑
j={B,K}Qj(S)aj
n
≤ α(S)
λ
, (1.7)
implying that bank leverage cannot exceed the time-varying threshold α(S)
λ
.16 Bank
net worth is thus a key variable regulating financial intermediation in the model:
when net worth is low, the leverage constraint is more likely to bind and this limits
the amount of assets that a banker can intermediate.
The implications of this constraint for assets’ accumulation can be better under-
stood by looking at the Euler equation for risky asset j
ES
[
Λˆ(S′,S)Rj(S′,S)
]
= ES
[
Λˆ(S′,S)R(S)
]
+ λµ(S), (1.8)
where Λˆ(S′,S) is the economy’s pricing kernel, defined as
Λˆ(S′,S) = Λ(S′,S)[(1− ψ) + ψα(S′)]. (1.9)
There are two main distinctions between this Euler equation and the one that
would arise in a purely neoclassical setting. First, the presence of leverage con-
straints limits the ability of banks to arbitrage away differences between expected
discounted returns on asset j and the risk free rate: this can be seen from equation
(1.8), as the multiplier generates a wedge between these two returns. Second, the
pricing kernel in equation (1.9) is not only a function of consumption growth as in
16Alternatively, we can interpret equation (1.7) as a collateral constraint. Indeed, using the
balance sheet identity we write the leverage constraint as b ≤
[
α(S)−λ
α(S)
]∑
j={B,K}Qj(S)aj . That
is, bankers’ debt cannot exceed a time varying fraction of the market value of their total assets.
15
canonical neoclassical models, but also of bank leverage. Indeed, as stated in equa-
tion (1.7), financial leverage is proportional to α(S) when µ(S) > 0. Adrian et al.
(2013) provides empirical evidence in support of leverage-based pricing kernels for
the U.S. economy and He and Krishnamurthy (2012b) discuss their asset pricing
implications in endowment economies. If the leverage constraint never binds, i.e.
µ(S) = 0 ∀ S, equation (1.8) collapses to the neoclassical benchmark.17
Result 1 also implies that banks heterogeneity in their net worth and asset hold-
ings does not affect aggregate dynamics. Indeed, equation (1.8) suggests that
assets returns depend on the dynamics of the multiplier µ(S) which, in turn, is
a function of financial leverage (see equation (1.6)). Since this latter is identi-
cal across bankers when the constraint binds, µ(S) is independent on the cross-
sectional distribution of bank net-worth: agents in the economy do not need to
know this distribution when forecasting future prices, this making the numerical
analysis of the model tractable. For future reference, it is convenient to derive an
expression for the law of motion of aggregate net worth
N ′(S′,S) = ψ
 ∑
j={B,K}
[Rj(S
′,S)−R(S)]Qj(S)Aj +R(S)N
+ ω ∑
j={B,K}
Qj(S
′)Aj . (1.10)
Aggregate net worth equals the sum of the net worth accumulated by bankers
who did not switch occupations today and the transfers that households make to
newly born bankers. These transfers are assumed to be a fraction ω of the assets
intermediated in the previous period, evaluated at current prices. In the empirical
analysis, ω has the purpose of pinning down the level of financial leverage in a
deterministic balanced growth path of the economy, and it will be a small number.
17Using equation (1.2), we can see that a solution to equation (1.5) is α(S) = 1 ∀ S whenever
µ(S) = 0 ∀ S.
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Capital Good Producers
The capital good producers build new capital goods using the technology Φ
(
i
K
)
K,
where K is the aggregate capital stock in the economy and i the inputs used in
production. They buy inputs in the final good market, and sell capital goods to
final good firms at competitive prices. Taking the price of new capital Qi(S) as
given, the decision problem of a capital good producer is
max
i≥0
[
Qi(S)Φ
(
i
K
)
K − i
]
.
Anticipating the capital goods market clearing condition, the price for new cap-
ital goods is
Qi(S) =
1
Φ′
(
I(S)
K
) , (1.11)
where I(S) is equilibrium aggregate investment.
For the empirical analysis, I specify the production function for capital goods as
Φ(x) = a1x
1−ξ + a2, where ξ parametrizes the elasticity of Tobin’s q with respect
to the investment-capital ratio.
Final Good Producers
Final output y is produced by perfectly competitive firms that operate a constant
returns to scale technology
y = kα(ezl)1−α, (1.12)
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where k is the stock of capital goods, l stands for labor services, and z is a neutral
technology shock that follows an AR(1) process in growth
∆z′ = γ(1− ρz) + ρz∆z + σzε′z, ε′z ∼ N (0, 1). (1.13)
Labor is rented in competitive factor markets at the rate W (S). Capital goods
depreciate every period at the rate δ. Anticipating the labor market clearing
condition, profit maximization implies that equilibrium wages and profits per unit
of capital are
W (S) = (1− α)Y (S)
L(S)
, Z(S) = α
Y (S)
K
, (1.14)
where Y (S) and L(S) are equilibrium aggregate output and labor.
To purchase new capital goods, firms need external financing. At the beginning
of the period, firms issue claims to bankers in exchange for funds. While these
claims are perfectly state contingent and therefore correspond to equity holdings,
I interpret them more broadly as privately issued paper such as bank loans. For
each claim aK bankers pay QK(S) to firms.
18 In exchange, they receive the realized
return on a unit of the capital stock in the next period:
RK(S
′,S) =
(1− δ)QK(S′) + Z(S′)
QK(S)
. (1.15)
Realized returns to capital move over time because of two factors: variation
in firms’ profits and variation in the market value of corporate securities. These
movements inRK(S
′,S) induce variation in aggregate net worth, as equation (1.10)
suggests.
18No arbitrage implies that the price of a unit of new capital equals in equilibrium the price
of an IOU issued by firms, Qi(S) = QK(S).
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The Government
In every period, the government engages in public spending. Public spending as
a fraction of GDP evolves as follows
log(g)′ = (1− ρg) log(g∗) + ρg log(g) + σgε′g, ε′g ∼ N (0, 1). (1.16)
The government finances public spending by levying lump sum taxes on house-
holds and by issuing long-term government bonds to financial intermediaries. Long
term debt is introduced as in Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2013). In every period
a fraction pi of bonds matures. When this event happens, the government pays
back the principal to investors. The remaining fraction (1− pi) does not mature:
the government pays the coupon ι, and investors retain the right to obtain the
principal in the future. The average duration of bonds is therefore 1
pi
periods. I
introduce risk of sovereign default by assuming that the government can default in
every period and write off a fraction D ∈ [0, 1] of its outstanding debt. The param-
eter D can be seen as the “haircut” that the government imposes on bondholders
in a default. Denoting by QB(S) the pricing function for government securities,
tomorrow’s realized returns on a dollar invested in government bonds are
RB(S
′,S) = [1− d′D]
[
pi + (1− pi) [ι+QB(S′)]
QB(S)
]
, (1.17)
where d′ is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the government defaults next period.
Realized returns on government bonds vary over time and they affect the balance
sheet of financial intermediaries. First, when the government defaults, it imposes
a haircut on bondholders which has a direct negative effect on the net worth of
bankers. Second, and to the extent that pi < 1, RB(S
′,S) is sensitive to variation
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in the price of government securities: a decline in QB(S
′), for example, lowers the
reselling value of government bonds and reduces the returns on holding government
debt.
Denoting by B′ the stock of public debt, the budget constraint of the government
is given by
QB(S)
B′ − (1− pi)B[1− dD]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Newly issued bonds
 = [pi + (1− pi)ι]B[1− dD]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Payments of principals and coupons
+ gY (S)− τ(S)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Primary Deficit
. (1.18)
Taxes respond to past debt according to the law of motion
τ(S)
Y (S)
= t∗ + γτ
B
Y (S)
,
where γτ > 0.
19 Finally, I assume that sovereign risk evolves exogenously. In every
period the government is hit by a shock εd with a standard logistic distribution.
The government defaults on its outstanding debt if εd is sufficiently large. In
particular, d′ follows
d′ =
1 if ε
′
d − s ≥ 0
0 otherwise,
(1.19)
with s being a Gaussian AR(1) process
s′ = (1− ρs) log(s∗) + ρss+ σsεs. (1.20)
This formulation allows us to study how the endogenous variables respond to
variation in sovereign risk. In fact, the conditional probability of a sovereign de-
19This formulation guarantees that the government does not run a Ponzi scheme and that
its intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied in every state of nature. See Bohn (1995) and
Canzoneri et al. (2001).
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fault is pd(S) = e
s
1+es
: an increase in s is equivalent to an increase in the conditional
probability that the government defaults tomorrow.
1.2.2 Market Clearing
Letting f(.) be the density of net worth across bankers, we can express the market
clearing conditions as follows20
i) Credit market:
∫
aK(n; S)f(n)dn = K
′(S).
ii) Government bonds market:
∫
aB(n; S)f(n)dn = B
′(S).
iii) Market for households’ savings:
∫
b′(n; S)f(n)dn = b′(S).
iv) Market for final goods: Y (S)(1− g) = C(S) + I(S).
1.2.3 Equilibrium Conditions and Numerical Solution
Since the non-stationary technology process induces a stochastic trend in several
endogenous variables, it is convenient to express the model in terms of detrended
variables. For a given variable x, I define its detrended version as x˜ = x
z
.21 The
state variables of the model are S = [K˜, B˜, P˜ ,∆z, g, s, d]. As I detail below,
the variable P˜ keeps track of aggregate bank net worth. The control variables
{C˜(S), R(S), α(S), QB(S)} solve the residual equations (1.2), (1.5) and (1.8) (the
last one for both assets).
20Note that we have anticipated earlier the market clearing condition for the labor market
and for the capital good market.
21The endogenous state variables of the model are detrended using the level of technology
last period.
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The endogenous state variables [K˜, B˜, P˜ ] evolve as follows
K˜ ′(S) =
{
(1− δ)K˜ + Φ
[
e∆z
(
Y˜ (S)(1− eg)− C˜(S)
K˜
)]
K˜
}
e−∆z, (1.21)
B˜′(S) =
[1− dD]{pi + (1− pi)[ι+QB(S)]}B˜e−∆z + Y˜ (S)
[
g −
(
t∗ + γτ BY˜ (S)
)]
QB(S)
, (1.22)
P˜ ′(S) = R(S)[QK(S)K˜ ′(S) +QB(S)B˜′(S)− N˜(S)]. (1.23)
The state variable P˜ measures the detrended cum interest promised payements of
bankers to households at the beginning of the period, and it is necessary to keep
track of the evolution of aggregate bankers’ net worth. Finally, the exogenous
state variables [∆z, log(g), s] follow, respectively, (1.13), (1.16) and (1.20), while
d follows
d′ =
1 with probability
es
1+es
0 with probability 1− es
1+es
.
(1.24)
I use numerical methods to solve for the model decision rules. The algorithm
for the global numerical solution of the model relies on projection methods (Judd,
1992; Heer and Maussner, 2009). In particular, let x(S) be the function describing
the behavior of control variable x. I approximate x(S) using two sets of coefficients,
{γxd=0, γxd=1}. The law of motion for x is then described by
x(d, S˜) = (1− d)γx0 ′T(S˜) + dγx1 ′T(S˜),
where S˜ = [K˜, B˜, P˜ ,∆z, g, s] is the vector of state variables that excludes d, and
T(.) is a vector collecting Chebyshev’s polynomials. The coefficients {γxd=0, γxd=1}x
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are such that the residual equations are satisfied for a set of collocation points
(di, S˜i) ∈ {0, 1}× S˜. I choose S˜ and the set of polynomial T(.) using the Smolyak
collocation approach. Krueger and Kubler (2003) and Krueger et al. (2010) pro-
vides a detailed description of the methodology. When evaluating the residual
equations at the collocation points, I evaluate expectations by “precomputing in-
tegrals” as in Judd et al. (2011). Finally, I adopt Newton’s method to find the
coefficients {γxd=0, γxd=1}x satisfying the residual equations. Appendix A.2 provides
a detailed description of the algorithm and discusses the accuracy of the numerical
solution.
1.3 Two Simple Examples Illustrating the Mech-
anisms
Before moving on to the empirical analysis it is useful to describe the mechanisms
that ties sovereign risk to the funding costs of firms and real economic activity. An
increase in the probability of a future sovereign default lowers capital accumulation
via two distinct channels. i) it tightens the leverage constraints of bankers, and
ii) it increases the required premia for holding firms’ claims.
I illustrate these propagation mechanisms using two stylized versions of the
model. We will see that a decline in current net worth tightens bankers’ lever-
age constraints (Section 1.3.1) and that bad news about future net worth leads
to an increase in risk premia over firms’ assets (Section 1.3.2). I then discuss
how sovereign risk interacts with these two mechanisms in the model described in
the previous section. Finally, Section 1.3.3 explains why disentangling these two
mechainisms provides important information for evaluating the effects of credit
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policies in the model.
1.3.1 A Decline in Current Net Worth
I consider a deterministic economy with full depreciation (δ = 0), no capital ad-
justment costs (ξ = 0) and no government. Moreover, I assume that the transfers
to newly born bankers equal a fraction ω of current output, N = ωY and that
bankers live only one period (ψ = 0).
As in the neoclassical model with full depreciation and log utility, the saving
rate is constant in this economy. Specializing equation (1.6) to this particular
parametrization, we obtain an expression for the multiplier on incentives con-
straints
µ =
λσ − ω
λσ
,
where σ is the saving rate. Using equation (1.8), we can solve for σ
σ = min
{
αβ + ω
1 + λ
, αβ
}
.
I assume that the leverage constraints are currently binding (λβα > ω), and I
analyze the implications of an unexpected transitory decline in the transfers to
bankers. More specifically, I assume that at time t = 1 the transfer to bankers
ω declines, then goes back to its previous level at t = 2, and no further changes
occur at future dates. Agents do not expect such a change, but are perfectly
informed about the path of the transfer from period t = 1 ownward and they make
rational choices based on this path. While analytical solutions for this example
can be easily derived, I illustrate the transition to steady state using a numerical
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example.22
Figure 1.1: A Decline in Current Net Worth
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Notes: The figure reports the transitional dynamics induced by a transitory and unexpected 5%
decline in net worth. The parametrization adopted is [α = 0.33, ν =∞, β = 0.995, λ = 0.44, ω =
0.10]. The right panels report variables expressed as percentage deviations from their steady
state.
The top left panel of Figure 1.1 plots the equilibrium in the credit market prior
to the decline in ω. The supply of funds is derived from the bankers’ optimization
problem: if the leverage constraints were not binding, bankers would be willing to
lend at the risk free rate R since this economy is non-stochastic. The supply of
funds to firms is inelastic at K ′ = α
λ
N , the point at which the leverage constraint
binds. The demand for credit is downward sloping and equal to the expected
marginal product of capital, αK ′α−1E[L′α]. Since the leverage constraint binds,
expected returns to capital equal R(1 + λµ).
The unanticipated decline in ω tightens the leverage constraint (α
λ
N∗ < α
λ
N),
and the inelastic part of the supply schedule shifts leftward. The right panels of the
figure describe adjustments for quantities and prices. The tightening of credit has
adverse effects on capital accumulation. Consumption increases because agency
22The qualitative behavior of this transition is robust across a wide range of parameter values.
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costs makes savings in banks less attractive. The risk free rate declines in order
to accommodate this rise in consumption. Aggregate hours falls because the low
returns to savings make working unattractive. The decline in hours leads to a
drop in output.
There are three important things to note about this example. First, consumption
and output move in opposite directions conditional on a tightening of the leverage
constraint of banks. This “comovement problem” arises frequently in neoclassical
settings, see Barro and King (1984) for a general formulation and Hall (2011) and
Bigio (2012) for specific analysis in models with financial frictions.23 One way to
restore comovement would be to allow the demand for labor to be directly affected
by the tightenss of bank leverage constraint. This could be done, for example, by
introducing working capital constraint as in Mendoza (2010) and using preferences
that mute the wealth effect on labor. While this extention is straightforward to
pursue in the current set up, I focus on a benchmark real model for comparability
with previous research. Second, variation in bank net worth is amplified in the
full model because of endogenous response in Tobin’s q. This occurs if there are
frictions in the production of capital goods, ξ > 0. Brunnermeier et al. (2013)
provide a detailed discussion of these amplification effects in models with finan-
cial frictions. Third, the tightening of the leverage constraint induces negative
comovement between bankers’ marginal value of wealth α = 1
1−µ , and realized re-
turn on holding capital. When the constraint tightens, the former increases while
the latter declines. This is intuitive: an additional unit of wealth for bankers is
more valuable when the constraints are tight because it allows them to arbitrage
away part of the difference between E[R′K ] and R. Moreover, the decline in credit
23See also Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009), ? and ? for a discussion of related comovement
problems in different environments.
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to firms leads to a reduction in output per unit of capital, which translates into
lower firms’ profits. As we will see in the subsequent analysis, this negative co-
movement between RK and α is the key mechanism that generates endogenous
risk in the model.
An increase in the probability of a future sovereign default in the model of
Section 3.3 triggers a decline in bank net worth and this may induce their leverage
constraints to bind. An increase in s, in fact, leads to a decline in the market value
of government bonds because investors anticipate a future haircut. Thus, current
realized returns on government bond holdings decline. From equation (1.17) we
can see that this effect is stronger the longer the maturity of bonds.24 Low realized
returns on bonds have a negative impact on bank net worth as we can see from
equation (1.10). The parameters governing the exposure of banks to government
bonds determine the quantitative importance of the elasticity of net worth to RB.
Thus, an increase in s can activate the process of Figure 1.1 through its adverse
effects on bank net worth. I will refer to this mechanism as the leverage-constraint
channel.
1.3.2 Bad News about Future Net Worth
Besides affecting the current net worth of financial intermediaries, sovereign credit
risk acts as a bad news regarding their future wealth. As I will show in this section,
this carries important consequences on the way banks discount risky assets. It is
helpful at this stage to derive an equilibrium relation describing the pricing of
assets in the economy of Section 3.3. From equation (1.8) and (1.5) we find that
24The parameter pi also has an indirect effect on the elasticity of RB to the s-shock: when
the maturity is longer, bond prices are more elastic to the sovereign risk shock.
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expected returns to asset j equal
ES[Rj(S′,S)] = R(S)
[
1 +
λµ(S)
α(S)[1− µ(S)]
]
− R(S)covS[Λˆ(S
′,S), Rj(S′,S)]
α(S)[1− µ(S)] . (1.25)
Equation (1.25) defines the cross-section of assets’ returns. Expected returns to
capital typically carry a risk premium represented by covS[Λˆ(S
′,S), RK(S′,S)]. In
the model, this component is sensitive to news about how tight bank leverage
constraints will be in the future.
This can be illustrated with a simple modification of the previous set-up. I now
allow ψ to be greater than 0.25 Moreover, I assume that there are two regimes in
the economy.
i) “Normal times”: transfers are fixed at their steady state, and bank leverage
constraints are not binding.
ii) “Financial crises”: bankers are hit by the transitory decline in transfers
described in the previous section.
I assume that the economy is currently in the normal time regime, and I denote
by p the probability that in the next period it switches to a financial crisis regime.
Once in a financial crisis, the economy experiences the temporary decline in ω
described in the previous section. I assume that p = 0 at t = 0. In period t = 1,
the economy experiences an unexpected increase in p to 0.1. In period t = 2, p
returns to 0 and no further changes are anticipated. The agents are surprised by
the initial increase in p, but they are aware of its future path from t = 1 onward,
and they make rational choices based on this path. Figure 1.2 describes how the
credit market and equilibrium quantities are affected by this increase in p.
25The decision problem of bankers is static when ψ = 0.
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Figure 1.2: Bad News about Future Net Worth
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Notes: The figure reports the transitional dynamics induced by a transitory and unexpected
increase in p from 0 to 0.10. The parametrization adopted is [α = 0.33, ν = ∞, β = 0.995, λ =
0.44, ω = 0.10, ψ = 0.95]. The bottom right panel reports variables expressed as percentage
deviations from their steady state.
The increase in p shifts the elastic component of the credit supply schedule
upward because of a decline in cov(Λˆ′, R′k). The top right panels of the figure
explain where this change in the covariance originates. The first panel plots the
joint distribution for (Λˆ′, R′k) conditional on being in normal times when p = 0.
This is a point distribution: the pricing kernel equals β while realized returns to
capital are equal to β−1. When p increases to 0.1, banks assign a higher probability
of switching to the financial crises regime. As shown in the previous section,
realized returns to capital are low in this state while bankers’ marginal valuation
of wealth is high. Capital is therefore a “bad” asset to hold during a financial
crisis because it pays little precisely when bankers are most in need of wealth. For
this reason, it commands a risk premium in normal times, and these premia are
typically increasing in p.26
A sovereign default in the model of Section 3.3 resembles the financial crisis
26In this example this is true only when p < 0.5.
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regime discussed here: banks suffer large balance sheet losses because of the haircut
imposed by the government. Claims on firms pay off badly in this state because
of low firm profits and the decline in their market value. These low payouts are
highly discounted by banks because they are already facing large balance sheet
losses, and their marginal valuation of wealth is high. When the likelihood of this
event increases, banks have a precautionary incentive to deleverage because the
economy is approaching a state where firms’ claims are not particularly valuable,
and this deleveraging results in a decline in capital accumulation. I will refer to
this second mechanism through which sovereign credit risk propagates to the real
economy as the risk channel.
1.3.3 Policy Relevance
While these two propagation mechanisms have similar implications for quantities
and prices, they carry substantially different information. This can be seen by
comparing the credit markets in Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2. In Figure 1.1, excess
returns over firms’ claims arise because the constraints on bank leverage prevent
profitable investment opportunities: if banks had an additional unit of wealth,
they would invest it in firms’ claims. In Figure 1.2, instead, excess returns reflect
fair compensation for increased risk: bank leverage constraint are not binding,
and there are no unexploited profitable opportunities.
This distinction has important implications for the evaluation of credit policies
in the model. For example, it is reasonable to expect that an injection of equity
to the banking sector may be more effective in stimulating banks’ lending when
these latter are facing tight constraints on their leverage, while their aggregate
implications may be muted when risk premia are high. We will see in Section
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1.5 that this intuition holds in the model. First though, I move to the empirical
analysis.
1.4 Empirical Analysis
The model is estimated using Italian quarterly data (1999:Q1-2011Q4). This sec-
tion proceeds in three steps. Section 1.4.1 describes the data used in estimation
and discusses how they help identifying the mechanisms of interest. Section 1.4.2
illustrates the estimation strategy. I place a prior on parameters and conduct
Bayesian inference. Because of the high computational costs involved in solving
the model repeatedly, I adopt a two-step procedure. In the first step, I estimate a
version of the model without sovereign default risk on the 1999:Q1-2009:Q4 sub-
sample. In the second step, I estimate the parameters for the {st} shock using
a time series for sovereign default probabilities for the Italian economy. Section
1.4.3 presents an assessment of model fit based on posterior predictive checks for
a set of sample moments computed from the data.
1.4.1 Data
As discussed in the previous section, the transmission of sovereign risk to the real
economy is the result of two key mechanisms. Their strength in the model is
governed by three “parameters”: i) the elasticity of government bond returns to
sovereign risk; ii) the elasticity of bank net worth to variation in realized returns
on government bonds; iii) the macroeconomic implications of tighter leverage con-
straints for banks. The selection of the data aims to making the model consistent
with three sets of facts that can empirically inform these aspects of the model.
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First, I ensure that the time-varying nature of sovereign risk in the model is re-
alistic. Indeed, the behavior of government bonds’ prices in response to sovereign
risk is partly determined by how persistent agents perceive these changes to be.
For this purpose, I use credit default swaps (CDS) spreads on Italian government
securities with a five-year maturity. This time series is available at daily frequen-
cies starting in January 2003 from Markit. See Appendix A.3.1 for further details.
Second, I measure the exposure of banks to this risk. I collect data on the
exposure of the five largest Italian banks to domestic government debt obtained
from the 2011 European Banking Authority stress test.27 As detailed in Appendix
A.3.2, these data include holdings of domestic government securities, loans to
central government and local authorities and other provisions, and these items
are classified in terms of their maturity. I match this information with the end of
2010 consolidated balance sheet data obtained from Bankscope. This allows me
to measure the size of the exposure of these five banks to the Italian government
in terms of their total assets.28
Third, I measure the cyclical behavior of the leverage constraint. The agency
frictions studied in this paper are fairly abstract at this level of aggregation and
they have poorly measured empirical counterparts. For this reason, I use the
model’s restrictions to relate the tightness of banks’ leverage constraint to a set
of observable variables. Result 2 in Appendix A.3.3 shows that the Lagrange
multiplier on the leverage constraint of banks can be expressed as a function of
financial leverage (levt) and of the spread between a risk free security (R
f
t ) that is
27The five banks are: Unicredit, Intesa-San Paolo, MPS, BPI and UBI. Their total assets at
the end of 2010 accounted for 82% of the total assets of domestic banking groups in Italy.
28These data do not correct for the possibility that banks insured part of this debt via CDS.
Acharya and Steffen (2013) impute the exposure of major banks to distressed sovereigns in the
euro-area, finding that insurance via CDS is likely to be small.
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traded only by bankers and the risk free rate (Rt)
µt =
[
Rft−Rt
Rt
]
levt
1 +
[
Rft−Rt
Rt
]
levt
. (1.26)
I use equation (1.26) to generate a time series for the multiplier µt. I measure
Rft with the prime rate on interbank loans (EURIBOR). This is the natural rate
to consider because we can interpret the model from Section 3.3 as having a
frictionless interbank market of the type considered in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010).
The risk free rate Rt is matched with the yields on German government securities.
The leverage of financial intermediaries is measured using the Italian flow of funds.
Appendix A.3.3 describes in detail the steps involved in measuring µt. Figure 1.3
reports this time series along with GDP growth. Two main facts stand out from
a visual inspection of the figure. First, the Lagrange multiplier is countercyclical,
rising substantially in periods in which GDP growth is markedly below average.
Second, it is very close to 0 until 2007:Q2. Thus, the constraints seem to bind
only occasionally in our sample.
While these three sets of facts are important to identify the effects of inter-
est, they are not informative for all model parameters. Thus, I complement this
information with time series for the labor income share, the investment-output
ratio, the government spending-output ratio and hours worked. Appendix A.3.4
provides detailed definitions and data sources.
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Figure 1.3: Lagrange Multiplier on Leverage Constraint and GDP
Growth: 1999:Q1-2012:Q4
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Notes: The Lagrange multiplier on banks’ leverage constraint is the solid line (left axis). The
circled line is GDP growth (right axis). Appendix A.3 provides detailed information on data
sources.
1.4.2 Estimation Strategy
I denote by θ ∈ Θ the vector of model parameters. It is convenient to organize
the discussion around the following partition, θ = [θ1, θ2]
θ1 =
[
µbg , ψ, ξ, σz , ρz , γ, pi, g
∗, ρg , σg , γt, ν, α,
ibg
ybg
, lbg , levbg , Rbg , expbg , qbgb , adj
bg
]
, θ2 = [D, s
∗, ρs, σs].
Conceptually, we can think of θ1 as indexing a restricted version of the model
without sovereign risk, while θ2 collects the parameters determining the sovereign
default process. I have reparametrized [λ, ω, δ, χ, ι, τ ∗, a1, a2] with balanced growth
values for, respectively, the Lagrange multiplier on leverage constraints (µbg), the
leverage ratio (levbg), the investment-output ratio
(
ibg
ybg
)
, worked hours (lbg), the
price of government securities (qbgb ), the ratio of government securities held by
bankers to their total assets (expbg) and the size of capital adjustment costs (adjbg).
While a nonlinear analysis of the model is necessary to capture time variation
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in risk premia and the fact that leverage constraints bind only occasionally, it
complicates inference substantially since repeated numerical solutions of the model
are computationally costly. I therefore estimate θ using a two-step procedure. In
the first step, I infer θ1 by estimating the model without sovereign risk on the
1999:Q1-2009:Q4 subsample using Bayesian methods. This restricted version of
the model has fewer state variables and is easier to analyze numerically. Moreover,
focusing on this restricted model should not substantially alter the inference over
θ1 because i) the 1999:Q1-2009:Q4 period was characterized by low sovereign risk
for the Italian economy; and ii) the decision rules of the restricted model closely
approximate those of the full model in this area of the state space. In the second
step, I estimate θ2 using a retrieved time series of sovereign default probabilities.
Estimating the Model without Sovereign Risk
The model without sovereign risk has five state variables St = [Kˆt, Pˆt, Bˆt,∆zt, gt].
The parameters are
θ1 =
µbg, ψ, ξ, σz, ρz, γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
θ˜1
, pi, g∗, ρg, σg, γt, ν, α,
ibg
ybg
, lbg, levbg, Rbg, expbg, qbgb , adj
bg︸ ︷︷ ︸
θ∗1
 .
I construct the likelihood function of the model using time series for GDP growth
and the Lagrange multiplier on banks’ leverage constraint described earlier. As ex-
plained in the earlier section, the cyclical behavior of the model’s financial friction
is key to assess the impact of sovereign risk on the real economy: a likelihood-
based approach guarantees a high degree of consistency between the model implied
behavior for these variables and their data counterparts.
This choice has limitations. First, I am discarding potentially important infor-
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mation as one could incorporate the components of the multiplier into the likeli-
hood function: the risk free rate, the interbank rate and the leverage of banks. I
verified though that the model is too restrictive to track the time series behavior
of financial leverage in the earlier part of the sample, because structural shocks
do not generate enough variation in asset prices when leverage constraints are
far from binding.29 Second, certain model parameters are only weakly affected
by the information in the likelihood and their identification is problematic. For
this reason, and prior to conduct full information inference, I determine a subset
of θ1, θ
∗
1, prior to the estimation using external information. Table 1.1 reports
the numerical values for these parameters. I set [ i
bg
ybg
, levbg, lbg, Rbg] to the sample
average of their empirical counterparts while α is determined using the sample
average of the labor income share. I use the information in Table A.1 in Appendix
A.3.2 to determine [expbg, pi]: holdings of government securities account for 8%
of banks’ total assets in the model, and the average maturity of those bonds is
set to 23 months. I select [g∗, ρg, σg] from the estimation of an AR(1) on the
spending-output ratio over the 1999:Q1-2011:Q4 period. The remaining parame-
ters in θ∗ are determined through normalizations or previous research. I set the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply to 2 and γτ to 0.5. The former is in the high range
of the estimates obtained using U.S. data (Rios-Rull et al., 2012a), but it is not an
uncommon value in the profession for the analysis of Real Business Cycle models.
Since taxes are non-distortionary in the model, γτ has little implications for the
model’s endogenous variables other than debt. I set adjustment costs to zero in a
balanced growth path while I normalize qbgb to 1 (bonds trade at par in a balanced
growth path).
29This aspect is related to one shortcoming of pure neoclassical models, namely their inability
to generate volatility in asset prices. See for example Bocola and Gornemann (2013) for a
discussion.
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Table 1.1: Parameters Determined with External Information
Parameters Source
ibg
ybg
levbg lbg Rbg α OECD, EU-KLEMS,
0.25 4.34 0.30 1.0034 0.30 ECB, BoI
expbg pi EBA,
0.079 0.044 Bankscope
eg
∗
ρg σg OECD
0.22 0.92 0.010
qbgb adj
bg ν γτ Normalizations,
1 0 2 0.5 Previous Research
Notes: See Appendix A.3 for information on data sources.
I next turn to the estimation of θ˜1 = [µ
bg, ψ, ξ, γ, ρz, σz]. Let Yt = [GDP Growtht, µt]′,
and let Yt = [Y1, . . . ,Yt]
′. The model defines the nonlinear state space system
Yt = fθ˜1(St) + ηt ηt ∼ N (0,Σ)
St = gθ˜1(St−1, εt) εt ∼ N (0, I),
where ηt is a vector of measurement errors and εt are the structural shocks.
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Measurement errors, absent from the structural model, are included to help the
evaluation of the likelihood function. I approximate the likelihood function of this
nonlinear state space model using sequential importance sampling (Ferna´ndez-
Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı´rez, 2007a).31 The posterior distribution of model pa-
rameters is
p(θ˜1|YT ) = L(θ˜1|Y
T )p(θ˜1)
p(YT )
,
30The functions gθ˜1(.) and fθ˜1(.) are approximated following the steps described in Appendix
A.2 for a version of the model that does not feature sovereign credit risk. Since θ∗1 is fixed, I
omit from the notation the dependence of decision rules on these parameters.
31I use the auxiliary particle filter of Pitt and Shephard (1999) which, in this application,
substantially improves the efficiency of the likelihood evaluation. See Aruoba and Schorfheide
(2013a) for a recent application to economics. I consider a diagonal matrix Σ where the nonzero
elements are equal to 25% of the sample variance of {Yt}. Appendix A.4 provides a description
of the evaluation of the model’s likelihood function.
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where p(θ˜1) is the prior, L(θ˜1|YT ) the likelihood function and p(YT ) the marginal
data density. I characterize the posterior density of θ˜1 using the Random Walk
Metropolis Hastings for DSGE models developed in Schorfheide (2000a) with an
adaptive variance-covariance matrix for the proposal density. Appendix A.4 pro-
vides a description of the estimation algorithm. Table 1.2 reports the prior along
with posterior statistics for θ˜1.
Table 1.2: Prior and Posterior Distribution of θ˜1
Parameter Prior Para 1 Para 2 Posterior Mean 90% Credible Set
µbg × 100 Uniform 0 ∞ 0.18 [0.13,0.21]
ψ Uniform 0 1 0.97 [0.95,0.98]
ξ Beta 0.5 0.25 0.42 [0.35,0.50]
γ × 400 Normal 1.25 0.5 0.36 [0.06,0.75]
ρz Beta 0.3 0.25 0.08 [0.04,0.14]
σz × 100 Inverse Gamma 0.75 2 0.94 [0.84,1.06]
Notes: Para 1 and Para 2 list the mean and standard deviation for Beta and Normal distribution; and s and
ν for the Inverse Gamma distribution, where pIG(σ|ν, s) ∝ σ−ν−1e−νs2/2σ2 . The prior on γ is truncated at
0. Posterior statistics are computed using 10000 draws from the posterior distribution of model’s parameters.
The table reports equal tail probability 90% credible sets.
The prior on the TFP process is centered using presample evidence while I center
ξ to 0.5, a conventional value in the literature. Priors on these three parameters
are fairly diffuse. I choose uniform priors over µbg and ψ, implying that the shape
of the posterior is determined by the shape of the likelihood. Regarding posterior
estimates, the multiplier is estimated to be close to 0 in a deterministic balanced
growth path while ψ is close to unity. This suggests that agency costs are fairly
small on average in the model. This is not surprising given the time series behavior
of µt in Figure 1.3.
32 Capital adjustment costs and the TFP process are in the
range of what is typically obtained in the literature when using U.S. data.
32One way of assessing the size of financial friction in the model is to ask how large the
distortion is that they generate on returns to capital. The posterior mean of µbg tells us that
this distortion is approximately equal to 18 basis points in a balanced growth path of the model.
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Estimating Sovereign Risk
I next turn to the estimation of θ2 = [D, s
∗, ρs, σs]. The empirical strategy consists
of i) constructing a time series for the probabilities of a sovereign default and ii)
using this time series to estimate θ2.
I accomplish the first task by exploiting the model’s pricing equation. In fact,
using equation (1.8) and equation (1.5), we can define the the risk neutral measure
as:33
pˆ(S′|S) = R
f (S)p(S′|S)Λˆ(S′,S)
α(S)[1− µ(S)] + λµ(S) .
After integrating the above expression over states S′ associated with a sovereign
default next period, I obtain an expression for the actual probability of a sovereign
default, pdt . This time series is related to its risk neutral counterpart, pˆ
d
t , as follows
pdt = pˆ
d
t
αt(1− µt) + λµt
Rft Et[Λˆt+1|dt+1 = 1]
. (1.27)
Because of bankers’ risk aversion, there is a wedge between these two probabilities,
represented by the risk correction αt(1−µt)+λµt
Rft Et[Λˆt+1|dt+1=1]
. Equation (1.27) is important
because it allows us to measure actual probabilities of sovereign default using
empirical counterparts to risk neutral probabilities and the risk correction.
First, I obtain a time series for {pˆdt } using CDS spread on Italian government
securities, up to a normalization of the haircut parameter D. I fix D to 0.45,
consistent with the historical experience on recent sovereign defaults in emerging
economies (Cruces and Trebesh, 2013).34 While Pan and Singleton (2008) show
33Note that pˆ(S′|S) is nonnegative and it integrates to 1. To see the last property, note that
the return on a risk free security traded by bankers can be written as Rf (S) = α(S)[1−µ(S)]+λµ(S)ES[Λˆ(S′,S)]
using equation (1.8) and equation (1.5).
34Zettelmeyer et al. (2013) document a larger haircut (on average between 59% and 65%)
in the Greek debt restructuring event of 2012. A value of D equal to 0.45 is conservative, and
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that D could be estimated using information from the term structure of sovereign
CDS spreads, their Monte Carlo analysis suggests that this parameter is typically
poorly identified in small samples.
Second, I construct a time series for Et[Λˆt+1|dt+1 = 1], the conditional expecta-
tion of the pricing kernel in the event of a sovereign default. This is a difficult task
because of the absence of a sovereign default in the sample. I indirectly use the
model’s restrictions to conduct this extrapolation. In particular, I approximate
the object of interest as follows
Et[Λˆt+1|dt+1 = 1] ≈ Et[Λˆt+1] + κVart[Λˆt+1] 12 , (1.28)
where κ > 0 is a hyperparameter. The idea underlying equation (D.10) is that
the pricing kernel in the model is above its unconditional average in the event of
a sovereign default because of banks’ implicit risk aversion: κ parametrizes the
number of standard deviations by which Et[Λˆt+1|dt+1 = 1] is above Et[Λˆt+1].
The terms {Et[Λˆt+1],Vart[Λˆt+1] 12} are generated using an empirical counterpart
to the model’s pricing kernel defined in equation (1.9). The pricing kernel, in turn,
is a function of observables and model parameters estimated in the first step
Λˆt = βe
−∆ log(ct)[(1− ψ) + ψλlevt], (1.29)
where ∆ct is consumption growth and levt is financial leverage. I use equation
(1.29), the posterior mean for [β, ψ, λ] and a time series for the conditional forecasts
of [∆ct+1, levt+1] generated by a first order Bayesian Vector Autoregressive model
to construct {Et[Λˆt+1],Vart[Λˆt+1] 12}. I then select the hyperparameter κ with the
corrects for potential transfers that the government may give to its domestic bondholders.
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help of the structural model. I consider a set of values κi ∈ {1, 3, 5} and select the
value that minimizes, in model simulated data, average root mean square errors
for the approximation of Et[Λˆt+1|dt+1 = 1]. This gives a value of κ = 3.
Third, I combine the retrieved time series for {Et[Λˆt+1|dt+1 = 1]} with obser-
vations on banks’ financial leverage, the multiplier and the prime interbank rate
to generate the risk correction αt(1−µt)+λµt
Rft Et[Λˆt+1|dt+1=1]
. I make use of the fact that the
marginal value of wealth for bankers is proportional to financial leverage when the
constraint binds, and measure the risk correction as follows:
λlevt(1− µt) + λµt
Rft {Et[Λˆt+1] + κVart[Λˆt+1] 12}
. (1.30)
Figure 1.4: Sovereign Default Probabilities
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Notes: The top left panel reports risk neutral probabilities of a sovereign default. The bottom
right panel reports the risk correction, defined in equation (1.30). The right panel reports actual
probabilities of a sovereign default, defined in equation (1.27).
Figure 1.4 plots {pdt } along with its decomposition of equation (1.27) for the
different values of κ. The top left panel reports the risk neutral probabilities, the
bottom-left panel plots the risk correction and the right panel reports the time
series for actual sovereign default probabilities. The estimates imply that roughly
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30% of actual sovereign default probabilities in the sample is due to risk premia,
consistent with the empirical evidence reported in Longstaff et al. (2011) for a
group of developing countries.
I then use {pdt } to estimate the parameters of the sovereign risk shock st. Indeed,
the two are related in the model as follows
log
(
pdt
1− pdt
)
= st, st = (1− ρs)s∗ + ρsst−1 + σsεs,t, (1.31)
where εs,t is a standard normal random variable. I use the Kalman filter to evaluate
the likelihood function of this linear state space model. Table 1.3 reports prior
and posterior statistics for [s∗, ρs, σs]. As I do not have presample information,
I consider fairly uninformative priors. Posterior statistics are computed from a
canonical Random Walk Metropolis Hastings algorithm.
Table 1.3: Prior and Posterior Distribution of [s∗, ρs, σs]
Parameter Prior Para 1 Para 2 Posterior Mean 90% Credible Set
s∗ Normal -7 5 -6.17 [-8.88,-3.35]
ρs Beta 0.5 0.3 0.95 [0.87,0.98]
σs Inverse Gamma 0.75 4 0.55 [0.44,0.70]
Notes: Para 1 and Para 2 liststhe mean and standard deviation for Beta and Normal distribution; and s
and ν for the Inverse Gamma distribution, where pIG(σ|ν, s) ∝ σ−ν−1e−νs2/2σ2 . Posterior statistics are
computed using 10000 draws from the posterior distribution of model’s parameters. The table reports equal
tail probability 90% credible sets.
1.4.3 Model Fit
In order to determine if the estimated model fits the time series described in the
previous section, I verify whether model simulated trajectories for the multiplier,
GDP growth and sovereign default probabilities resemble those observed in the
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data. This is accomplished through posterior predictive checks.35 I generate model
implied densities for sample statistics and check how they compare with the same
statistics computed from actual data.
First, I examine the performance of the model regarding GDP growth and the
multiplier. I summarize their joint behavior using the following sample statistics:
mean, standard deviation, first order autocorrelation, skewness, kurtosis and their
correlation. These are collected in S. The model implied densities for S are
generated using the following algorithm
Posterior Predictive Densities: Let θi denote the i’th draw from the poste-
rior density of the model’s parameter. For i = 1 to M
i) Conditional on θi simulate a realization for GDP growth and the multiplier
of length T=100.36 Let {Yit} denote this realization.
ii) Based on the simulated trajectories {Yit}, compute a set of sample statistics
S i. 
Given the draws {S i}, I use percentiles to describe the predictive density p(S(.)|YT ).
Figure 1.5 shows the 5th and 95th percentile of the model implied density (the box)
along with its median (the bar) and their sample counterpart (the dot).
The model generates trajectories for the multiplier and GDP growth whose mo-
ments are in line with those observed in the data. The main discrepancy with the
data is in the excess kurtosis for the GDP growth trajectory: the model is too
restrictive to replicate this feature of the data. In addition, the model captures
35See Geweke (2005a) for a general discussion of predictive checks in Bayesian analysis and
Aruoba et al. (2013) for a recent application to the evaluation of estimated nonlinear Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium models.
36These simulations are generated from the restricted model (no sovereign risk). Simulations
are initialized at the ergodic mean of the state vector.
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Figure 1.5: Posterior Predictive Checks: Multiplier and GDP Growth
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Notes: Dots correspond to the value of the statistic computed from actual data. Solid horizontal
lines indicate medians of posterior predictive distribution for the sample statistic and, the boxes
indicate the equal tail 90% credible set associated with the posterior predictive distribution.
part of the left skewness of GDP growth. This derives from two properties: the
amplification of the leverage constraint and the fact that it binds in recessions.
In fact, GDP growth is more sensitive to structural shocks when the leverage
constraint binds. Since these constraints are only occasionally binding, this am-
plification generates asymmetry in the unconditional distribution for GDP growth.
Left skewness is then the result of GDP growth and the multiplier being negatively
correlated. Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2013) discuss the asymmetry generated by
occasionally binding credit constraints in a model of housing.
Second, I ask whether the behavior of sovereign default probabilities in the model
is in line with what was observed in the data. The posterior predictive checks are
reported in Table 1.4. We can verify that the specification adopted to model time-
variation in sovereign risk captures key features of the empirical distribution of
sovereign default probabilities.
Overall, the results in this section suggest that: i) the cyclical behavior of the
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Table 1.4: Posterior Predictive Checks: Sovereign Default Probabilities
Statistic Data Posterior Median 90% Credible Set
Median 0.07 0.25 [0.01,6.81]
Mean 0.53 0.53 [0.03,11.7]
Standard Deviation 0.76 0.63 [0.03,13.5]
Autocorrelation 0.91 0.83 [0.69,0.94]
Skewness 2.03 2.04 [0.96,3.78]
Kurtosis 7.37 7.23 [3.04,20.1]
Notes: Based on 1000 draws from the posterior distribution of [s∗, ρs, σs]. For each draw,
I simulate the {st} process for 100 periods. Statistics are computed on each of these 1000
samples. The table reports the posterior median and equal tail probability 90% credible set
for the posterior predictive distributions.
leverage constraint in the estimated model is empirically reasonable; and that ii)
agents in the model have beliefs about the time-varying nature of sovereign credit
risk that closely track what was observed in the data.
1.5 Model Analysis
This section analyzes some properties of the estimated model that are important
for the interpretation of the main experiments of this paper, which will be pre-
sented in Section 1.6. There are three key points that emerge from this analysis:
i) A sovereign default leads to a deep decline in real economic activity. This
occurs because the haircut on government bonds tightens the leverage con-
straints of banks and triggers a decline in aggregate investment (Section
1.5.1).
ii) An increase in the probability of a sovereign default when the economy is
in the non-default state leads to an increase in expected excess returns.
This occurs through two mechanisms. First, sovereign credit risk tightens
45
the leverage constraint of banks (leverage-constraint channel). Second, it
increases the required premia that banks demand for holding firms’ assets
(risk channel). This increase in the financing premia of firms is associated
with a decline in capital accumulation and output (Section 1.5.2).
iii) The aggregate effects of equity injections into the banking sector are highly
state dependent, even if implemented at times of high financial stress.37
These interventions are more successful in stimulating real economic activity
in regions of the state space where leverage constraints are tight. Conversely,
these policies have substantially weaker effects when risk premia on firms’
assets are high (Section 1.5.3).
Since the aim of this section is purely illustrative, the model’s parameters are
fixed at their posterior mean.
1.5.1 A Sovereign Default
Figure 1.6 shows the behavior of key model’s variables around a typical sovereign
default. I apply event study techniques to the simulated time series and report
their average path around the default. The window covers 10 quarters before and
after the event.
At t = 0 the government imposes a haircut on bondholders. As a consequence,
bank net worth declines and the leverage constraint tightens, thus forcing them
to reduce their holdings of firms’ assets. This has adverse effects on aggregate
investment and output: at t = 0, they are respectively 25% and 2.9% below
their trend. From t = 1 onward, bank net worth recovers because excess returns
37Periods of high financial stress will be defined as periods during which expected excess
returns are above a threshold and output growth is below a threshold.
46
Figure 1.6: A Sovereign Default
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Notes: The panels are constructed as follows. Simulate M = 15000 realizations of length T =
300. Each simulation is initialized at the ergodic mean of the state vector. For each realization,
select time series around a sovereign default event. Net worth, output and investment are linearly
detrended. The figure reports medians across the simulations. Returns on government bonds are
expressed as deviations from their t = −10 value in annualized basis points. The other variables
are expressed as percentage deviations from their t = −10 value.
are above average. This loosens the leverage constraint, and the economy slowly
returns to its balanced growth path.
It is important to stress two important facts about a sovereign default in the
model. First, the behavior of asset prices substantially amplifies this event (Kiy-
otaki and Moore, 1997; Mendoza, 2010). The tightening of the leverage constraint
forces banks to restrict lending to firms. The associated decline in capital demand
puts downward pressure on asset prices because of Tobin’s Q and further depresses
the net worth of banks. As we can see from the figure, the market value of firms
is 6% below trend at t = 0, while bank net worth is roughly twice the size of
the haircut imposed by the government. Second, as the bottom-right panel of the
figure shows, the marginal value of wealth for bankers is high during a sovereign
default.
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It is also interesting to note that a sovereign default is preceded by a deep slow-
down in real economic activity, which conforms with historical evidence on these
episodes, see Yeyati and Panizza (2011). This observation is typically rationalized
in the literature via a selection argument: equilibrium models of sovereign de-
faults predict that incentives for the government to renege on debt are high in bad
economic times, see Arellano (2008) and Mendoza and Yue (2012) for example.
In the model analyzed here, the “V” shape behavior of output around a default
event occurs purely because of anticipation effects: increases in the probability
of a future sovereign default are, in fact, recessionary. The next section explains
why.
1.5.2 An Increase in the Probability of a Future Sovereign
Default
From equation (1.25) we obtain a decomposition of expected excess returns to
capital into two pieces: the multiplier component and the covariance component.
Et[RK,t+1 −Rt]
Rt︸ ︷︷ ︸
EERt
=
λµt
αt[1− µt]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Multiplier componentt
− covt[Λˆt+1, RK,t+1]
αt[1− µt]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Covariance componentt
. (1.32)
According to equation (1.32), expected excess returns can be high because of two
distinct sources. First, banks face tight leverage constraints and this restricts the
flow of funds to firms (Multiplier component). Second, banks require a premium
for lending to firm because this intermediation is risky (Covariance component).
Sovereign credit risk influences both of these components.
Figure 1.7 plots Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) to an s-shock when the
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Figure 1.7: IRFs to an s-shock: Expected Excess Returns
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Notes: IRFs are computed via simulations initialized at the ergodic mean of the state vector. QB
and Net Worth are expressed as percentage deviations from their ergodic mean value. Returns
are reported in annualized basis points.
economy is at the ergodic mean. The initial impulse in s is such that the probabil-
ity of a future sovereign default goes from 0.17% to 5%. This represents roughly a
6 standard deviations shock. The figure shows that this shock tightens the lever-
age constraint of banks. The price of government bonds declines by 18%, leading
to a reduction in their realized returns of roughly the same magnitude. The net
worth of banks declines by 15%. Because of this decline in net worth, the leverage
constraints of banks start binding, as the behavior of the multiplier shows. Ex-
pected excess returns increase by 200 basis points in annualized terms on impact,
140 of which are attributable to the multiplier component. Also the covariance
component respond to the s-shock: this risk channel explains 30% of the impact
increase in expected excess returns.
Figure 1.8 explains why firms’ are perceived to be riskier when a sovereign default
approaches. The figure reports the joint probability density function (contour
lines) for the next period pricing kernel and realized returns to capital. The
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Figure 1.8: The s-shock and Risk Premia
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Notes: The left panel reports the joint density of {Λˆt+1, RK,t+1} at the ergodic mean. This
is constructed as follows. Simulate M = 15000 realizations for {Λˆ, RK}. Each simulation is
initialized at the ergodic mean of the state vector and it has length T = 2. The contour lines are
generated from a nonparametric density smoother applied to {Λˆm2 , RmK,2}Mm=1. The right panel
reports the same information, at a different point in the state space. The procedure to construct
the figure is the same as above, but the simulations are initialized as follows: i) s-shock is set so
that pdt = 0.05; ii) the other state variable are set at their ergodic mean.
left panel reports it when the state vector is at its ergodic mean. The right panel
reports the same object with the only exception that the probability of a sovereign
default next period equals 5%. We can see from the left panel of the figure a clear
negative association between realized returns to capital and the pricing kernel,
suggesting that the model generates a non-trivial compensation for risk at the
ergodic mean. As the economy approaches a sovereign default (right panel), these
variables become more negatively associated. This motivates an increase in the
compensation for holding claims on firms in their balance sheet. Intuitively, capital
is a “bad” asset to hold during a sovereign default because the decline in its market
value has adverse effects on bank net worth, and these balance sheet losses are
very costly since banks’ marginal value of wealth is high. This makes the s-shock
a priced risk factor for firms’ claims.
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The rise in expected excess returns after an s-shock is associated with a decline
in capital accumulation. Figure 1.9 reports the response of aggregate investment
and output to the s-shock. The increase in the probability of a sovereign default
leads to a decline in output and aggregate investment of, respectively, 1.5% and
12%. The mechanisms through which this happens are those described in Section
1.3.
Figure 1.9: IRFs to an s-shock: Quantities
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1.5.3 An Injection of Equity into the Banking Sector
The distinction between the two propagation mechanisms studied in this paper
is key for the assesment of credit policies. I illustrate this point by studying the
effects of an equity injection into the banking sector. This type of interventions
has been already studied in the literature, see for example Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010) and He and Krishnamurthy (2012a). I assume that at t = 1 the government
transfers resources from households to banks using lump sum taxes. This policy
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is not anticipated by agents, and no further policy interventions are expected in
the future. The policy has the effect of changing the liability structure of banks,
raising their net worth relative to their debt.
To make the experiment realistic, I implement the policy when the economy is
in a “financial recession”. I define this as a state in which output growth is 1.5
standard deviations below average while expected excess returns are 1.5 standard
deviations above average. Qualitatively, the results do not depend on these cut-
offs. I denote by {S∗i }i a set of states variables that is consistent with this definition
of financial recession.38 For each element of {S∗i }i, I compute the expected path
for selected endogenous variables under the policy and without the intervention.
The policy effects are reported as percentage differences between these two paths.
In order to interpret the results, I define
δi =
−Covariance componenti
EERi
, (1.33)
where the Covariance component and EER are defined in equation (1.32). The
variable δi ∈ [0, 1] gives us an indication of how risky are firms in state S∗i . In
fact, when δi = 0, expected excess returns exclusively reflects agency costs while
δi = 1 means that they reflect fair compensation for risk. Figure 1.10 plots two
sets of results. The solid line reports policy responses conditioning on δi ≤ 0.25,
while the dotted line conditions on δi ≥ 0.75.
The figure shows that equity injections are particularly effective in stimulating
real economic activity when agency costs are large (δ ≤ 0.25). The policy re-
laxes bank leverage constraints and leads to an increase in capital accumulation.
38Operationally, this set is constructed by simulating time series of length T = 20000 from
the model and selecting {S∗i }i so that output growth and expected excess returns satisfy the
threshold restrictions.
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Figure 1.10: An Injection of Equity into the Banking Sector
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Notes: The figure is constructed as follows: i) simulte the model for T = 20000 periods; ii)
select state variables such that output growth is 1.5 standard deviations below average and
expected excess returns 1.5 standard deviations above average; iii) for each of these states as
initial condition, compute the expected path under the equity injection and in absence of the
policy; iv) take the difference between these expected paths. The figure reports the effects of the
policy on outcome variables when conditioning on different values of δ, see equation (1.33). Net
Worth, Output, and Investment are linearly detrended in simulations. Returns are reported in
basis points. The other variables as percentage changes.
This effect is reinforced by general equilibrium forces since the increase in capital
demand pushes up the market value of firms, strenghtening the balance sheet of
banks and relaxing further their leverage constraint.
The same policy has substantially weaker effects in regions of the state space
where firms’ risk is high (δ ≥ 0.75). The red dotted line reports this case. We can
observe that the response of investment and output to the equity injection is 2.5
times smaller with respect to the previous case. Moreover, the general equilibrium
effects are substantially muted.
This state-dependence in the effects of equity injections has an intuitive expla-
nation. Expected excess returns in the model can be high because of two reasons:
tight leverage constraints (low δ-regions) and high risk premia (high δ-regions).
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Leverage constraints prevents banks from undertaking otherwise profitable in-
vestment opportunities. Therefore, policies that relax their constraints stimulate
investment because they facilitate the flow of funds from households to firms. A
large value of δ, instead, indicates that the high excess returns we observe are fair
compensation for risk: aggregate investment respond little to equity injections
since these latter have only indirect effects on this risk.39
1.6 Measurement and Policy Evaluation
I now turn to the two main quantitative experiments of this paper. In Section
1.6.1, I measure the effect of sovereign credit risk on the financing premia of
firms and output, and I assess the contribution of the leverage-constraint channel
and the risk channel. More specifically, I use the estimated model along with the
particle filter to generate trajectories for variables of interest under the assumption
that sovereign default probabilities in Italy were constrant over the sample. I
then study the difference between these counterfactual trajectories and the actual
trajectories in order to assess the impact of sovereign credit risk on the variables
of interest. Section 1.6.2 proposes a quantitative assessment of the Longer Term
Refinancing Operations (LTROs) implemented by the European Central Bank
(ECB) in the first quarter of 2012. As we saw in the earlier section, the effects of
policy interventions are state and size dependent due to the highly nonlinear nature
of the model. Therefore, an integral part of the policy evaluation is to specify the
“initial conditions”. I do so by estimating the state of the Italian economy in
39By strengthening bank net worth, the policy provides a buffer when a sovereign default hits
the economy. This dampens the effects of a sovereign default on realized returns to capital and
lowers risk premia ex-ante. The size of the equity injection is thus an important determinant of
the policy effects.
54
2011:Q4 using the particle filter. The evaluation of LTROs is conducted from an
ex-ante perspective.
1.6.1 Sovereign Risk, Firms’ Borrowing Costs and Output
What were the effects of sovereign credit risk on the financing premia of firms and
on real economic activity in Italy? What was the relative strength of the leverage-
constraint channel and the risk channel in driving this propagation? In order to
answer these questions, I conduct a counterfactual experiment. First, I use the
particle filter to extract the historical sequence of shocks for the Italian economy.
Second, I feed the model with counterfactual trajectories for these shocks: these
are equivalent to the estimated ones, with the exception that the innovations to
st are set to 0 for the entire sample. I then compare the actual and counterfactual
path for a set of the model’s endogenous variables. Their difference reflects the
effects of sovereign risk on the variables of interest. More specifically, I use the
following algorithm
Counterfactual Experiment: Let θi denote the i’th draw from the posterior
distribution of the model’s parameter. For i = 1 to M
i) Conditional on θi, apply to {Yt = [GDP Growtht, µt, pidt ]}2011:Q4t=2003:Q1 the par-
ticle filter and construct the densities {p(St|Yt, θi)}2011:Q4t=2003:Q1.
ii) Sample N realizations of the state vector from {p(St|Yt, θi)}2011:Q4t=2003:Q1.
iii) Feed into the model each of these realizations, n ∈ N , and generate a path
for a set of outcome variables, {xt(i, n)}t.
iv) For each realization n, replace the sovereign risk shock with its unconditional
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mean. Feed the model with this counterfactual realization of the state vector
and collect in {xct(i, n)}t the implied outcome variables of interest.
v) The effect of sovereign credit risk for the outcome variable x is measured as
xefft (i, n) = xt(i, n)− xct(i, n). 
Regarding the specifics of this experiment, I select the parameters’ draws by
subsampling, picking 1 of every 100. Thus, M = 100. In the filtering state, I set
measurement errors to 0.5% of the sample variance of {Yt}t and I use 500,000
particles. This implies that the filtered time series {Yt}t are essentially equivalent
to the actual data. I first analyze the effect of sovereign risk on the financing costs
of firms and on output. I then decompose these effects into the two transmission
mechanisms.
The left panel of Figure 1.11 reports the filtered and counterfactual trajectories
for GDP growth while the top-right panel reports the effects of sovereign risk
on expected excess returns. The rise in sovereign risk in Italy over the 2010:Q1-
2011:Q4 period led to an increase in the financing costs of firms and a decline in
output growth. The model predicts that expected excess returns increased by 50
basis points on average over this period, with a peak of 100 basis points in the
last quarter of 2011. GDP growth would have been on average 0.5422% higher
throughout the 2010-2011 period if sovereign default probabilities were fixed at
their unconditional mean.
The bottom-right panel of the figure reports the covariance component defined in
equation (1.32) as a fraction of expected excess returns. The model shows that the
risk channel played quantitatively a first order role in the propagation of sovereign
credit risk in Italy, and its relevance grew over time: at the end of 2011:Q4, the
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Figure 1.11: Sovereign Risk, Firms’ Borrowing Costs and Output
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Notes: The solid line in the left panel reports the posterior mean for the filtered GDP growth
series, and the dotted line reports the posterior mean of its counterfactual. The solid lines
in the right panels represent the posterior mean. The Dark and light shaded area represents,
respectively, a 60% and 90% equal tail probability credible sets for the variables of interest.
covariance component explains on average 47% of the effects of sovereign risk on
the financing premia of firms. Table 1.5 reports posterior statistics for variables
of interest.
Table 1.5: Sovereign Risk, Firms’ Borrowing Costs and Output: 2010:Q1-
2011:Q4
Statistic Posterior Mean 90% Credible Set
Cumulative Output Losses 4.7576 [2.0890,8.0290]
Average Expected Excess Returns 0.4768 [0.1633,1.0741]
Covariance Component 0.2619 [0.1940,0.5129]
Notes: Cumulative output losses: sum of GDP growth losses (difference between counterfactual and filtered
GDP growth) over the 2010:Q1-2011:Q4 period. Average expected excess returns: average difference be-
tween filtered and counterfactual expected excess return, expressed in annualized basis points. Covariance
component: fraction of expected excess returns explained by the covariance component.
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1.6.2 Longer Term Refinancing Operations
The ECB undertook several interventions in response to the euro-area sovereign
debt crisis. Some of these policies were explicitly targeted toward easing the
tensions in the market for bonds of distressed governments. The Security Markets
Program (SMP) and the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) fall within this
category.40 Other interventions, instead, had the objective of loosening the funding
constraints of banks exposed to distressed government debt. The unconventional
LTROs launched by the ECB in December 2011 and February 2012 were the most
important in this class. Relative to canonical open market operations in Europe,41
these interventions featured a long maturity (36 months), a fixed-interest rate (1%)
and special rules for the collateral that could be used by banks. Moreover, the
two LTROs were the largest refinancing operations in the history of the ECB, as
more than 1 trillion euros were lent to banks through these interventions.
A full assessment of the policy is beyond the scope of this paper. LTROs, in
fact, are not sterilized and the real model considered here misses this aspect.
Moreover, the policy may have resulted in a reduction of sovereign credit risk, and
the analysis in this paper does not capture this effect either. However, we can use
the model to ask whether the provision of liquidity to banks, by itself, stimulated
lending. I model LTROs as a nonstationary version of the discount window lending
considered in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). The government gives banks the option
40In May 2010, the ECB started the SMP. Under the SMP, the ECB could intervene by
buying, on secondary markets, the securities that it normally accepts as collateral. This program
was extensively used for sustaining the price of government securities of southern European
countries. The program was replaced by OMTs in August 2012. This latter program had two
main differences compared with SMP: i) OMTs are ex-ante unlimited; ii) their approval is subject
to a conditionality program from the requiring country.
41Open market operations in the euro-area are conducted through refinancing operations.
These are similar to repurchase agreements: banks put acceptable collateral with the ECB and
receive cash loans. Prior to 2008, there were two major types of refinancing operations: main
refinancing operations (loans of a weekly maturity) and LTROs, with a three month maturity.
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at t = 1 of borrowing resources up to a threshold m. These resources are financed
through lump sum taxes. The loans have a fixed interest rate Rm. Banks repay
the loan (principal plus interest) at a future date T and no interests are payed
between t and T . Finally, the government has perfect monitoring of banks, so
that these liabilities do not count for their leverage constraint.42 Within the logic
of the model, this intervention has the effect of relaxing the leverage constraint
of banks, and it has a positive effect on their net worth. These two points are
explained in Appendix A.5, along with a description of the numerical algorithm
used to implement the policy.
The evaluation of LTROs is conducted using the following algorithm
Evaluating LTROs: Let θi denote the i’th draw from the posterior distribution
of the model’s parameter. For i = 1 to M
i) Conditional on θi, sample from p(S2011:Q4|YT , θi) N realizations of the state
vector.
ii) For each {Sn2011:Q4}n, simulate the model forward J times with and without
the policy intervention.
iii) For each outcome variable x, compute the difference between these two paths
xefft (i, n, j) = x
ltro
t (i, n, j)− xno ltrot (i, n, j). Collect these paths in xefft (i, n, j).

The density p(St=2011:Q4|YT , θi) is computed using the particle filter. The vector
of variables {xefft (i, n, j)}t denotes the effect of the policy on variable x. The results
of this experiment can be interpreted as an ex-ante evaluation of the policy, since
42If that were not the case, the loans would perfectly crowd out households’ deposits by
construction: see Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010).
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I am conditioning on retrospective estimates for the state vector in the 2011:Q4
period. In order to make the experiment more realistic, I calibrate the policy to
the actual ECB intervention. I set Rm = 1.00, T = 12 and m = 0.1Yˆ
ss.
Figure 1.12: Ex-Ante Assessment of LTROs
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Notes: The solid line in the left panel is the conditional mean forecasts of the GDP growth time
series from 2012:Q1 to 2014:Q4. The Dark and light shaded area represents, respectively, a 60%
and 90% equal tail probability credible sets. The right panels reports the predictive densities
for GDP growth with and without LTROs (box plots).
As a benchmark, I first discuss the forecasted path for GDP growth in absence
of the policy. The left panel of Figure 1.12 reports the posterior median of the
model’s forecast for GDP growth in absence of the policy along with its 60% and
90% credible set. The model predicts a “risky” recovery for GDP growth from the
2011:Q4 point of view. While on average GDP growth returns to its trend value
by 2013, we can see a long left tail in these forecasts, especially in the early part
of 2012. That is, the model indicates some probability that economic outcomes
substantially worsen in the absence of the policy.43
The right panel of Figure 1.12 shows how LTROs influence these forecasts. I
43The long left tail is induced by two factors: i) the asymmetries induced by the leverage
constraint; ii) the probability of a sovereign default.
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use box plots to describe the predictive densities p(GDP GrowthT+h|YT ) with
and without LTROs for h = {1, 6, 11}. The box stands for the interquartile
range, the line within the box is the median while the circle represents the mean.
The refinancing operations have a clear positive effect on GDP growth in the
first quarter of 2012. Indeed, the median forecast for GDP growth under the
policy is 0.5% while in its absence is 0.16%. More strikingly, the policy removes
most of the downside risk: the left tail of the predictive density for GDP growth
in 2012:Q1 almost disappears. This happens because the policy increases the
maturity of banks’ liabilities, which makes their balance sheet less sensitive to
adverse shocks. As time goes on and the repayment date approaches, though,
GDP growth forecasts under LTROs become fairly similar to those in absence
of this policy. At the scheduled repayment date, the predictive density for GDP
growth is actually more left-skewed relative to that obtained in absence of the
policy.
Figure 1.13 reports posterior statistics on the policy effects for the level of out-
put, expected excess returns and their decomposition into multiplier and covari-
ance components. The policy lowers expected excess returns on impact and most
of these effects are due to looser funding constraints of banks. The covariance
component is barely affected by refinancing operations at early stages because of
the reasons discussed in Section 1.5.3.
These initial positive effects are reversed over time. Starting from 2013:Q1, the
model places a probability of at least 20% on LTROs increasing the financing
costs of firms and reducing the level of output. This result, which may appear
paradoxical, is driven by the behavior of the model at the repayment stage. In
2014:Q4, banks need to repay the loans they took on and adverse net worth shocks
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Figure 1.13: Effects of LTROs on Output and Expected Excess Returns
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Notes: The solid line reports the posterior mean of the expected policy effects on the time series
2012:Q1 to 2014:Q4. The Dark and light shaded area represents, respectively, a 60% and 90%
equal tail probability credible sets. Output is linearly detrended and expressed in percentages.
The other variables are expressesed in annualized basis points.
at that date are very costly for them. The anticipation of the repayment stage
makes banks more cautious ex-ante and leads them to demand higher compen-
sation for risk. This counteracts the initial positive effects of the policy. Under
certain circumstances, this second effect may dominate and lead to an increase
in expected excess returns and to a decline in output relative to the no-policy
benchmark. Overall, these results suggest that refinancing operations are fore-
casted to be quite ineffective in stimulating real economic activity if we condition
to empirically reasonable regions of the state space in 2011:Q4.
This result does not imply that refinancing operations are a bad policy instru-
ment. Rather, that their effects depend on the economic environment in which
they are implemented. In order to see this last point, I implement LTROs in a
different region of the state space, drawn from the density p(St=2008:Q3|YT , θi).
In contrast to the 2011:Q4 period, the model interprets the financial distress of
2008:Q3 as driven mainly by banks liquidity problems. Table 1.6 reports the ef-
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fects of the policy on output and expected excess returns on impact and at the
repayment stage. Two main differences stand out compared to the previous anal-
ysis. First, the policy has a substantially stronger effect on the financing premia
of firms and on output when implemented in 2008:Q3. Expected excess returns
decline on impact by 79 basis points while the level of output increases by 0.52%.
Second, the downside risk at the repayment stage is substantially reduced. This
can be seen by comparing the credible sets for output at the repayment stage for
the two cases.
Table 1.6: Effects of LTROs on Impact and at Repayment: 2008:Q3 vs.
2011:Q4
2008:Q3 2011:Q4
Statistic Impact Repayment Impact Repayment
Output 0.52 0.01 0.34 -0.01
[0.29,0.73] [-0.24,0.15] [0.11,0.56] [-0.86,0.12]
Expected Excess Returns -0.79 -0.01 -0.35 0.11
[-1.30,-0.26] [-0.39,0.25] [-0.71,-0.01] [-0.2054,2.14]
Notes: Posterior statistics on the effects of LTROs on output and expected excess returns on impact
(period 1) and at the repayment stage (period 12). The first two columns initialize the state vector
at p(St=2008:Q3|YT , θi). The last two columns initialize the vector at p(St=2011:Q4|YT , θi).
The reasons underlying this state dependence are related to the discussion of
equity injections in Section 1.5.3. In 2008:Q3, agency costs are estimated to be
high. This indicates that there are profitable investment opportunities in the
economy and banks use the funds from the LTROs to lend to firms. General
equilibrium, then, generates a positive loop: the market value of firms’ claims is
positively influenced by higher demand for capital, and this strengthens bank net
worth. As a result, banks arrive at the repayment stage with a buffer that makes
their balance sheet less sensitive to adverse shocks. These general equilibrium
effects are, instead, muted when implementing the policy in 2011:Q4.
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1.7 Conclusion
In this paper I have conducted a quantitative analysis of the transmission of
sovereign credit risk to the borrowing costs of firms and real economic activity. I
studied a model where banks are exposed to risky government debt and they are
the main source of finance for firms. An increase in the probability of a sovereign
default has negative effects on credit markets through two channels. First, by re-
ducing the market value of government securities, higher sovereign risk reduces the
net worth of banks and hampers their funding ability: their increased financing
costs pass-through into the borrowing rates of firms (leverage-constraint channel).
Second, an increase in the probability of a sovereign default raises the risks associ-
ated with lending to firms: if the default occurs in the future, in fact, claims on the
productive sector will pay out little and banks will have to absorb these losses. I
referred to this second mechanisms as the risk channel. The structural estimation
of the model on Italian data suggests that the sovereign debt crisis significantly
increased the financing premia of firms, with the risk channel explaining up to
47% of these effects. Moreover, the rise in the probability of a sovereign default
had severe adverse consequences for the Italian economy: cumulative output losses
were 4.75% at the end of 2011. In counterfactual experiments, I use the estimated
model to evaluate the policy response adopted by the ECB, with particular em-
phasis on the LTROs of the first quarter of 2012. The model estimates that these
interventions have minor effects on lending and output. This happens because
risk premia, which were sizable when the policy was enacted, discourage banks’
lending to firms. More generally, the analysis shows that the stabilization proper-
ties of these interventions are state dependent in the model, and their aggregate
effects depend on the relative strength of the leverage-constraint channel and of
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the risk-channel.
There are a number of dimensions in which the model could be extended. The
most important is to allow sovereign default risk to respond to macroeconomic
conditions. This could be done in different ways, for example by introducing
distortionary taxation in the model and considering the optimal default policy
of a Ramsey government. Incorporating these aspects would allow for a more
complete evaluation of policy responses adopted by the ECB. A second extension
would be that of considering an open economy. I believe this dimension would
help the empirical identification of the mechanisms discussed in this paper, since
they are likely to generate differential implications for international capital flows.
While both of these issues are challenging, and require a substantial departure
from this framework, they represents exciting opportunities for future work.
Abstracting from the current application, recent research advocates the use of
indicators of credit spreads as observables when estimating quantitative models
with financial intermediation. This paper adds to that by underscoring the im-
portance of measuring the sources driving the movements in these indicators of
financial stress. Understanding whether firms’ financing premia during crises are
high because of “frictions” in financial markets or because of fair compensation for
increased risk is a key information for policy makers. Incorporating the nonlinear-
ities emphasized in this paper in larger scale models used for policy evaluation is
technically challenging. Moreover, given the policy relevance of these nonlineari-
ties, there is a need for developing tools for their empirical validation in the data.
I plan to address these issues in future work.
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Chapter 2
Assessing DSGE Model
Nonlinearities
2.1 Introduction
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models are now widely used for
empirical research in macroeconomics, as well as for forecasting and quantita-
tive policy analysis in central banks. In these models, decision rules of economic
agents are derived from assumptions about agents’ preferences and production
technologies utilizing some fundamental principles such as optimization, rational
expectations, and competitive equilibrium. In practice, this means that the func-
tional forms and parameters of equations that describe the behavior of economic
agents are tightly restricted by the equilibrium conditions. Consequently, a care-
ful evaluation of the DSGE model-implied restrictions is an important aspect of
empirical research.
Until recently, much of the research that estimates DSGE models used first-order
approximations to the equilibrium decision rules. This made linear models such
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as vector autoregressions (VARs) appropriate for evaluating the restrictions of the
DSGE model. With the advance of the methods to estimate DSGE models using
higher-order approximations, as developed in Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Rubio-
Ramı´rez (2007b), an important avenue of research has opened. The end of the
Great Moderation also makes nonlinear models all the more relevant for empirical
macroeconomics.1 While there is a burgeoning literature on both the methods to
solve nonlinear DSGE models and their applications, there does not seem to be
an obvious nonlinear time series model to use to evaluate these DSGE models.
The objective of this paper is to develop a class of time series models that mimic
nonlinearities of DSGE models and to use these models as a benchmark for the
evaluation of a nonlinear DSGE model. Motivated by the popular second-order
perturbation approximations of DSGE model dynamics, we consider autoregres-
sive models that involve quadratic terms of lagged endogenous variables as well
as interactions between current period innovations and lagged endogenous vari-
ables, which generate conditional heteroskedasticity. These time series models are
derived from a perturbation solution to a nonlinear difference equation and have
a recursively linear structure that makes it straightforward to characterize stabil-
ity properties and derive moments. While multivariate extensions are possible,
we focus in this paper on univariate specifications, that we refer to as QAR(p,q)
models, where “Q” stands for quadratic.2 In the empirical work, we use p = q = 1.
1There are in principle two types of nonlinearities that can appear in a nonlinear DSGE
model. First are (approximately) smooth nonlinearities, where decision rules display curvature
and possibly asymmetries such as those that are generated by asymmetric loss or cost functions.
Second are kinks in decision rules such as those that are generated by the zero lower bound on
nominal interest rates. This paper is about the former. While the latter is also crucial and we
intend to extend our work to address this type of nonlinearities, solving and estimating DSGE
models with kinks in decision rules is very difficult. See, for example, Gust et al. (2012), Aruoba
and Schorfheide (2013b), Bocola (2013), and references therein.
2The abbreviation QAR has previously been used for Quantile Autoregressions, see Koenker
and Xiao (2006).
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After documenting some of the theoretical properties of the QAR models, the
first step of the empirical analysis is to fit QAR(1,1) models to growth of real
gross domestic product (GDP), inflation, nominal wage growth, and interest rate
data for the U.S. We start our sample in 1960 but consider various subsamples,
using 1983 (the end of the Volcker era and the start of the Great Moderation)
and 2007 (the end of the Great Moderation and the start of the Great Recession)
as additional start and end points. We find three sets of important nonlinearities
across the variables and samples we consider. First, GDP growth displays pro-
nounced nonlinearities in the post-1983 samples with sharp output losses during
recessions are relatively slow recoveries. Second, for inflation and wage growth
the long samples that start in 1960 and extend beyond the 1990s exhibit high
volatility in times of high inflation and wage growth, which is mainly driven by
the observations in the 1970s. Finally, QAR estimates for interest rates imply an
asymmetric behavior by the Federal Reserve in the post-1983 era; interest rates
increase more gradually than they fall.
The second step of the empirical analysis consists of the estimation of a DSGE
model. In our application we focus on the estimation and evaluation of a New
Keynesian DSGE model with asymmetric price and wage adjustment costs, build-
ing on Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009). This model can generate downward nominal
wage and price rigidity and is interesting for several reasons. First, it is well
known that in the absence of the zero-lower-bound (ZLB) constraint on nominal
interest rates, unrealistically large shocks or degrees of risk aversion, New Key-
nesian DSGE models do not generate significant nonlinearities (see, for instance,
An (2007)). However, once one allows for asymmetric adjustment costs, agents’
decision rules can become strongly nonlinear. Thus, ex ante, to the extent that
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there are nonlinearities in the data, the model may be able to deliver some of
these.
Second, downward rigidity is a well-documented feature of nominal wage changes
at the micro-level, e.g., Gottschalk (2005), Barattieri et al. (2010), and Daly et
al. (2012). Third, there are a number of papers that have incorporated downward
nominal wage rigidity into DSGE models to study its macroeconomic effects. For
instance, Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009) study optimal monetary policy in the
presence of downward nominal wage rigidity. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2013)
use downward nominal wage rigidity to generate large output losses and a jobless
recovery in a deflation (or liquidity-trap) equilibrium of a New Keynesian model
with ZLB constraint. Thus, a careful evaluation of the nonlinearities that this
mechanism generates is important.
In estimating the DSGE model, we use the same data set as in the estimation of
the univariate QAR models and consider two samples, one long and one short, both
of which end in 2007 to avoid using data where the ZLB starts to bind. By and
large, the parameter estimates for the DSGE models are consistent with estimates
that have been reported elsewhere in the literature. In particular, our estimates
indicate asymmetries in the adjustment costs for both prices and nominal wages
that make increases less costly than decreases.
The final, and most important step of the analysis is to conduct a posterior
predictive check of the DSGE model that compares coefficient estimates obtained
from data simulated from an estimated DSGE model to coefficient estimates ob-
tained from actual data. The predictive check amounts to assessing how far the
QAR estimates obtained from the actual data lie in the tails of the predictive dis-
tribution. The general conclusion is that the DSGE model does not generate very
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strong nonlinearities except for inflation and nominal wage growth, both of which
show conditional heteroskedasiticity. This means that the asymmetric adjustment
costs in prices and wages are able to deliver asymmetric behavior in inflation and
nominal wage growth in line with the data but this asymmetry does not spill over
neither to real GDP growth, nor to the policy instrument of the Federal Reserve.
Our work is related to several branches of the literature. There exists a large
body of work on nonlinear time series models.3 However, none of these model
classes seem to be directly useable for our purposes since either the nonlinear-
ities do not match the nonlinearities of DSGE models solved with higher-order
perturbation methods or the models have undesirable instability properties.
The proposed QAR family is most closely related to generalized autoregressions
(GAR) discussed in Mittnik (1990) in the sense that the conditional mean of the
dependent variable yt is a polynomial function of its lags. Our QAR models also
involve interactions between lagged dependent variables yt−j and innovations ut,
which is a defining property of bilinear models and linear autoregressive conditional
heteroskedasticity (LARCH) models, e.g., Giraitis et al. (2000). However, rather
than simply augmenting a linear autoregressive model by quadratic terms and
interactions between lagged endogenous variables and innovations, we derive its
structure from a second-order perturbation approximation to the solution of a
nonlinear difference equation along the lines of Holmes (1995). To the extent
that both conditional mean and variance depend on quadratic functions of the
innovations ut our model is also related to the class of (G)ARCH-M models, e.g.
Engle et al. (1987) and Grier and Perry (1996). Finally, the QAR model can
3These include regime switching models, e.g. Hamilton (1989) and Sims and Zha (2006),
time-varying coefficient models, e.g. Cogley and Sargent (2002) and Primiceri (2005), threshold
and smooth-transition autoregressive models, e.g. Tong and Lim (1980) and Tera¨svirta (1994),
bilinear models, e.g. Granger and Andersen (1978) and Rao (1981).
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be viewed as a set of tight restrictions on the coefficients of a Volterra (1930)
representation of a nonlinear time series.
There exists an abundant literature that develops methods to evaluate DSGE
models based on comparisons with more flexible and densely parameterized time
series models. However, much of the existing econometric work is based on lin-
earized DSGE models. A natural benchmark for the evaluation of such models
is provided by vector autoregressions (VARs) that relax the cross-coefficient re-
strictions. In fact, there exists an extensive literature that develops and applies
methods to evaluate DSGE models based on comparisons with VARs, e.g., Cogley
and Nason (1994), Schorfheide (2000b), Christiano et al. (2005a), Del Negro et al.
(2007), and Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2007a).
In this paper we use so-called posterior predictive checks to evaluate a prototyp-
ical DSGE model. A general discussion of the role of predictive checks in Bayesian
analysis can be found in Lancaster (2004) and Geweke (2005b). Canova (1994)
is the first paper that uses predictive checks to assess implications of a DSGE
model. While Canova (1994)’s checks were based on the prior predictive distribu-
tion, we use posterior predictive checks in this paper as, for instance, in Chang et
al. (2007b). Finally, Abbritti and Fahr (2013) use a model with asymmetric wage
adjustment costs and search and matching frictions to investigate the ability of the
model to deliver nonlinearities, focusing on skewness and turning point statistics.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we review
the structure of second-order perturbation approximations of DSGE models. The
QAR model is developed in Section 2.3. We discuss some of its theoretical prop-
erties as well as Bayesian inference. Estimates of the QAR model for U.S. data
are presented in Section 2.4. The DSGE model with asymmetric price and wage
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adjustment costs is introduced in Section 2.5. The estimation and evaluation of
the DSGE model is presented in Section 3.2. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes. An
online Appendix contains detailed derivations of the properties of the QAR model,
as well as details of the Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods employed
in this paper.
2.2 DSGE Model Nonlinearities
Most estimated nonlinear DSGE models are solved with perturbation methods
because they can be efficiently applied to models with a large state space. A
DSGE model solved by second-order perturbation can be generically written as
ci,t = ψ1i(θ) + ψ2ij(θ)xj,t + ψ3ij(θ)zj,t
+ψ4ijk(θ)xj,txk,t + ψ5ijk(θ)xj,tzk,t + ψ6ijk(θ)zj,tzk,t
xi,t+1 = ζ1i(θ) + ζ2ij(θ)xj,t + ζ2ij(θ)zj,t (2.1)
+ζ4ijk(θ)xj,txk,t + ζ5ijk(θ)xj,tzk,t + ζ6ijk(θ)zj,tzk,t
zi,t+1 = ξ2ij(θ)zj,t + ξ3i(θ)i,t+1,
where θ denotes the parameters of the model and the DSGE model variables are
grouped into control variables ci,t, e.g., consumption, endogenous state variables
xi,t, e.g., the capital stock, and exogenous state variables zi,t, e.g., total factor pro-
ductivity. The notation aijkxj,txk,t in (2.1) is shorthand for
∑n
j=1
∑n
k=1 aijkxj,txk,t.
Since not all of the control and state variables are observable it is common to aug-
ment the system by a measurement equation of the form
yi,t = A1i(θ) + A2ij(θ)cj,t + A3ij(θ)xj,t + A4ij(θ)zj,t + ei,t, (2.2)
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where the ei,t’s are measurement errors. Typically, the vector of observables yt is
composed of a subset of the state and control variables such that the A matrices
are simple selection matrices.
Nonlinear features may arise endogenously or exogenously. Curvature in util-
ity functions, adjustment cost function, and production functions can generate
nonlinear decision rules of households and firms endogenously. An example of an
exogenous nonlinearity is stochastic volatility in the exogenous shocks that gener-
ate business cycle fluctuations. In (2.1) the endogenous nonlinearity is captured
by the quadratic functions of xt and zt that appear in the law of motion of the
control variables ci,t and the endogenous state variables xi,t+1. The representation
assumes that there are no exogenous nonlinearities as the exogenous states xexoi,t
evolve according to a linear autoregressive process.
The objective of this paper is to propose an econometric method to assess the
empirical adequacy of the nonlinear terms in the DSGE model solution (2.1).
The DSGE model generates cross-coefficient restrictions between the first-order
terms and the higher-order terms which may or may not be correctly specified. In
principle, one could try to estimate two versions of the state-space model given
by (2.1) and (2.2): a restricted version that imposes the functional relationship
between the low-dimensional DSGE model parameter vector θ and the state-space
coefficients ψ(·), ζ(·), and ξ(·) and an unrestricted version in which the ψ’s, ζ’s, and
ξ’s are freely estimated. The discrepancy between the restricted and unrestricted
estimates provides a measure of empirical adequacy. However, due to the large
number of parameters and some inherent identification problems, the unrestricted
estimation of the state-space system (2.1) and (2.2) is difficult to implement. In
fact, even the literature that evaluates linearized DSGE models has by and large
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abstained from trying to estimate unrestricted state-space representations.
A more common approach in the literature on linearized DSGE models is to com-
pare properties of the DSGE model to properties of an unrestricted VAR. This
comparison can take many different forms, e.g., assessing the discrepancy between
unrestricted VAR coefficient estimates and the DSGE-model-implied VAR approx-
imation as in Smith (1993), or the comparison of VAR and DSGE model impulse
responses as in Cogley and Nason (1994) or Christiano et al. (2005a). Since our
goal is to identify nonlinearities, a linear VAR would not be of any use. Instead, we
compare parameter estimates of nonlinear autoregressive time series models ob-
tained from actual U.S. data and data simulated from a nonlinear DSGE model.
If the DSGE model is well specified, then the estimates of the auxiliary models
ought to be very similar. This comparison is formalized as a Bayesian posterior
predictive check. We proceed by providing a detailed description of the auxiliary
time series model that is used for the DSGE model evaluation.
2.3 Quadratic Autoregressive Models
The most popular (and empirically successful) nonlinear time series models are
those capturing time variation in the coefficients of linear time series models,
e.g., Markov-switching models, time-varying coefficient models, GARCH models,
stochastic volatility models. However, none of these models provide a good charac-
terization of the nonlinearity generated endogenously by the DSGE model solution
in (2.1). For this reason we develop a new class of nonlinear autoregressive time
series models that are more closely tied to the DSGE model solution in (2.1).
We introduce the specification of a first-order quadratic autoregressive (QAR)
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model in Section 2.3.1. We subsequently characterize some of its important prop-
erties in Section 2.3.2 and describe the implementation of posterior inference in
Section 2.3.3. Section 2.3.4 provides generalizations of the basic specification and
discusses the relationship of our QAR models to other nonlinear time series mod-
els.
2.3.1 Specification of the QAR(1,1) Model
The starting point is a perturbation approximation of the solution of a nonlinear
difference equation of the form
yt = f(yt−1, ωut), ut
iid∼ N(0, 1). (2.3)
We assume that the process characterized by (2.3) has a unique deterministic
steady state that solves the equation y∗ = f(y∗, 0). Following the literature on
perturbation methods, e.g. Holmes (1995) and Lombardo (2011), we construct an
approximate solution of the form
y∗t = y
(0)
t + ωy
(1)
t + ω
2y
(2)
t . (2.4)
It turns out that this solution is second-order accurate in the sense that
yt = y
∗
t +Op(ω3) (2.5)
as ω −→ 0.
To obtain y∗t , we take a second-order Taylor expansion of the function f around
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yt = y∗ and ω = 0:
yt − y∗ = fy(yt−1 − y∗) + fuωut (2.6)
+
1
2
fy,y(yt−1 − y∗)2 + fy,u(yt−1 − y∗)ωut
+
1
2
fu,u(ωut)
2 + higher-order terms,
where fx,y denotes the (x, y)’th derivative of f evaluated at the point (yt = y∗, ω =
0). Substituting (2.4) into (2.6) and neglecting terms of order Op(ω3), one obtains:
y
(0)
t − y∗ + ωy(1)t + ω2y(2)t
= fy
(
y
(0)
t−1 − y∗ + ωy(1)t−1 + ω2y(2)t−1
)
+ fuωut
+
1
2
fy,y
(
y
(0)
t−1 − y∗ + ωy(1)t−1 + ω2y(2)t−1
)2
(2.7)
+
1
2
fy,u
(
y
(0)
t − y∗ + ωy(1)t−1 + ω2y(1)t−1
)
ωut +
1
2
fu,uω
2u2t +Op(ω3).
We set y
(0)
t = y
(0)
t−1 = y∗ and then match terms of the same ω-order on the left-
hand-side and the right-hand-side of (2.7) to obtain the laws of motion for y
(1)
t
and y
(2)
t :
y
(1)
t = fyy
(1)
t−1 + fuut,
y
(2)
t = fyy
(2)
t−1 +
1
2
fy,y
(
y
(1)
t−1
)2
+
1
2
fy,uy
(1)
t−1ut +
1
2
fu,uu
2
t .
Notice that y
(1)
t follows an AR(1) process and that conditional on y
(1)
t the dynam-
ics of y
(2)
t are also linear. Substituting the expressions for y
(1)
t and y
(2)
t into (2.4)
and collecting terms, we obtain that a second-order accurate perturbation approx-
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imation of the nonlinear difference equation (2.3) is given by the system:
yt = y∗ + fy(yt−1 − y∗) + 1
2
fy,y
(
ωy
(1)
t−1
)2
+
(
fu +
1
2
fy,uy
(1)
t−1
)
ωut +
1
2
fu,uω
2u2t
y
(1)
t = fyy
(1)
t−1 + fuut (2.8)
We undertake a few additional modifications. We define st ≡ ωy(1)t and introduce
the parameters
φ0 = y∗, φ1 = fy, φ˜2 =
1
2
fy,y, γ˜ =
1
2ω
fy,u, σ = fuω.
Moreover, we drop the term 1
2
fu,uu
2
t to obtain a conditional Normal distribution
of yt. Overall, this leads to the nonlinear state-space model:
yt = φ0 + φ1(yt−1 − φ0) + φ˜2s˜2t−1 + (1 + γ˜s˜t−1)σut (2.9)
s˜t = φ1s˜t−1 + σut, ut
iid∼ N(0, 1).
To complete the specification of the time series model we assume that the distri-
bution of the initial values in period t = −T∗ have distribution F−T∗ , and that the
innovations ut are normally distributed:
(y−T∗ , s˜−T∗) ∼ F−T∗ , ut iid∼ N(0, 1). (2.10)
We refer to (2.9) as the QAR(1,1) model. The first “1” indicates the number of
lags in the conditional mean function and the second “1” denotes how many lags
interact with the innovation ut.
It is convenient to reparameterize the QAR(1,1) model as follows. Define φ2, γ,
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and st such that
φ2 = φ˜2
σ2
1− φ21
, γ =
σ√
1− φ21
γ˜, and st =
√
1− φ21
σ
s˜t. (2.11)
Under the reparameterization the coefficients φ2 and γ interact with standardized
versions of s2t−1 and st−1, respectively. Thus, (2.9) becomes
yt = φ0 + φ1(yt−1 − φ0) + φ2s2t−1 + (1 + γst−1)σut (2.12)
st = φ1st−1 +
√
1− φ21ut, ut iid∼ N(0, 1).
2.3.2 Important Properties of the QAR(1,1) Model
In order to appreciate two of the important implications of the recursively linear
structure of the QAR(1,1) model given by (2.12) consider the alternative speci-
fication (omitting the constant term and the volatility dynamics) yt = φ1yt−1 +
φ2y
2
t−1 + ut, 0 < φ1 < 1 and φ2 > 0. It is straightforward to verify that this
specification has two steady states, namely, y
(1)
∗ = 0 and y
(2)
∗ = (1− φ1)/φ2. The
second steady state arises as an artefact of the quadratic representation even if
the underlying nonlinear model (2.3) only has a single steady state. Moreover,
from writing ∆yt = (−1 + φ1 + φ2yt−1)yt−1 + ut notice that the system becomes
explosive if a large shock has pushed yt−1 above y
(2)
∗ . This explosiveness can arise
regardless of the value of φ1.
The multiplicity of steady states and the undesirable explosive dynamics have
been pointed out in the context of second-order perturbation solutions of DSGE
models by Kim et al. (2008) who proposed an ex-post modification of quadratic
autoregressive equations to ensure that unwanted higher-order terms do not propa-
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gate forward and generate explosive behavior not present in the underlying nonlin-
ear model. This modification is called pruning in the literature.4 Our derivation of
the QAR model in Section 2.3.1 automatically generates a recursively linear struc-
ture with a unique steady state and non-explosive dynamics for suitably restricted
values of φ1. If the marginal distribution of s−T∗ is N(0, 1), then the process st,
t ≥ −T∗, is strictly stationary under the restriction |φ1| < 1. In turn, the vector
process zt = [st−1, s2t−1, ut]
′ is strictly stationary and we can rewrite the law of
motion of yt in (2.9) as
yt = φ0 + φ1(yt−1 − φ0) + g(zt) = φ0 +
∞∑
j=0
φj1g(zt−j). (2.13)
This representation highlights that yt is a stationary process. Since g(zt) is a
nonlinear function of ut and its history, the process is, however, not linear in ut
anymore. In fact, under the assumption that yt was initialized in the infinite past
(T∗ −→ −∞), we obtain the following representation:
yt = φ0+σ
∞∑
j=0
φj1ut−j+σ
∞∑
j=0
∞∑
l=0
γ˜I{l > j}φl−j1 + φ˜2 min {j,l}∑
k=0
φj+l−k1
ut−jut−l. (2.14)
(2.14) is a discrete-time Volterra series expansion, in which the Volterra kernels
of order one and two are tightly restricted and the kernels of order larger than two
are equal zero.5 The recursively linear structure also facilitates the computation
of higher-order moments of yt. Further details are provided in the appendix.
4 Lombardo (2011) constructs a pruned perturbation solution of a DSGE model directly
rather than by ex-post adjustment. Lan and Meyer-Gohde (2013) solve DSGE models by con-
structing approximate second-order Volterra series expansions for the model variables, which
also eliminates unwanted higher-order terms. Andreasen et al. (2013) derive the moments of
observables from a general state-space representation for pruned DSGE models to facilitate
moment-based estimation.
5 The infinite sequences of coefficients on terms {ut−j}j≥0, {ut−jut−l}j≥0,l≥0,
{ut−jut−lut−k}j≥0,l≥0,k≥0, etc. are called Volterra kernels.
79
Impulse responses defined as
IRFt(h) = Et[yt+h|ut = 1]− Et[yt+h]
are state dependent. For instance, for h = 1 we obtain
IRFt(0) = σ(1 + γst−1), IRFt(1) = σ
(
φ1(1 + γst−1) + 2φ1φ2
√
1− φ21st−1
)
. (2.15)
Moreover, the model generates conditional heteroskedasticity. The conditional
variance of yt is given by
Vt−1[yt] = (1 + γst−1)2σ2. (2.16)
2.3.3 Posterior Inference for the QAR(1,1) Model
We estimate the QAR(1,1) model using Bayesian methods. Starting point is a
joint distribution of data, parameters, and initial states:
p(Y0:T , θ, s0) = p(Y1:T |y0, s0, θ)p(y0, s0|θ)p(θ),
where p(Y1:T |y0, s0, θ) is a likelihood function that conditions on the initial values
of y0 and s0, p(y0, s0|θ) characterizes the distribution of the initial values, and p(θ)
is the prior density of the QAR(1,1) parameters, and θ = [φ0, φ1, φ2, γ, σ
2]′. Since
for large values of |st−1| the term (1 + γst−1) in (2.12) may become close to zero
or switch signs, we replace it by
(
(1− ϑ) exp
[
γ
1− ϑst−1
]
+ ϑ
)
, (2.17)
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where 1+γst−1 is the first-order Taylor series expansion of (2.17). The exponential
transformation guarantees non-negativity of the time-varying standard deviation
and the constant ϑ provides some regularization that ensures that the shock stan-
dard deviation is strictly greater than σ exp(ϑ) in all states of the world.
It is convenient to factorize the likelihood function into conditional densities as
follows:
p(Y1:T |y0, s0, θ) =
T∏
t=1
p(yt|y0:t−1, s0, θ).
Given s0 and θ it is straightforward to evaluate the likelihood function iteratively.
Conditional on st−1 the distribution of yt is normal. The equation for yt in (2.12)
can be solved for ut to determine st, which completes iteration t. In addition
to the likelihood function, we need to specify an initial distribution p(y0, s0|θ).
We assume that the system was in its steady state in period t = −T∗, that is,
y−T∗ = φ0 and s−T∗ = 0. Based on iterating the original system (2.9) forward
we compute a mean and variance for (y0, s0) and assume that the initial values
are normally distributed. Further details of this initialization are provided in the
Appendix. Since the dimension of θ is small, we use a single-block random-walk
Metropolis (RWM) algorithm to generate draws from the posterior of θ.
2.3.4 Further Discussion
The QAR(1,1) model in (2.8) has a straightforward generalization in which we
include additional lag terms:
yt = φ0 +
p∑
l=1
φ1,l(yt−l − φ0) +
p∑
l=1
p∑
m=l
φ˜2,lmst−lst−m +
(
1 +
q∑
l=1
γ˜lst−l
)
σut (2.18)
s˜t =
p∑
l=1
φ1,lst−l + σut.
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We refer to (2.18) as QAR(p,q) model.6 As in the standard AR(p) model, the
stationarity of yt is governed by the roots of the lag polynomial 1−
∑p
l=1 φ1,lz
l. The
quadratic terms generate an additional p(p + 1)/2 coefficients in the conditional
mean equation for yt. Since the number of coefficients grows at rate p
2, a shrinkage
estimation method is required even for moderate values of p, in order to cope with
the dimensionality problem. The QAR model can also be extended to the vector
case, which is an extension that we are pursuing in ongoing research. The empirical
analysis presented in Section 3.2 is based on the QAR(1,1) specification.
The QAR model is closely related but not identical to some of the existing
nonlinear time series models. For γ = 0 the QAR(1,1) can be viewed as a pruned
version of the generalized autoregressive model (GAR) discussed in Mittnik (1990)
which augments the standard AR model by higher-order polynomials of the lagged
variables. The conditional heteroskedasticity in (2.9) has a linear autoregressive
structure. For φ2 = 0 our model is a special case of the LARCH model studied in
Giraitis et al. (2000). Since the conditional variance of yt can get arbitrarily close
to zero, likelihood-based estimation of LARCH models is intrinsically difficult.
We circumvent these difficulties by introducing the exponential transformation
in (2.17).
Grier and Perry (1996, 2000) have estimated GARCH-M models on macroeco-
nomic time series. GARCH-M models provide a generalization of the ARCH-M
models proposed by Engle et al. (1987) and can be written as
yt = φ0 + φ1(yt−1 − φ0) + φ2(σ2t − σ2) + σtut
σ2t − σ2 = γ1(u2t−1 − σ2) + γ2(σ2t−1 − σ2).
6If we start with a pth order nonlinear difference equation in (2.3), then we can arrive at a
QAR(p,p) model.
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Under suitable parameter restrictions yt can be expressed as a nonlinear function
of ut and its lags. As in the case of the QAR model, yt depends on the sequence
{u2t−j}. In addition, the term σtut introduces interactions between ut and u2t−j,
j > 1. However, coefficients on terms of the form ut−jut−l, j 6= l are restricted to be
zero. From our perspective, the biggest drawback of the GARCH-M model is that
nonlinear conditional mean dynamics are tied to the volatility dynamics: in the
absence of conditional heteroskedasticity the dynamics of yt are linear. The QAR
model is much less restrictive in this regard: yt can be conditionally homoskedastic
(γ = 0) but at the same time have nonlinear conditional mean dynamics, that is,
φ2 6= 0.
2.4 QAR Empirics
We begin the empirical analysis by fitting the QAR(1,1) model to per capita
output growth, nominal wage growth, GDP deflator inflation, and federal funds
rate data.7 The choice of data is motivated by the DSGE model that is being
evaluated subsequently. The DSGE model features potentially asymmetric wage
and price adjustment costs and we will assess whether the nonlinearities generated
by this DSGE model are consistent with the nonlinearities in U.S. data. We report
parameter estimates for the QAR model in Section 2.4.1 and explore the properties
of the estimated models in Section 2.4.2.
7 All series are quarterly and obtained from the FRED database of the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis. Output growth is the log difference of real GDP (GDPC96). We compute
log differences of civilian noninstitutional population (CNP16OV) and remove a one-sided eight-
quarter moving average to smooth population growth. The smoothed population growth series
is used to obtain per capita GDP growth rates. Inflation is the log difference of the GDP deflator
(GDPDEF). Nominal wage growth is the log difference of compensation per hour in the nonfarm
business sector (COMPNFB). As interest rate we use quarterly averages of monthly effective
federal funds rates (FEDFUNDS).
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Table 2.1: Estimation Samples and Pre-Samples
Sample Estimation Sample Pre-Sample for Prior
1 1960:Q1 - 1983:Q4 1955:Q1 - 1959:Q4
2 1960:Q1 - 2007:Q4 1955:Q1 - 1959:Q4
3 1960:Q1 - 2012:Q4 1955:Q1 - 1959:Q4
4 1984:Q1 - 2007:Q4 1955:Q1 - 1983:Q4
5 1984:Q1 - 2012:Q4 1955:Q1 - 1983:Q4
2.4.1 Estimation of QAR(1,1) Model on U.S. Data
We estimate QAR(1,1) models for output growth, inflation, nominal wage growth,
and interest rates using five different sample periods, which are summarized in
Table 2.1. The longest sample spans the period from 1960:Q1 to 2012:Q4. This
sample includes the high-inflation episode of the 1970s, the subsequent disinflation
period, as well as the Great Recession of 2008-09. We then split this sample after
1983:Q4 into a pre-Great-Moderation sample that ranges from 1960:Q1 to 1983:Q4
and a post-Great-Moderation sample from 1984:Q1 to 2012:Q4. Since the 2008-
09 recession involves large negative GDP growth rates which may be viewed as
outliers, and federal funds rate has been at or near the lower bound of 0% since
2008, we consider two additional samples that exclude the Great Recession data
and end in 2007:Q4.
To specify the prior distribution for the QAR parameters we use normal distribu-
tions for φ0, φ2, and γ. The autoregressive coefficient φ1 is a priori also normally
distributed, but the normal distribution is truncated to ensure stationarity of the
QAR model. Finally, the prior distribution of σ is of the inverted gamma form.
We use pre-sample information to parameterize the priors. The pre-sample peri-
ods for our five estimation samples are provided in the last column of Table 2.1.
Throughout the estimation the tuning constant ϑ in (2.17) is fixed at ϑ = 0.1. The
prior distributions for φ1, the first-order autoregressive coefficient, are centered at
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Figure 2.1: Posterior Medians and Credible Intervals for QAR Parame-
ters Parameter φ2
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Notes: The solid bars indicate posterior medians and the shaded boxes delimit 90% equal-tail-
probability credible intervals.
the pre-sample first-order autocorrelations of the four time series. The inverse
Gamma distribution of σ is centered at the residual standard deviation associated
with the pre-sample estimation of an AR(1) model. Finally, the prior mean of φ0
is specified such that the implied E[yt] of the QAR(1,1) model corresponds to the
pre-sample mean of the respective time series. The priors for φ2 and γ are centered
at zero and have a standard deviation of 0.1. Further details are provided in the
Appendix.
Figure 2.1 summarizes the posterior distributions of φ2 and γ. In this figure the
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boxes represent the 90% credible intervals and the solid bars indicate posterior
medians. Detailed estimation results for the remaining QAR(1,1) parameters are
tabulated in the Appendix. The φ2 posteriors for GDP growth using the three
samples starting in 1960 are essentially centered at zero with the 90% credible
interval covering both positive and negative values. The γ posterior medians for
the same samples are slightly negative, around -0.05, but the 90% credible sets also
cover positive values, providing only some mild evidence for conditional variance
dynamics. For the two post-Great Moderation samples the φ2 estimates drop to
about -0.1 and the credible set now excludes zero. The strongest evidence for
nonlinearity in GDP growth is present in the 1984-2012 sample, which includes
large negative growth rates of output during the Great Recession, in the form of
φ2 < 0 and γ < 0. Nonlinearities in wages and inflation are reflected in positive
estimates of γ. These nonlinearities are most pronounced for the 1960-2007 and
the 1960-2012 samples. For the federal funds rate we obtain estimates of φ2
near zero and estimates of γ of about 0.4 for samples that include the pre-1984
observations. For samples that start after the Great Moderation the pattern is
reversed: the estimates of φ2 are around -0.2 and the estimates of γ are close to
zero. We will discuss the interpretation of these estimates in Section 2.4.2.
Figure 2.2 depicts log marginal likelihood differentials for the QAR(1,1) versus
a linear autoregressive AR(1) model. The AR(1) models are estimated by setting
φ2 = γ = 0 and using the same priors for φ0, φ1, and σ as in the estimation of the
QAR(1,1) model. A positive value indicates evidence in favor for the nonlinear
QAR(1,1). Under equal prior probabilities, the difference in log marginal data
density between two models has the interpretation of log posterior odds. By and
large, the marginal likelihood differentials favor the QAR(1,1) specification. The
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Figure 2.2: Log Marginal Data Density Differentials: QAR(1,1) versus
AR(1)
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Notes: The figure depicts log marginal data density differentials. A positive number provides
evidence in favor of the QAR(1,1) specification.
evidence in favor of the nonlinear specification is strongest for the federal funds
rate. Marginal likelihood differentials range from 20 to 60. For output growth there
is substantial evidence in favor of the QAR model for the post-Great Moderation
samples, whereas for inflation large positive log marginal likelihood differentials
are obtained for the 1960-2007 and the 1960-2012 samples. For wage growth
the evidence in favor of the nonlinear specification is less strong: log marginal
likelihood differentials are around 2.
2.4.2 Properties of the Estimated QAR Models
In this section we discuss what the nonlinearities we identified in the previous
section mean for each variable. For ease of exposition, we focus on the subsample
that “maximizes” the nonlinearities for each variable, which roughly corresponds
to picking the subsample that has the largest marginal data density differential
between the AR(1) and the QAR(1,1) models.
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GDP Growth. Our results show that the posterior medians of φ2 and γ for GDP
growth are less than zero. The largest estimates (in absolute terms) are obtained
for the 1984-2012 sample. As (2.16) shows, with a negative γ, the periods of
below-mean growth (likely to be recessions) are also periods where volatility is
higher, which is a well-known business cycle fact. A negative φ2, along with
a negative γ also imply that the response to shocks is a function of the initial
state s0. Using the formulas in (2.15), Figure 2.3 depicts the absolute responses of
GDP growth to a negative and a positive one-standard deviation shock. In the left
panel, we assume that the initial state s0 takes on large negative values whereas
the responses in the right panel condition on large positive s0’s.
8 This figure
highlights that regardless of the initial state negative shocks are more persistent
than positive shocks. Moreover, both shocks are more persistent in recessions.
Combining these results, we deduce that multiple positive shocks are necessary to
recover from a recession, while a small number of negative shocks can generate a
recession. In other words output losses during recessions are sharp and recoveries
are slow.
The impulse response findings are consistent with the time-series plot of GDP
growth, which is provided in the top left panel of Figure 2.4. In this figure shaded
areas indicate NBER recessions and the solid vertical line indicates the year 1984,
which is the starting point of two of the five estimation samples. The unconditional
mean of the variable is shown as a horizontal dashed line. Focusing on the post-
1983 sample, the most extreme observations are all during recessions, confirming
the effect of γ < 0. Looking at the quarters just prior to and just after NBER
recessions, we see that the declines in GDP growth are always very sharp but the
8To obtain the s0 for a given draw, we compute a two-period moving average to smooth the
st series and use the minimum and the maximum values for this smoothed series.
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Figure 2.3: Impulse Responses of GDP Growth (In Absolute Terms)
Notes: 1984-2012 sample. Solid and dashed lines correspond to median impulse responses to
one-standard-deviation shocks and shaded bands represent 60% credible intervals (equal tail
probability). To initialize the latent state s0 we compute two-quarter moving averages based
on the states associated with the estimated QAR model and calculate the minimum and the
maximum of the smoothed series. For the left panel (large negative s0) the initialization is
based on the minimum and in the right panel (large positive s0) it is based on the maximum.
recoveries, defined as getting back to and staying at pre-recession level, take much
longer.
It is easy to see why the nonlinearities identified in the samples starting in
1984 are not as pronounced in the samples that start in 1960. First, prior to
1984 there are more episodes of large positive GDP growth rates. These are, in
absolute terms, as large as the negative growth rates observed between 1960 and
2012. Thus, recessions are not necessarily periods of higher volatility. Second,
the recoveries from recessions are as sharp as the entries, not displaying the clear
asymmetry in the later sample. These findings explain why a linear AR(1) is a
good description of GDP growth pre-1984.9
9Qualitatively, our results for GDP growth are in line with findings by Brunner (1997), who
estimated three nonlinear models for real Gross National Product (GNP). Based on a sample
from 1947 to 1990 the author obtained strong evidence of countercyclical volatility, that is
recessions are periods of high volatility. Moreover, Brunner (1997) detects nonlinear conditional
mean dynamics: according to the impulse responses the effects of a negative shock accumulate
faster than those of a positive shock, in line with our findings. Similarly, McKay and Reis (2008)
find that the brevity and violence of contractions and expansions are about equal in a sample
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Figure 2.4: Data
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Notes: All variables are in annualized percentage units. Shaded areas indicate NBER recessions
and the dashed horizontal line represents the sample mean of the series.
Inflation and Wage Growth. The nonlinearities in the inflation dynamics are
most pronounced in the 1960-2007 sample with γ > 0 and φ2 = 0. Once again
referring to the conditional variance formula in (2.16), we conclude that periods
of above-mean inflation are associated with high volatility. In fact, the top right
panel of Figure 2.4 shows that the period from 1970 to 1980 has high and volatile
inflation. A similar conclusion can be reached in the post-1983 sample but to a
lesser degree. The bottom left panel of Figure 2.4 shows that nominal wage growth
displays properties similar to inflation. In the 1960-2007 sample, which is also the
relevant one for nominal wage growth, volatility tends to be high when the level
is high. Because nominal wage growth is more volatile than inflation, and there
are many large negative observations, the estimate of γ is smaller for the former
that encompasses our longest sample, once again in line with our results.
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series.
Federal Funds Rate. The bottom right panel of Figure 2.4 shows the plot of
the federal funds rate. Based on the QAR(1,1) estimation results, there are two
samples with strong nonlinearities. In the 1960-2007 sample, we find a positive γ.
As was the case for inflation and nominal wage growth, this is due to the obser-
vations from late 1960s to mid 1980s, which are typically above the unconditional
mean and thus volatility is higher when the level is higher. For the 1984-2012
sample we find φ2 < 0 and γ = 0. In this period the extreme observations are
equally likely to be positive or negative and thus γ = 0 is reasonable. φ2 < 0
implies that interest rate fall faster than they rise. This seems to be consistent
with Federal Reserve’s operating procedures in the post-1983 sample and it can
have two separate explanations. First, the Federal Reserve may have an asymmet-
ric policy rule, in which reactions to deviations from targets may depend on the
sign of the deviation. This can happen, for example, if the Federal Reserve is risk
averse and wants to avoid recessions: when GDP growth falls, the central bank is
willing to cut the policy rate quickly, but when GDP growth starts to improve, it
is reluctant to increase the policy rate immediately. Second, the variables that the
Federal Reserve track may have asymmetries themselves. Given our finding that
φ2 < 0 for GDP in this sample, the second explanation is certainly reasonable.
There is some evidence about the first explanation as well. For example Dolado
et al. (2004) and Cukierman and Muscatelli (2008) estimate a non-linear Taylor
rule using GMM and find that U.S. monetary policy is better characterized by a
nonlinear policy rule after 1983, especially with respect to the reaction to output
gap deviations.
To sum up, the estimation of QAR(1,1) models provides evidence of interesting
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and substantial nonlinearities in the U.S. macroeconomic time series. For the two
samples that start in 1960 and extend beyond the 1990s the nonlinearities are
reflected in the run-up in inflation in the 1970s, with spill-overs to nominal wage
growth and the federal funds rate. In the shorter post-1983 samples, there are two
important nonlinearities – the asymmetries in GDP growth, which is particularly
pronounced if the 2008-09 recession is included in the sample, and the federal
funds rate. In the remainder of this paper we examine whether a DSGE model
with asymmetric adjustment costs for prices and wage can possibly generate the
nonlinearities documented in this section.
2.5 A DSGE Model with Asymmetric Price and
Wage Adjustment Costs
By now there exists a large empirical literature on the estimation of New Keynesian
DSGE models, including small-scale models such as the one studied in Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004) and Rabanal and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2005), as well as variants of
the Smets and Wouters (2007a) model. It turns out that in the absence of zero-
lower-bound constraints on nominal interest rates, high degrees of risk aversion,
large shocks, or exogenous nonlinearities such as stochastic volatility, these models
do not generate strong nonlinearities, in the sense that first-order and higher-
order perturbation approximations deliver very similar decision rules. In order to
generate stronger nonlinearities that can be captured in higher-order perturbation
approximations, we consider a model with potentially asymmetric price and wage
adjustment costs that builds on Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009).
The model economy consists of a final good producing firm, a continuum of inter-
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mediate goods producing firms, a representative household, and a monetary as well
as a fiscal authority. The model replaces Rotemberg-style quadratic adjustment
cost functions by linex adjustment cost functions, which can capture downward (as
well as upward) nominal price and wage rigidities. Our model abstracts from cap-
ital accumulation. In the subsequent empirical analysis we examine whether the
asymmetric adjustment costs can generate the observed nonlinearities in inflation
and wage growth and whether the effects of asymmetric adjustment costs trans-
late into nonlinearities in GDP growth and the federal funds rate. In a nutshell,
asymmetric price adjustments should lead to asymmetric quantity adjustments.
To the extent that the central bank sets interest rates in response to inflation
and output movements, nonlinearities in the target variables may translate into
nonlinearities in the interest rate itself.
Final Good Production. The perfectly competitive, representative, final good
producing firm combines a continuum of intermediate goods indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]
using the technology
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Yt(j)
1−λp,tdj
) 1
1−λp,t
. (2.19)
Here 1/λp,t > 1 represents the elasticity of demand for each intermediate good.
The firm takes input prices Pt(j) and output prices Pt as given. Profit maximiza-
tion implies that the demand for intermediate goods is
Yt(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−1/λp,t
Yt. (2.20)
The relationship between intermediate goods prices and the price of the final good
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is
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
Pt(j)
λp,t−1
λp,t dj
) λp,t
λp,t−1
. (2.21)
Intermediate Goods. Intermediate good j is produced by a monopolist who
has access to the following production technology:
Yt(j) = AtHt(j), (2.22)
where At is an exogenous productivity process that is common to all firms. In-
termediate good producers buy labor services Ht(j) at a nominal price of Wt.
Moreover, they face nominal rigidities in terms of price adjustment costs. These
adjustment costs, expressed as a fraction of the firm’s revenues, are defined by the
linex function
Φp(x) = ϕp
(
exp (−ψp (x− pi)) + ψp (x− pi)− 1
ψ2p
)
, (2.23)
where we let x = Pt(j)/Pt−1(j) and pi is the steady state inflation rate associated
with the final good. The parameter φp governs the overall degree of price stick-
iness and ψp controls the asymmetry of the adjustment costs. Taking as given
nominal wages, final good prices, the demand schedule for intermediate products
and technological constraints, firm j chooses its labor inputs Ht(j) and the price
Pt(j) to maximize the present value of future profits
Et
[ ∞∑
s=0
βsQt+s|t
(
Pt+s(j)
Pt+s
(
1− Φp
(
Pt+s(j)
Pt+s−1(j)
))
Yt+s(j)− 1
Pt+s
Wt+sHt+s(j)
)]
. (2.24)
Here, Qt+s|t is the time t value of a unit of the consumption good in period t+ s
to the household, which is treated as exogenous by the firm.
Labor Packers. Labor services used by intermediate good producers are sup-
plied by a perfectly competitive labor packer. The labor packer aggregates the
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imperfectly substitutable labor services of households according to the technology:
Ht =
(∫ 1
0
Ht(k)
1−λwdk
) 1
1−λw
. (2.25)
The labor packer chooses demand for each type of labor in order to maximize his
profits, taking as given input prices Wt(k) and output prices Wt. Optimal labor
demand is then given by:
Ht(k) =
(
Wt(k)
Wt
)− 1
λw
Ht. (2.26)
Perfect competition implies that labor cost Wt and nominal wages paid to workers
are related as follows:
Wt =
(∫ 1
0
Wt(k)
λw−1
λw dk
) λw
λw−1
. (2.27)
Households. Each household consists of a continuum of family members indexed
by k. The family members provide perfect insurance to each other which equates
their marginal utility in each state of the world. A household member of type
k derives utility from consumption Ct(k) relative to a habit stock. We assume
that the habit stock is given by the level of technology At. This assumption
ensures that the economy evolves along a balanced growth path even if the utility
function is additively separable in consumption, real money balances, and leisure.
The household member derives disutility from hours worked Ht(k) and maximizes
Et
[ ∞∑
s=0
βs
(
(Ct+s(k)/At+s)
1−τ − 1
1− τ − χH
H
1+1/ν
t+s (k)
1 + 1/ν
)]
, (2.28)
where β is the discount factor, 1/τ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
χH is a scale factor that determines the steady state hours worked. Moreover ν is
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the Frisch labor supply elasticity.
The household is a monopolist in the supply of labor services. As a monopolist,
he chooses the nominal wage and labor taking as given the demand from the labor
packer. We assume that labor market frictions induce a cost in the adjustment
of nominal wages. Adjustment costs are payed as a fraction of labor income and
they have the same linex structure assumed for prices
Φw(x) = ϕw
(
exp (−ψw (x− γpi)) + ψw (x− γpi)− 1
ψ2w
)
, (2.29)
where x = Wt(k)/Wt−1(k) and γpi is the growth rate of nominal wages where
γ is the average growth rate of technology as we define below. Beside his labor
choices, the household member faces a standard consumption/saving trade-off. He
has access to a domestic bond market where nominal government bonds Bt(k) are
traded that pay (gross) interest Rt. Furthermore, he receives aggregate residual
real profits Dt(k) from the firms and has to pay lump-sum taxes Tt. Thus, the
household’s budget constraint is of the form
PtCt(k) +Bt(k) + Tt
= Wt(k)Ht(k)
(
1− Φw
(
Wt(k)
Wt−1(k)
))
+Rt−1Bt−1(k) + PtDt(k) + PtSCt,
where SCt(k) is the net cash inflow that household k receives from trading a full set
of state-contingent securities. We denote the the Lagrange multiplier associated
with the budget constraint by λt. The usual transversality condition on asset
accumulation applies, which rules out Ponzi schemes.
Monetary and Fiscal Policy. Monetary policy is described by an interest rate
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feedback rule of the form
Rt = R
∗ 1−ρR
t R
ρR
t−1e
R,t , (2.30)
where R,t is a monetary policy shock and R
∗
t is the (nominal) target rate. Our
specification of R∗t implies that the central bank reacts to inflation and deviations
of output growth from its equilibrium steady state γ:
R∗t = rpi
∗
( pit
pi∗
)ψ1 ( Yt
γYt−1
)ψ2
. (2.31)
Here r is the steady state real interest rate, pit is the gross inflation rate defined
as pit = Pt/Pt−1, and pi∗ is the target inflation rate, which in equilibrium coincides
with the steady state inflation rate. The fiscal authority consumes a fraction ζt
of aggregate output Yt, where ζt ∈ [0, 1] follows an exogenous process. The gov-
ernment levies a lump-sum tax (subsidy) to finance any shortfalls in government
revenues (or to rebate any surplus).
The model economy is perturbed by four exogenous processes. Aggregate pro-
ductivity evolves according to
lnAt = ln γ + lnAt−1 + ln zt, where ln zt = ρz ln zt−1 + z,t. (2.32)
Thus, on average technology grows at the rate γ and zt captures exogenous fluc-
tuations of the technology growth rate. Define gt = 1/(1 − ζt). We assume that
ln gt = (1− ρg) ln g + ρg ln gt−1 + g,t. (2.33)
The inverse demand elasticity for intermediate goods evolves according to a first
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order autoregressive processes in logs:
lnλp,t = (1− ρp) lnλp + ρp lnλp,t−1 + p,t. (2.34)
Finally, the monetary policy shock R,t is assumed to be serially uncorrelated.
The five innovations are independent of each other at all leads and lags and are
normally distributed with means zero and standard deviations σz, σg, σp, and σR,
respectively.
2.6 Estimation and Evaluation of DSGE Model
The estimation and evaluation of the DSGE model proceeds in three steps. In Sec-
tion 2.6.1 the DSGE model is estimated for two samples: 1960-2007 and 1984-2007,
using the same series that were studied in Section 2.4. In Section 2.6.2 we use pos-
terior predictive checks that are based on posterior mean estimates of QAR(1,1)
parameters to assess whether the nonlinearities captured in the second-order ap-
proximated DSGE model are commensurate with the nonlinearities captured by
the QAR(1,1) model. Finally, we assess the effect of adjustment cost asymmetries
on the model’s ability to generate nonlinear inflation and wage growth dynamics
in Section 2.6.3.
2.6.1 DSGE Model Estimation on U.S. Data
The second step in the empirical analysis consists of estimating the DSGE model
based on the same data that was used to estimate the QAR(1,1) models in Sec-
tion 2.4. The marginal prior distributions for the DSGE model parameters are
summarized in Table ??. We use pre-sample evidence to quantify a priori beliefs
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about the average growth rate of the economy, as well as average inflation and
real interest rates. We use the same priors for both samples. The prior mean for
τ implies a risk aversion coefficient of 2. Our prior for the Frisch labor supply
elasticity covers some of the low values estimated in the microeconometrics liter-
ature as well as a value of 2 advocated in the real-business-cycle literature based
on steady-state considerations. The prior for the price-adjustment-cost parameter
ϕp is specified indirectly through a prior for the slope κ(ϕp) of the New Keynesian
Phillips curve. This prior encompasses values that imply an essentially flat as well
as a fairly steep Phillips curve. The prior for the wage rigidity is directly specified
on ϕw and spans values in the range from 0 to 30. The priors for the asymmetry
parameters ψp and ψw are centered at zero (symmetric adjustment costs) and have
a large variance, meaning that the asymmetries could potentially be strong. We
do not restrict the signs of ψp and ψw, i.e., allowing a priori for both downward
and upward price and wage rigidities. The priors for the monetary policy rule
coefficients are centered at 1.5 (reaction to inflation), 0.2 (output growth), and
0.5 (interest rate smoothing). Finally, we use priors for the parameters associated
with the exogenous shock processes then generate a priori reasonable magnitudes
for the persistence and volatility of the observables.
The DSGE model presented in Section 2.5 is solved using a second-order approx-
imation, which leads to a nonlinear state-space representation. We use the particle
filter developed in Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2007b) to evaluate
the likelihood function of the DSGE model. To facilitate the likelihood evalu-
ation with the particle filter, the measurement equation contains mean-zero iid
Gaussian measurement errors. The measurement error variances are set equal to
10% of the sample variances of GDP growth, inflation, interest rates, and nominal
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Table 2.2: Posterior Estimates for DSGE Model Parameters
Prior Posterior
1960:Q1-2007:Q4 1984:Q1-2007:Q4
Parameter Distribution Para (1) Para (2) Mean 90% Interval Mean 90% Interval
400
(
1
β − 1
)
Gamma 2.00 1.00 0.47 [0.08, 1.04] 1.88 [0.47, 3.01]
piA Gamma 3.00 1.00 3.19 [2.57, 3.84] 3.34 [2.44, 4.32]
γA Gamma 2.00 1.50 2.04 [1.57, 2.77] 1.98 [1.59, 2.36]
τ Gamma 2.00 1.00 4.83 [2.75, 7.28] 4.10 [2.35, 6.06]
ν Gamma 0.50 1.00 0.37 [0.21, 0.52] 0.10 [0.05, 0.17]
κ(ϕp) Gamma 0.30 0.20 0.02 [0.01, 0.04] 0.21 [0.12, 0.35]
ϕw Gamma 15.0 7.50 18.7 [8.47, 38.1] 11.7 [5.34, 20.2]
ψw Uniform -200 200 67.4 [33.2, 99.5] 59.4 [21.7, 90.9]
ψp Uniform -300 300 150 [130, 175] 165 [130, 192]
ψ1 Gamma 1.50 0.50 1.77 [1.51, 2.12] 2.57 [1.93, 3.26]
ψ2 Gamma 0.20 0.10 1.41 [0.97, 1.85] 0.79 [0.42, 1.18]
ρr Beta 0.50 0.20 0.81 [0.23, 0.72] 0.73 [0.64, 0.80]
ρg Beta 0.80 0.10 0.95 [0.92, 0.98] 0.96 [0.94, 0.98]
ρz Beta 0.20 0.10 0.48 [0.23, 0.72] 0.07 [0.01, 0.20]
ρp Beta 0.60 0.20 0.89 [0.86, 0.94] 0.90 [0.76, 0.98]
100σr InvGamma 0.20 2.00 0.17 [0.14, 0.21] 0.17 [0.12, 0.23]
100σg InvGamma 0.75 2.00 0.88 [0.58, 1.29] 0.83 [0.49, 1.30]
100σz Beta 0.75 2.00 0.44 [0.31, 0.62] 0.47 [0.38, 0.56]
100σp Beta 0.75 2.00 2.62 [0.46, 7.23] 6.54 [4.56, 9.37]
Notes: 1/g is fixed at 0.85. Para (1) and Para (2) list the means and the standard deviations
for Beta, Gamma, and Normal distributions; the upper and lower bound of the support for the
Uniform distribution; and s and ν for the Inverse Gamma distribution, where pIG(σ|ν, s) ∝
σ−ν−1e−νs
2/2σ2 . The effective prior is truncated at the boundary of the determinacy region. As
90% credible interval we are reporting the 5th and 95th percentile of the posterior distribution.
wage growth. Posterior inference is implemented with a single-block RWM algo-
rithm, described in detail in An and Schorfheide (2007). Theoretical convergence
properties of so-called particle MCMC approaches are established in Andrieu et
al. (2010).
Posterior summary statistics for the DSGE model parameters are reported in
Table 2.2. The most interesting and important estimates are the ones of the
asymmetry parameters in the price and wage adjustment cost function. The wage
and price rigidity estimates differ substantially across subsamples. For instance,
the estimated slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve is 0.02 for the 1960-
2007 sample, whereas it increases to 0.2 for the post-1983 sample. Likewise, the
estimated wage rigidity is larger over the long sample. The positive estimates of
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ψp and ψw imply that it is more expensive to lower prices and wages than to raise
them and that the asymmetry in prices is more pronounced than in wages. The
asymmetry of the adjustment costs is more pronounced for prices (ψˆp equals 150
and 165, respectively) than for wages (ψˆw equals 67 and 59, respectively).
Compared to the estimates reported by Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009) and Abbritti
and Fahr (2013) who report estimates of ψˆw = 3, 844 and ψˆw = 24, 700, respec-
tively, our estimates of the ψw’s are considerably smaller.
10 In our experience such
large values of ψw lead to a clear deterioration of the model’s ability to track U.S.
data. Moreover, the second-order solution of the DSGE model relies on a third-
order approximation of the linex cost function which becomes very inaccurate for
large values of ψ. In particular, we found that for values of ψw above 500 the the
adjustment costs for large positive wage changes (that lie in the support of the
ergodic distribution) would become negative due to the polynomial approximation
of the linex function.
We estimate the risk-aversion parameter τ to be fairly large, around 4, and
the Frisch labor supply elasticity to be fairly low, ranging from 0.1 to 0.4. The
estimates of ν are in line with those reported in R´ıos-Rull et al. (2012b). The
policy rule coefficient estimates are similar to the ones reported elsewhere in the
DSGE model literature. The coefficient ψ1 on inflation is larger for the post-1983
sample, which is consistent with the view that after the Volcker disinflation the
Federal Reserve Bank has responded more aggressively to inflation movements.
10Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009) estimated their DSGE model Simulated Method of Moments
(SMM). While they also used consumption and hours worked data in their estimation, the
SMM objective function only includes second moments. The authors find that the covariance
of consumption and hours worked, respectively, with wage growth plays a crucial role for their
estimation. Abbritti and Fahr (2013) use a calibration approach to parameterize their model.
Given their preferred calibration of the exogenous technology, discount-factor, and monetary-
policy shocks, they find that a very large value of ψw is needed to match the volatility and
skewness of wage growth observed in the data.
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The government spending shock, which should be viewed as a generic demand
shock, is the most persistent among the serially correlated exogenous shocks: ρg is
approximately 0.95. The estimated autocorrelation ρz of technology growth shock,
which generates most of the serial correlation in output growth rates, drops from
0.48 for the long sample to 0.07 for the post-1983 sample.
2.6.2 Posterior Predictive Checks
We proceed by examining whether QAR(1,1) parameter estimates obtained from
data that are simulated from the estimated DSGE model are similar to the es-
timates reported in Section 2.4 computed from actual data. This comparison is
formalized through a posterior predictive check. The role of posterior predictive
checks in Bayesian analysis is discussed in the textbooks by Lancaster (2004) and
Geweke (2005b) and reviewed in the context of the evaluation of DSGE models
in Del Negro and Schorfheide (2011b). The posterior predictive checks is imple-
mented with the following algorithm.
Posterior Predictive Check. Let θ(i) denote the i’th draw from the posterior
distribution of the DSGE model parameter θ.
i) For i = 1 to n:
ii) Conditional on θ(i) simulate a pre-sample of length T0 and an estimation
sample of size T from the DSGE model. The second-order approximated
DSGE model is simulated using the pruning algorithm described in Kim et
al. (2008). A Gaussian iid measurement error is added to the simulated data.
The measurement error variance is identical to the one imposed during the
estimation of the DSGE model. Denote the simulated data by Y
(i)
−T0+1:T .
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iii) Based on the simulated trajectory Y
(i)
−T0+1:T estimate the QAR(1,1) model as
described in Section 2.4.1. The prior for the QAR(1,1) parameters is elicited
from the presample Y
(i)
−T0+1:0 and the posterior is based on Y
(i)
1:T . Denote the
posterior median estimates of the QAR parameters by S(Y (i)−T0+1:T ).
iv) The empirical distribution of
{S(Y (i)−T0+1:T )}ni=1 approximates the posterior
predictive distribution of S|Y−T0+1:T . Examine how far the actual value
S(Y1:T ), computed from U.S. data, lies in the tail of its predictive distribu-
tion. 
The predictive check is carried out for each QAR(1,1) parameter estimate sep-
arately. The results are summarized in Figure 2.5. The top panel corresponds
to the 1960-2007 sample, whereas the bottom panel contains the results from the
1984-2007 sample. The red dots signify the posterior median estimates obtained
from U.S. data and correspond to the horizontal bars in Figure 2.1. The blue rect-
angles delimit the 90% credible intervals associated with the posterior predictive
distributions and the solid horizontal bars indicate the medians of the predictive
distributions. The length of the credible intervals reflects both parameter uncer-
tainty, i.e., the fact that each trajectory Y
(i)
−T0+1:T is generated from a different
parameter draw θ(i), and sampling uncertainty, meaning that if one were to hold
the parameters θ fixed, the variability in the simulated finite-sample trajectories
generates variability in posterior mean estimates. Because the posterior variance
of the DSGE model parameters is fairly small, these intervals mostly capture sam-
pling variability. Accordingly, they tend to be larger in the bottom panel (short
sample) than in the top panel (long sample).
By and large the QAR parameter estimates for output growth, wage growth, and
inflation from model-generated data are very similar to the ones obtained from
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Figure 2.5: Predictive Checks Based on QAR(1,1) Estimates
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Notes: Dots correspond to posterior median estimates from U.S. data. Solid horizontal lines
indicate medians of posterior predictive distributions for parameter estimates and the boxes
indicate 90% credible associated with the posterior predictive distributions.
actual data – in the sense that most of actual estimates do not fall far in the tails
of their respective posterior predictive distributions. Only interest rates exhibit
large discrepancies between actual and model-implied estimates of the QAR(1,1)
parameters.
Overall, the estimated DSGE model does not generate very strong nonlineari-
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ties. Posterior predictive distributions for φˆ2 and γˆ typically cover both positive
and negative values. The only exceptions are the predictive distributions for wage
growth and inflation γˆ conditional on the 1960-2007 sample, which imply that γˆ
is positive. Recall from Table 2.2 that for this sample we estimate sizeable ad-
justment costs (κˆ = 0.02 and ϕˆw = 18.7). Moreover, the asymmetry parameter
estimates are substantially larger than zero: ψˆp = 150 and ψˆw = 67.4. The model-
implied positive estimates of γ imply that high inflation and wage-growth rates
are associated which high levels of volatility, which describes the experience of the
U.S. economy in the 1970s and early 1980s. However, the nonlinear inflation and
wage dynamics do not generate any spillovers to nonlinearities in GDP growth
or the interest rate. Figure 2.5 indicates that the predictive distribution for the
corresponding φˆ2 and γˆ are centered at zero. For the 1984-2007 sample the over-
all magnitude of the estimated adjustment costs are smaller, which flattens the
adjustment cost functions, makes the asymmetries less important for equilibrium
dynamics, and shifts the predictive distribution for the inflation and wage growth
γˆ’s toward zero.
There are two types of nonlinearities present in the data that the estimated
DSGE model does not predict. First, for the short sample φˆ2 for GDP growth
is negative, because the post-1983 sample exhibits pronounced drop in output
growth during the recessions but does not feature positive growth rates of similar
magnitudes in early parts of expansions. Second, the interest rate exhibits strong
nonlinearities in the data, i.e., a large positive γˆ in the 1960-2007 sample and a
large negative φˆ2 in the 1984-2007 sample, that the DSGE model is unable to
reproduce.
To sum up, of the nonlinearities we identified in Section 2.4, the only ones the
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DSGE model seems to be able to deliver are the conditional heteroskedasticity
in inflation and nominal wage growth. It is able to do so relying on the asym-
metric adjustment costs which penalize downward adjustments more than upward
adjustments. However, while ex-ante reasonable, these asymmetries in prices do
not spill over to quantities. Moreover, since the interest-rate feedback rule in the
model does not feature any asymmetries, which would result from the central bank
having an asymmetric loss function, and since there are no asymmetries in GDP
growth in the model, the policy instrument does not display the asymmetry we
identified in the data.
2.6.3 The Role of Asymmetric Adjustment Costs
To further study the role of asymmetric adjustment costs in generating nonlinear
wage and inflation dynamics we repeat the predictive checks based on φˆ2 and γˆ for
alternative choices of ψp and ψw. We focus on the 1960-2007 sample because the
nonlinearities are more pronounced than in the post-1983 sample. For each draw
θ(i) from the posterior distribution of the DSGE model parameters, we replace ψ
(i)
p
and ψ
(i)
w by alternative values ψ¯p and ψ¯w. In particular, we consider an elimination
of the asymmetries, i.e., ψ¯p = ψ¯w = 0 and an increase to ψ¯p = ψ¯w = 300. The
results are plotted in Figure 2.6. A decrease of the asymmetry in the adjustment
costs moves the predictive distributions of φˆ2 and γˆ toward zero, whereas an
increase shifts them further away from zero. Relative to the overall width of
the predictive intervals the location shifts are fairly small. This highlights that a
precise measurement of nonlinearities is very difficult using quarterly observations.
For nominal wage growth the increase in the asymmetry parameters essentially
eliminates the gap between the median of the posterior predictive distributions
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Figure 2.6: Effect of Adjustment Costs on Nonlinearities
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Notes: 1960-2007 sample. Box plots of posterior predictive distribution for φ2 and γ estimates for
different parameter values of the adjustment cost functions. No Asymmetric Costs is ψp = ψw =
0 (light blue); High Asymmetric Costs is ψp = ψw = 300 (dark blue). Large Dots correspond to
posterior median estimates based on U.S. data.
for φˆ2 and γˆ and the estimates obtained from actual data, which are -0.05 and
0.14, respectively. For inflation the median of the predictive distributions for
φˆ2 and γˆ shift slightly upward, toward 0.05 and 0.06, respectively. This implies
that the actual value of φˆ2 lies further in the tail of the predictive distribution
if ψw is increased, whereas the actual value of γˆ is less far in the tails. While
an increase of ψw improves the outcome of the predictive check constructed from
the QAR parameter estimates for nominal wage growth, judging from the overall
posterior distribution, the increased asymmetries lead to a deterioration of fit in
other dimensions of the model, which is why the posterior estimates for ψp and
ψw are only about 150 and 68, respectively.
107
2.7 Conclusion
Building on the specification of generalized autoregressive models, bilinear models,
and LARCH models, this paper uses a perturbation approximation of a nonlinear
difference equation to obtain a new class of nonlinear time series models that
can be used to assess nonlinear DSGE models. We use these univariate QAR(1,1)
models to identify nonlinearities in the U.S. data and to construct predictive checks
to assess a DSGE model ability to capture nonlinearities that are present in the
data. The QAR(1,1) estimates obtained from U.S. data highlight nonlinearities
in output growth, inflation, nominal wage growth, and interest rate dynamics.
Output growth displays sharp declines and slow recoveries in the post-1983 sample.
Inflation and nominal wage growth both display conditional heteroskedasticity in
the 1960-2007 sample. Finally, downward adjustments in the federal funds rate
seem to be easier than upwards adjustments in the post-1983 sample.
Among the nonlinearities identified through the estimation of the QAR models,
the only ones that our estimated DSGE model seems to be able to capture, are the
conditional heteroskedasticity in inflation and nominal wage growth. The model
does so by relying on the asymmetric adjustment costs which penalize downward
adjustments more than upward adjustments. The model is not able to generate
the apparent nonlinearities in output growth and the federal funds rate.
The tools developed in this paper can be used to identify nonlinearities in any
time series and doing this for other key series such as labor market variables in
the U.S., and for key variables in other countries will be a useful exercise. The
predictive checks simply require a simulation from the model and can be applied to
any model, whether or not it is estimated, and should be a part of the toolbox for
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researchers working with DSGE models. Finally, we leave multivariate extensions
of the QAR model, where the main challenge is to cope with the dimensionality
of the model, to future research.
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Chapter 3
Risk, Economic Growth and the
Market Value of U.S.
Corporations
3.1 Introduction
During the postwar period, the U.S. economy experienced large movements in the
value of firms. The market value of U.S. corporations relative to gross domestic
product (henceforth, value-output ratio) went through a slump during the 1970s
followed by a large increase throughout the 1980s and 1990s until the marked
decline of the last decade.1 Researchers have devoted a great effort to understand-
ing the origins of these medium-term fluctuations.2 A widespread view among
them is that the value of corporations should be particularly sensitive to variables
1We define the market value of the U.S. corporate sector to be the sum of outstanding
equities and net debt liabilities. See Appendix D.5 for details in the construction of this series
using Flow of Funds data.
2In this paper, we refer to medium-term fluctuations as the movements in the medium
frequency component of a time series. As in Comin and Gertler (2006), the medium term
consists of frequencies between 32 and 200 quarters.
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that drive expectations of future corporate payouts and that influence the rate at
which investors discount them. Within this context, research pioneered by Barsky
and De Long (1993) and Bansal and Yaron (2004) suggests that economic funda-
mentals affecting the long-run growth of corporate payouts and its risk should be
responsible for these large swings in the stock market.
Motivated by this view, recent studies have investigated the links between aggre-
gate productivity and asset prices. While Beaudry and Portier (2006) and Croce
(2012) have documented a strong sensitivity of stock prices to the mean of total
factor productivity (TFP) growth, the theories mentioned above also suggest that
variation in other moments of aggregate productivity may be relevant. Moreover,
the documented empirical correlation between TFP growth and stock prices does
not reveal a direction of causality.3 This latter concern is strengthened by the
finding that productivity driven standard macroeconomic models are not able to
generate the medium-term fluctuations in the value of firms when calibrated with
a realistic TFP process (see Boldrin and Peralta-Alva, 2009).
In this paper, we present new evidence on the relation between the value of
U.S. corporations and aggregate productivity. First of all, we document empir-
ically that changes in the volatility of TFP growth are important in predicting
the medium-term movements in the value of U.S. corporations. We fit a Markov
Switching model to TFP growth, detecting large and infrequent shifts in the mean
and volatility of this series throughout the postwar period.4 We then show that
3Changes in asset prices, for example, may feed-back into decisions of economic agents and
therefore influence aggregate productivity. Jermann and Quadrini (2007) study an economy
where increases in asset prices relax firms’ credit constraints and endogenously generate an
increase in measured TFP.
4In particular, we estimate that TFP was in a “high growth regime” between 1960Q1-1973Q1
and 1994Q1-2003Q4, while we estimate a “low volatility regime” during the period 1984Q1-
2009Q3. These results are consistent with previous empirical analysis on the behavior of U.S.
productivity; see for example Kahn and Rich (2007) and Benigno et al. (2011).
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these shifts explain two-thirds of the medium-run variability in the value-output
ratio measured using a band pass filter. In particular, a 1% increase in the con-
ditional mean of productivity growth is associated with a 19% increase in the
value-output ratio, while this indicator declines by 4% following a 1% increase
in the standard deviation of TFP growth. The second contribution of this paper
is to assess whether these elasticities can be interpreted as the response of asset
prices to exogenous changes in the first two moments of TFP growth. We develop
a stochastic growth model and show that, for reasonable calibrations, the model
is consistent with a large response of the value-output ratio to shocks in the mean
and volatility of TFP growth.
We build a stochastic growth model where households have Epstein-Zin prefer-
ences and where TFP growth is driven by two disturbances: a persistent Markov-
Switching shock to its mean and a purely transitory shock. Consistent with our
empirical analysis, we allow the volatility of the transitory component to vary over
time. We assume a particular form of incomplete information: agents are aware of
the underlying structure of the economy, and in every period they observe realized
TFP growth, but they cannot tell whether movements in TFP growth come from
the Markov-Switching mean or the transitory shock. We assume that they form
beliefs about the mean of TFP growth using Bayes’ rule.5 The induced movements
in beliefs about the growth regime influence agents’ views over future corporate
payouts. Beside the standard neoclassical channel, our model features monop-
olistic rents in production. This is intended to capture variation in dividends
unrelated to the marginal product of physical capital, e.g., organizational capi-
tal, patents, etc.. These are factors that previous research identifies as important
5The resulting filtering problem implies that the model shifts in the mean of productivity
growth are difficult to detect in real time, a fact that is well documented for the U.S. economy
(see Edge et al., 2007).
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drivers of firms’ valuation (see Hall, 2001). The interaction between incomplete
information, monopolistic rents and Epstein-Zin preferences generates a strong
sensitivity of the value-output ratio to the first two moments of TFP growth com-
pared to a full information neoclassical benchmark. In the next two paragraphs,
we briefly discuss the intuition underlying this result.
In the model, the behavior of the value of corporations conditional on a growth
shock resembles qualitatively that of related production based asset pricing models,
in particular Croce (2012). Indeed, under a plausible calibration of preferences,
the model features a strong intertemporal substitution effect. A persistent in-
crease in the mean of TFP growth is associated with expectations of a higher
growth in corporate payouts, and households react to this change in expectations
by demanding more assets. A higher demand for assets pushes up the value of
corporations, therefore generating a positive association between TFP growth and
asset prices. Our model, though, is less restrictive than Croce (2012) with respect
to the quantitative association. In fact, and differently from a neoclassical setting,
the value of corporations in our model is the sum of two components: the market
value of the physical capital stock and the present value of rents that firms are
expected to generate. As we will discuss in the paper, the latter component is
an order of magnitude more sensitive to the mean of TFP growth than the for-
mer. This aspect greatly improves the model’s ability to generate an empirically
plausible behavior for prices and quantities relative to its neoclassical benchmark.6
The model also has implications for the effects of volatility on the value of corpo-
rations. As in other production-based long-run risk models, agents in our economy
6Indeed, absent monopolistic rents, strong frictions in the production of capital would be
required by the model in order to generate a large elasticity of the value-output ratio to the
mean of TFP growth. These frictions, while making asset prices more volatile, would reduce the
relative volatility of investment to an empirical implausible level.
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are strongly averse to long-run fluctuations in the growth rate of corporate pay-
outs, and they therefore ask for a sizable compensation when holding shares. An
increase in the uncertainty over the long-run component of firms’ productivity
growth would accordingly generate a reduction in asset prices through its effects
on risk premia. In our model, this channel is triggered by the interactions between
incomplete information and volatility. Indeed, an increase in the volatility of the
transitory component of TFP growth adds more noise to the filtering problem
that agents are solving in real time. This makes them more uncertain about the
long-run properties of corporate payouts. Depending on the calibration consid-
ered, asset prices can be very sensitive to the volatility of TFP growth, a feature
that a model with full information would miss.7
We document that, under plausible calibrations, the model generates business
cycle statistics for real and financial variables that are in line with postwar U.S.
observations. Moreover, we compute the model implied elasticities of the value-
output ratio to the mean and volatility of TFP growth and compare them with
our empirical estimates. We find that a 1% increase in the mean of TFP growth
is associated with a 4% increase in the value-output ratio. At the same time, this
indicator falls by 0.4% after a 1% increase in the standard deviation of productivity
growth. This represents, respectively, 20% and 9% of the magnitude observed in
the data. We also show that, for less conservative calibrations of the TFP process,
the growth elasticity can be reconciled with our empirical estimates, while the
model accounts for 60% of the sensitivity of the value-output ratio to the volatility
of TFP growth.
Related Literature. The idea that variations in risk and economic growth
7See for example Naik (1994).
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influence asset prices has a long tradition in economics, see for example Malkiel
(1979), Pindyck (1984), Barsky (1989), Barsky and De Long (1993), Bansal and
Yaron (2004) and references therein. In a recent paper, Lettau et al. (2008) present
an endowment economy where shifts in the mean and volatility of consumption
growth influence stock prices. Their model accounts for the 1990s “boom” in the
U.S. stock market via a decline in the volatility of consumption growth, while
they estimate that changes in the mean of consumption growth have small effects
on stock prices. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to look at more
fundamental sources of variation in a general equilibrium model with production.
Our paper contributes to the production-based asset pricing literature (Jermann,
1998; Tallarini, 2000; Boldrin et al., 2001; Gourio, 2012). Within this literature,
our work is closely related to that of Croce (2012). He studies a neoclassical
growth model with recursive preferences, adjustment costs and persistent variation
in the mean of TFP growth. His model is consistent with the cyclical behavior of
standard real and financial indicators of the U.S. economy. The analysis, though,
is silent about the performance of the model regarding the elasticity of asset prices
to the mean and volatility of TFP growth. One of our contributions is to show
that two plausible mechanisms dramatically improve the model’s ability to capture
this conditional behavior of asset prices: incomplete information and monopolistic
rents.
Incomplete information is important in our model to generate a quantitatively
meaningful association between volatility and asset prices. The friction we con-
sider is not new in the literature, see for example Kydland and Prescott (1982a)
and Edge et al. (2007). Relative to the existing literature, we point out an in-
teresting interaction between learning and time-varying volatility. An increase in
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the volatility of the transitory component of TFP growth dampens the ability of
agents to learn about the persistent component of TFP growth.8 In a model with
Epstein-Zin preferences, this endogenous variation in uncertainty over long-run
growth has strong asset pricing implications. We find in addition that monopolis-
tic rents greatly enhance the performance of standard exogenous growth models
regarding the volatility of asset prices without impairing their ability to account
for variations in quantities. A similar point has been made recently by Comin et
al. (2009) and Iraola and Santos (2009) in a class of endogenous growth models.
We consider our empirical findings particularly relevant for the literature study-
ing movements in asset prices over longer horizons. Several attempts have been
put forth to explain the behavior of the U.S. stock market. Plausible explanations
for the medium-term movements in the value of corporations include technolog-
ical revolutions (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1999; Laitner and Stolyarov, 2003;
Pastor and Veronesi, 2009), variation in taxes and subsidies (McGrattan and
Prescott, 2005), intangible investments (Hall, 2001) and the saving behavior of
baby boomers (Abel, 2003). Our paper suggests that a successful theory should
account for the joint evolution of productivity growth and asset prices, since these
two series share common cycles in the medium run. This would help the profession
with the task of measuring the contribution of each of these mechanisms.
Layout. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 3.2 we doc-
ument the medium-term association between productivity growth and the value-
output ratio. Section 3.3 presents the model. In section 3.4 we calibrate the model,
8Bullard and Singh (2012) discuss a setting in which the opposite happens. They consider
an RBC model with a similar signal extraction problem to ours, but they model an increase in
the volatility of TFP growth by permanently increasing the gap between the two means of the
TFP growth process. This change, while increasing the unconditional volatility of TFP growth,
makes the signal extraction problem easier as agents can better distinguish between the two
different growth regimes.
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study its business cycle properties and analyze the behavior of the value-output
ratio conditional on a persistent change in the mean and volatility of TFP growth.
Section 4.5 concludes.
3.2 Productivity Growth and the Market Value
of U.S. Corporations: Empirical Evidence
We begin by looking at simple indicators of time variation in the mean and volatil-
ity of productivity growth. We construct a quarterly series for total factor produc-
tivity (TFP) in the U.S. business sector using BLS and NIPA data. Our data cover
the period from the first quarter of 1952 to the last quarter of 2010. In Figure 3.1,
we plot 10 years centered rolling window estimates for the annualized mean (top-
right panel) and standard deviation (bottom-right panel) of productivity growth.
The left panel of the figure plots the TFP growth series.
The data show substantial time variation in the mean and volatility of TFP
growth. In the top-right panel of Figure 3.1, we can observe the slowdown in
growth during the late 1960s/early 1970s and the subsequent resurgence during
the 1990s, facts that have been extensively discussed in narrative and econometric
studies on the U.S. economy.9 Regarding volatility, the bottom-right panel of
Figure 3.1 shows the drastic decline during the 1980s, consistent with the “great
moderation” in macroeconomic aggregates after 1984 (see Kim and Nelson, 1999;
McConnell and Quiros, 2000). It is also important to notice that shifts in these two
9One issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives is devoted to the productivity growth
slowdown of the 1970s (Volume 2, Number 4 ) and another issue to the resurgence in productivity
growth of the 1990s (Volume 14, Number 4 ). Econometric studies that have recently analyzed
shifts in the trend growth rate of productivity include Roberts (2000), French (2001), Kahn and
Rich (2007), Croce (2012) and Benigno et al. (2011).
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series are large and infrequent. For instance, the standard deviation of productivity
growth fluctuates very little during the period 1960-1980, and it experienced a
sudden reduction of about 50% in the early 1980s. Similarly, productivity growth
fell by 2% within a few years in the late 1960s and then fluctuated very little
around a value of 1.5% for about 20 years.
Figure 3.1: Growth and Volatility: Rolling Windows Estimates
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Note: The figure reports 10 years centered rolling windows estimates for the mean and volatility of TFP growth
(right panel). For example, the mean of TFP growth in 1980 is calculated as the arithmetic mean of
productivity growth within the period 1977.II-1983.II. The left panel reports the TFP growth series (blue line),
along with the rolling windows estimates for the mean (red line). The TFP growth series is annualized.
3.2.1 Identifying Shifts in Growth and Volatility: A Markov-
Switching Approach
We now describe a parametric model that we use to fit the shifts in the mean
and volatility of TFP growth documented in the previous section. We model the
growth rate of TFP as follows:
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∆Zt = µt + φ [∆Zt−1 − µt−1] + σtεt
µt = µ0 + µ1s1,t µ1 > 0 (3.1)
σt = σ0 + σ1s2,t σ1 > 0
εt ∼ N (0, 1) s1,t ∼MP(Pµ) s2,t ∼MP(Pσ)
The variable µt captures the different “growth regimes” characterizing the post-
war behavior of aggregate productivity. In particular, we assume that µt alternates
between two regimes driven by the Markov process s1,t ∈ {0, 1} whose law of mo-
tion is governed by the transition matrix Pµ. Since µ1 > 0, we interpret s1,t = 1
as the “high growth” regime during which productivity grows on average at the
rate µ0 +µ1, while s1,t = 0 implies that TFP grows at the rate µ0 (“low growth”).
Transitory fluctuations around µt are modeled via the white noise εt and an autore-
gressive component. The volatility of εt is allowed to fluctuate between a “high
volatility” regime and a “low volatility” regime driven by the Markov process
s2,t ∈ {0, 1}.10
Markov-Switching models are commonly used in the literature to fit large and
infrequent changes of the type observed in Figure 3.1, and they have already been
used to fit changes in the trend growth rate of productivity (see French, 2001; Kahn
and Rich, 2007).11 Our approach is different from existing ones in that we do not
model transitory fluctuations in the level of TFP. This is done mainly because the
10Our choice regarding the number of regimes is suggested by the nonparametric analysis in
the previous section and is confirmed by formal posterior odds comparisons.
11An equally plausible specification would be that of a random coefficients model in which
variations in µt and σt are represented by continuous stochastic processes. This approach has
been followed in a similar context by Cogley (2005). We have formally compared our specification
with one in which µt follows an AR(1) process, and the marginal data density slightly favors our
model. Results are available upon request.
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process in equation (1) makes the general equilibrium model of Section 3.3 more
tractable.
We estimate the model’s parameters using Bayesian methods. Appendix C.1.2
describes in detail the selection of the prior as well as the sampler adopted to
conduct inference. Table 3.1 reports posterior statistics for the model’s parame-
ters under the header Univariate Model, while the top panel of Figure 3.2 plots
posterior estimates of µt and σt.
Table 3.1: Markov-Switching Model: Prior Choices and Posterior Dis-
tribution
Univariate Model Multivariate Model
Parameter Prior Median 90% Credible Set Median 90% Credible Set
µ0 N (1.5, 1) 1.68 [0.30,2.67] 1.12 [0.59,2.67]
µ1 1(x > 0)N (1, 1) 1.19 [0.29,2.48] 1.75 [0.32,2.57]
σ0 IG(5, 2) 3.63 [3.40,3.83] 3.30 [2.60,3.99]
σ1 IG(5, 2) 2.51 [2.02,2.79] 2.92 [2.00,3.84]
φ N (0, 1) 0.10 [-0.01,0.20] 0.04 [-0.06,0.12]
P1,1,µ 1(|x| < 1)N (0.98, 0.3) 0.953 [0.543,0.998] 0.971 [0.861,0.997]
P2,2,µ 1(|x| < 1)N (0.98, 0.3) 0.975 [0.570,0.998] 0.969 [0.890,0.996]
P1,1,σ 1(|x| < 1)N (0.98, 0.3) 0.995 [0.965,0.999] 0.990 [0.901,0.999]
P2,2,σ 1(|x| < 1)N (0.98, 0.3) 0.992 [0.971,0.998] 0.990 [0.954,0.998]
The model clearly identifies movements in the volatility of productivity growth.
From the top right panel of Figure 3.2, we can observe a decline in σt of 44% in the
mid-1980s, with little uncertainty regarding this event. The model also identifies
a slight increase in the volatility of TFP growth toward the end of the sample,
although credible sets are large. On the contrary, shifts in the mean are poorly
identified with this approach, as shown by the large credible sets on µt and on the
parameters governing its behavior.
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Figure 3.2: Growth and Volatility: Markov-Switching Model
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Note: In the left panels, we report smoothed posterior estimates of µt. In particular, the solid line represents
the posterior mean E[µt|IT], while the shaded area denotes a 60% pointwise credible set. The right panels
report the same information for σt.
3.2.2 Identifying Shifts in Growth and Volatility: Multi-
variate Analysis
High uncertainty in our estimates for µt reflects the difficulties in detecting changes
in the trend growth rate of TFP. As the left panel of Figure 3.1 shows, transitory
fluctuations in TFP growth are large compared to the changes in the conditional
mean that we wish to isolate, and this complicates the filtering problem signif-
icantly. A remedy suggested in the literature consists of introducing additional
variables that carry information on µt. We follow this insight and augment the
model in equation (3.1) as follows:
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 ∆Zt
∆Yt
 =
 µt
µt
+ Φ
 ∆Zt−1 − µt−1
∆Yt−1 − µt−1
+ Σtet
µt = µ0 + µ1s1,t (3.2)
Σt = Σ0 + Σ1s2,t
εt ∼ N (0, 1) s1,t ∼MP(Pµ) s2,t ∼MP(Pσ)
This specification introduces a set of variables ∆Yt that share the same growth
rate as TFP. This formulation is rooted in economic theory. Indeed, under bal-
anced growth restrictions, equilibrium models predict that several economic ratios
share a common trend with TFP. This justifies the introduction of ∆Yt into the
analysis, as one can pool these time series with TFP growth in order to obtain a
sharper estimate of µt. Following Kahn and Rich (2007), we include the growth
rate of consumption per hour and compensation per hour in ∆Yt.
12
The law of motion for µt and Σt has the same Markov-Switching structure de-
scribed in the previous section. For tractability and parsimony, we allow the vari-
ance of the innovations to have common switches while keeping their correlation
structure constant over time.13 The model is estimated via Bayesian techniques
as discussed in Appendix C.1.3, and the results are reported under the header
Multivariate Model in Table 3.1 and in the bottom panel of Figure 3.2. These
estimates are consistent with the univariate analysis presented in the previous
section. The multivariate approach allows us to identify the shifts in the mean of
productivity growth more precisely. Credible sets on the parameters governing µt
12Consumption and wages are scaled by total hours in order to account for the unit root
behavior of hours worked that, under preferences consistent with balanced growth, is unrelated
to TFP dynamics. See Chang et al. (2007a) for a discussion of this issue.
13This is accomplished by reparametrizing Σt, see Appendix C.1.3 for details.
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are considerably tighter and this is reflected in increased precision of our estimates
for µt. As Figure 3.2 shows, we estimate that the trend growth rate of TFP was
about 3% in the periods 1960Q1:1973Q1 and 1997Q3:2004Q1, while growth was
around 1.3% in the remaining periods.
3.2.3 Productivity Growth and the Market Value of U.S.
Corporations
We now consider the relation between productivity growth and the market value
of U.S. firms. Following Hall (2001), Wright (2004) and McGrattan and Prescott
(2005), we use Flow of Funds data and define the market value of the U.S. corpo-
rate sector to be the sum of outstanding equities and net debt liabilities.14 This
indicator has the advantage of including the market value of closely held firms,
thus being a more reliable measure for trends in the value of firms relative to
standard indicators that are based only on publicly held corporations.
We summarize the relation between the value-output ratio and our estimates of
µt and σt via linear projections. Our benchmark specification is the following:
MVt = a + bµˆt + cσˆt + et (3.3)
Table 3.2 reports the results. From Column 3, we can observe a positive relation
between trend growth and the value-output ratio. An increase of 1% in the trend
growth rate of TFP is associated with an increase in the value-output ratio of
21%. Volatility, on the other hand, is negatively associated with the value of
14See Appendix D.5 for details on the calculation of this indicator.
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U.S. corporations. An increase of 1% in the standard deviation of TFP growth is
associated with a reduction in the value-output ratio of 12%.
Table 3.2: Growth, Volatility and the Value of U.S. Corporations
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Constant -0.34 0.36 0.17 -0.13
(0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.03)
µˆt 0.19 0.21 0.19
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
σˆt -0.07 -0.12 -0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.005)
R2 0.23 0.13 0.56 0.68
Note: Column [1] reports the results of a linear projection of E[µt|IT ] on the value-output ratio. Column [2]
reports the results of a linear projection of E[σt|IT ] on the value-output ratio. Column [3] reports the results
from the estimation of equation (3.3). Column [4] reports the results of a linear projection of E[µt|IT ] and
E[σt|IT ] on the medium frequency component of the the value-output ratio isolated using the band-pass filter
between 32 and 200 quarters. The value-output ratio is demeaned prior to running the projections. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses.
The linear projection also shows that the association between productivity growth
and the value-output ratio is sizable. Indeed, fluctuations in the first two moments
of productivity jointly predict more than half of the variation in the value-output
ratio at quarterly frequencies. In order to gain more insights into this associ-
ation, we plot in Figure 3.3 the value-output ratio along with the fitted values
of the linear projection. We can verify that the decline in growth in the early
1970s is closely followed by a sharp decline in the value-output ratio and that
the growth resurgence is associated with a boom in this indicator, while the sub-
sequent decline in productivity growth is associated with a fall in the valuation
of U.S. corporations. The great moderation occurred during a period of a rising
value-output ratio, while the surge in aggregate volatility observed toward the
end of the sample is associated with a decline in this indicator. Moreover, from
the figure we can see that most of the association between productivity growth
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and the value-output ratio occurs over horizons longer than the business cycle.
The fitted values of equation (3.3) closely track the medium term component of
the value-output ratio constructed using the band-pass filter (32-200 quarters).
This point is confirmed by column [4] of Table 3.2, where we project the medium
frequency component of the value-output ratio on µˆt and σˆt. Relative to column
[3], the R2 increases substantially, suggesting that the movements in TFP growth
and volatility that we identify are mainly relevant for predicting the medium-term
fluctuations in the value-output ratio.
Figure 3.3: Growth, Volatility and the Value of U.S. Corporations
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Note: The blue solid line plots the value of corporations scaled by gross domestic product. The red solid line
reports the fitted values of Equation (3.3). The black dotted line reports the medium frequency component of
the value-output ratio isolated using the band-pass filter between 32 and 200 quarters.
3.3 Model
So far, we have documented a strong relationship between persistent innovations
to the mean and standard deviation of TFP growth and medium-term fluctuations
in the value-output ratio. As mentioned in the Introduction, this reduced form
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association may have several interpretations. In what follows, we set up a quan-
titative model with the aim of measuring the fraction of this association that can
be explained by exogenous variation in the mean and volatility of TFP growth.
We consider a fairly standard growth model with four major ingredients:
i) Markov-Switching regimes in the mean and volatility of technological growth
ii) Recursive preferences
iii) Capital adjustment costs and monopolistic rents
iv) Incomplete information about the drivers of technological growth
In the model, infinitely lived households supply labor inelastically to firms and
own shares of the corporate sector. They use their dividend and labor income to
consume the final good and accumulate shares of the corporate sector. The final
good is sold in a competitive market by firms that aggregate a set of imperfectly
substitutable intermediate goods. Each variety is produced by an intermediate
good firm using capital and labor. Those firms rent the capital stock and labor
in competitive markets. They are monopolists in producing their variety. Capital
services are supplied by capital producers in a competitive market. These firms
own the capital stock and make optimal capital accumulation plans by maximizing
the present discounted value of profits.
Below we describe the major ingredients of our model, while Appendix C.2
contains a detailed account of the agents’ decision problems and of the equilibrium
concept adopted. In terms of notation, the level of variable X at time t is denoted
by Xt. Even though every endogenous variable depends on the history of shocks,
we keep the notation simple and omit this explicit dependence.
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3.3.1 Preferences
Households have Epstein-Zin preferences over streams of consumption. Given a
continuation value Ut+1 and consumption ct today, the agent’s utility is given by:
Ut = ((1− β)c
1−γ
η
t + βEt[((Ut+1)1−γ)]
1
η )
η
1−γ .
γ controls the degree of risk aversion, η is equal to 1−γ
1− 1
Ψ
and Ψ parametrizes
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption. The operator Et[.]
is interpreted as the expectation conditional on all the observations made by the
agents up to period t.
3.3.2 Production
A fixed variety of intermediate goods is produced in the economy. Intermediate
goods are indexed by j ∈ [0, 1], and each variety is produced by an intermediate
good producer. He uses capital services kj,t and labor services lj,t to produce yj,t
units of the good according to the production function:
yj,t = (e
Ztlj,t)
1−αkαj,t.
Zt is the log of TFP common to all firms. Intermediate goods are aggregated by
final good producers into units of a final good using the production function
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yt =
(∫ 1
0
y
ν−1
ν
j,t dj
) ν
ν−1
.
The final output is consumed by households or purchased by capital producers
to invest in capital. In particular, if a capital producer with kt units of capital
invests it, his stock of capital in period t + 1 will increase by G
(
it
kt
)
kt. For the
quantitative analysis, we parametrize G(.) as15
G (.) = a (.)1−τ + b.
Capital depreciates every period at the rate δ. Therefore, the stock of capital
for a producer evolves according to the following law of motion:
kt = (1− δ)kt +G
(
it
kt
)
kt
3.3.3 Total Factor Productivity and Information Structure
We model the logarithm of TFP as a random walk with time varying drift and
volatility:16
15This functional form is quite standard in the literature. Jermann (1998) points out that
the inverse of τ is equal to the elasticity of the investment-capital ratio to Tobin’s Q in a wide
class of models.
16This is different from Section 3.2 in that we do not include a autoregressive component, as
we did not find a strong contribution of this component in the estimation and as the omission
simplifies the numerical solution of the model.
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∆Zt = µt + σtεt εt ∼ N (0, 1),
where the drift and the volatility follow the Markov processes:
µt = µ0 + µ1s1,t µ1 > 0
σt = σ0 + σ1s2,t σ1 > 0.
The variable sj,t ∈ {0, 1} is a state whose probabilistic law of motion is governed
by the transition matrix Pj.
Household and firms know the parameters governing the stochastic process and
use it to form expectations about future periods. They are, however, imperfectly
informed about the drivers of technological progress. In particular, we assume that
they learn, at every point in time, the realization of TFP growth ∆Zt while not
observing its components µt and εt separately. Therefore, the information that
agents can use to update their beliefs about the current state of the stochastic
process is given by the history of TFP growth realizations, the state governing
volatility and an unbiased Gaussian signal gt = µt + σget that they receive in
every period. They are fully rational and form their beliefs about s1,t via Bayes’
rule. We denote the probability that any agent assigns to being in growth regime
s1,t in period t by pt(s1,t). Similarly, we label the likelihood that he attaches
to being in state s1,t+1 in period t + 1 by pt+1|t(s1,t+1) . Bayes’ rule implies the
following updating equations:
pt+1|t(s1,t+1) =
∑2
i=1 pt−1(i)P1(s1,t|i)∑2
j=1
∑2
i=1 pt−1(i)P1(j|i)
;
129
and
pt(s1,t) =
pt|t−1(s1,t)pN(∆Zt, gt|s1,t, s2,t)∑2
i=1 pt|t−1(i)pN(∆Zt, gt|i, s2,t)
pN(.|j, jˆ) is the pdf of a two dimensional normal random variable with mean
µ0+µ1j and standard deviation σ0+σ1jˆ for the first component and mean µ0+µ1j
and standard deviation σg for the second one. Both components are assumed to
be independent. The first equation updates the beliefs about the state today into
beliefs over the expected state tomorrow using the known probabilities of a state
transition. The second equation captures how those probabilities are updated
after observing the realizations of the growth rate and the signal. As we see, given
the structure of the stochastic process considered, (∆Zt, s2,t, gt) are sufficient to
update the beliefs of the household about the underlying state in the last period
to the beliefs in the current period.
3.3.4 Equilibrium and Numerical Solution
We focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which all capital good producers initially
own the same amount of capital. This assumption implies that capital good pro-
ducers make the same investment choices and that intermediate good producers
charge the same price and sell the same quantity to the final good producers. In
appendix C.2, we argue that the equilibrium law of motion for aggregate variables
can be derived from a planner’s problem, which we describe below.
The planner maximizes lifetime utility of the representative household by se-
lecting a sequence for investment, consumption, the capital stock and the value
function (it, ct, kt+1, Vt+1)
∞
t=0,
17 subject to the same information restriction as the
17These are functions of the realization of the stochastic process subject to the measurability
restrictions implied by the information structure.
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households, initial conditions and a function that maps the observed realizations
of shocks into an aggregate capital stock (kt)
∞
t=0:
18
max
(it,ct,kt+1,Vt+1)∞t=0
V0
s.t. ct + it =
ν − 1
ν
Ztk
α
t +
1
ν
Ztk
α
t
Vt = [(1− β)c
1−γ
η
t + βEt[V
1−γ
t+1 ]
1
η ]
η
1−γ
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt +G
(
it
kt
)
kt.
In addition, the choice of Vt has to be finite for all t. An equilibrium is fully
characterized when kt = kt. We solve the model numerically using global methods
as described in Appendix C.3.
3.3.5 Asset Prices
We can express the market value of firms as the present discounted value of corpo-
rate payouts to households. In our economy, there are two types of firms making
nonzero profits: the capital good producers and the intermediate good producers.
The per period profits of a capital good producer are given by:
18The aggregate capital is therefore measurable with respect to the households’ information
set and does not add new information to the signal extraction problem.
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dcpt = r
k
t kt − it,
where rkt stands for the return to capital. The per period profits of an intermediate
good producer are given in equilibrium by:
dipt =
1
ν
yt.
Profits are a fixed fraction of the revenues of an intermediate good producing firm.
Both types of producers distribute these profits to households in every period. As
a result, one can express the market value of these two types of firms as follows:
pst = Et
[ ∞∑
j=1
Λt,t+jd
s
t+j
]
s = {cp, ip}.
Here we denote by Λt,t+s the stochastic discount factor of the household between
period t and period t + s . The market value of the corporate sector is then the
sum of these two components. For future reference, it is convenient to further
characterize this object. Based on Hayashi (1982) it is easy to show that the
equilibrium value of the corporate sector is given by
pt =
1
(1− τ)a
(
it
kt
)τ
kt+1 +
1
ν
Et
[ ∞∑
j=1
Λt,t+jyt+j
]
. (3.4)
Indeed, one can easily verify that in our model the equilibrium value of capital
good producers can be expressed as the product of marginal Q and the capital
stock. The decomposition of equation (3.4) has an intuitive interpretation. It
tells us that, in equilibrium, the value of the corporate sector is the sum of two
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components: the value of the capital stock and the present discounted value of
monopolistic rents.19 In the next section, we will calibrate the model and study
how these two components respond to fluctuations in µt and σt.
3.4 Risk, Economic Growth and the Value of
Corporations
3.4.1 Calibration
We set a model period to be a quarter. The parameters of our model are:
θ = [δ, a, b, τ, β,Ψ, γ, µ0, µ1, P
µ
0|0, P
µ
1|1, σ0, σ1, P
σ
0|0, P
σ
1|1, α, ν, σg]
The depreciation parameter δ is set to 0.025, leading to an annual depreciation
rate of roughly 10%. We follow the literature in calibrating a and b so that
the deterministic balanced growth path of our model coincides with that of an
economy without adjustment costs (Van Binsbergen et al., 2010).20 The parameter
controlling the capital adjustment (τ) is set to 0.5, in the range of values considered
in the literature. The discount factor β is set to 0.994, a value that implies an
average annualized risk free-rate of 2.07%.21 Following Croce (2012), we set Ψ to
2 and γ to 10.22
19Indeed, in our decentralization, the price of capital equals 1(1−τ)a
(
it
kt
)τ
.
20We construct a deterministic balanced growth path around the average growth rate of TFP,
which we denote by µ.
21We solve the model repeatedly for different values of β until the average risk-free rate
computed on simulated data matches the target value. See Table 3.3 for additional details.
22A value of 2 for the IES and a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 10 are, for example,
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We use the empirical results in Section 3.2 to calibrate the parameters of the
shock process Zt.
23 In accordance with our estimates, we set µ0 = 0.003, µ1 =
0.0045, σ0 = 0.0082 and σ1 = 0.0073. As a benchmark, we restrict the transition
matrices of the two Markov processes to be symmetric, and we assume that Pµj|j =
Pσj|j. Thus, the two transition matrices can be represented by a single parameter,
denoted by ρ. We set ρ = 0.99, a value that implies an average state duration of
25 years. The unbiased signal in our model stands for all additional information
that agents use to infer shifts in the mean of productivity growth. We calibrate
its precision so that the average speed of learning is 16 quarters.24 This number
is consistent with the results in Edge et al. (2007) and Jorgenson et al. (2008).
We calibrate ν to 10, implying a markup of 10%. This value is in the range
typically considered in the business cycle literature for the whole U.S. economy.25
The remaining parameter to be calibrated is α. In our model, the labor income
share is given by
wtlt
yt
=
(ν − 1)
ν
(1− α), (3.5)
Because pure economic profits are treated as a reward to capital in U.S. national
accounts, we can calibrate α by matching a labor income share of 70% in line with
U.S. data. This strategy results in α = 0.22.
consistent with the estimates obtained by Attanasio and Vissing-Jorgensen (2003).
23In order to be consistent, we reestimate the model in Section 3.2 restricting the autoregres-
sive component of TFP growth to be equal to zero.
24We simulate the signal extraction problem 100,000 times. We keep the mean growth rate
fixed in the high regime for 100 periods. We then switch the regime to the low state and count
the number of periods it takes the filter to attach a probability of 0.9 to the low regime for the
first time. We keep changing σg until the average time it takes over the simulations is 16. The
resulting value for σg is 0.0074.
25See for example Altig et al. (2011) and their references.
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3.4.2 Unconditional Moments
Table 3.3 reports a set of model implied statistics for selected real and financial
variables along with their data counterparts. For comparison, we also report the
results for two natural benchmarks. We consider a version of our model in which
agents have perfect information over the TFP process (Full Info) and a version
in which intermediate firms operate in a competitive environment (No Rents).26
Under the calibration considered, our model generates business cycle fluctuations
for consumption, output and investment that are not too far from the data. In
particular, we obtain that consumption growth is less volatile than output growth,
while investment growth is more volatile, with relative magnitudes in line with data
observations. The model predicts a high degree of comovement of consumption
and investment growth with output growth. However it differs from the standard
Real Business Cycle model in that we obtain a relatively small correlation between
consumption and investment growth. This happens because changes in the beliefs
over the trend growth rate of TFP induce differential movements in aggregate
investment and consumption.27 Finally, the model implies a small autocorrelation
for the variables in growth rates, which is not surprising given its lack of a strong
internal propagation mechanism.28
The model is also consistent with the first two moments of the equity premium
26We recalibrate β in each case to keep the risk-free rate at 2.07 in order to make it easier to
contrast the three examples with regard to their asset pricing behavior.
27Indeed, a shock to the growth rate of TFP induces offsetting wealth and substitution effects
on the part of households. On the one hand, higher growth signals households’ higher income in
the future, which makes them more willing to reduce their savings and increase their consumption
level today. On the other hand, higher TFP growth implies a higher reward to savings today,
which motivates households to save more. Irrespective of which of these two effects prevails in
equilibrium, consumption and investment growth move in opposite directions conditional on a
TFP “growth” shock.
28This problem is shared by many simple business cycle models as discussed in Cogley and
Nason (1995).
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Table 3.3: Model Implied Moments for Selected Variables
σ(∆y)
σ(∆c)
σ(∆y)
σ(∆i)
σ(∆y)
ρ(∆y,∆c) ρ(∆y,∆i) ρ(∆i,∆c) ρ−1(∆y) ρ−1(∆c) ρ−1(∆i)
Data 1.00 0.79 2.69 0.70 0.69 0.60 0.34 0.23 0.50
Model 1.00 0.90 1.96 0.96 0.80 0.60 0.05 0.05 -0.04
Full Info 0.97 0.91 1.47 0.99 0.94 0.90 0.05 0.07 0.02
No Rents 0.90 0.89 1.94 0.89 0.82 0.47 0.06 0.05 -0.03
E[Re −Rf ] σ[Re −Rf ] ρ−1[Re −Rf ] E[Rf − 1] σ[Rf − 1] ρ−1[Rf − 1]
Data 4.49 15.89 0.02 2.07 2.6 0.61
Model 3.34 8.28 -0.06 2.07 1.63 0.87
Full Info 1.70 5.06 0.04 2.07 0.25 0.96
No Rents 3.52 5.00 0.43 2.07 2.12 0.87
Note: ∆Xt stands for the quarterly growth rate of variable X. Re is the annualized gross return on equity,
while Rf is the annualized gross return on a risk-free bond. We assume that equity is leveraged using a
debt-to-equity ratio of 1. The data figure for the volatility of the value-output ratio stands for the standard
deviation of the fitted values in equation (3.3). Means and standard deviations are reported in percentage
terms. Model statistics are based on a long simulation (T=1000000). The data column is based on quarterly
observations (1960Q1-2010Q4). Statistics on the equity premium and on the risk-free rate are calculated using
annual data from 1948 to 2010, which we downloaded from Robert Shiller’s website
http://www.econ.yale.edu/∼shiller/data.htm.
in postwar U.S. data. However, the mechanism through which we achieve a large
and volatile equity premium differs from that of other production-based versions
of the long-run risk model. Croce (2012), for example, generates a sizable eq-
uity premium by introducing a persistent random component into the growth rate
of productivity. This leads to covariation at low frequencies between consump-
tion growth and corporate payouts, therefore triggering the long run-risk channel
discussed in Bansal and Yaron (2004). In our model, this channel is triggered
by incomplete information. The Markov-Switching structure, in fact, imposes a
trade-off between the persistence and the volatility of µt. Under complete infor-
mation, the changes in the growth rate of corporate payouts would be too rare for
agents to require large premia on stocks.29 With incomplete information, though,
29As we use realized postwar growth rates in output to discipline our calibration, the model
cannot generate a high risk premium by triggering the rare disaster risk channel as in Gourio
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what matters for the equity premium are the beliefs of agents regarding µt. In
our model, these beliefs are more volatile than µt because the learning process
is influenced by high frequency variations in TFP growth, in its volatility and in
the signal. This generates additional risk from the perspective of investors. The
resulting effect on prices stands out clearly when comparing the performance of
our model to its full information benchmark since the latter generates a sensibly
lower equity premium (1.70% versus 3.34% implied by our model).
While still falling short on the volatility of the equity premium in the data, the
calibrated model substantially improves relative to the Full Information and the
No Rents model. As will be argued in more depth in the next section, incom-
plete information raises the sensitivity of asset prices to σt, while monopolistic
rents make them more sensitive to µt. A stronger response of asset prices to eco-
nomic fundamentals contribute to raising the unconditional volatility of the equity
premium. Finally, the model is able to generate the low volatility and high persis-
tence of the risk-free rate observed in U.S. postwar data. The mechanisms through
which this happens are well understood in the literature on the production-based
long-run risk model, see for example Croce (2012).
3.4.3 Growth, Volatility and the Value of Corporations
In the previous section, we discussed the performance of the model in reproducing
key unconditional moments. We now study the sensitivity of the value-output
ratio to the first two moments of TFP growth. For this purpose, and in view of
the analysis of Section 3.2, it is natural to study the model implied elasticities
of the value-output ratio to the mean and volatility of TFP growth. In what
(2012).
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follows, we analyze the economic mechanisms through which µt and σt influence
the value-output ratio by means of impulse response functions (IRFs) and through
extensive sensitivity analysis. In Section 3.4.5, we will ask how far the model goes
in matching quantitatively these elasticities.
Figure 3.4 shows IRFs of selected variables to a positive change in µt. The top
panel reports the dynamics of TFP growth and the value-output ratio, while the
bottom panel plots the response of the expected stochastic discount factor and
the expected average 5-year growth rate of corporate payouts. The annualized
growth rate of TFP increases by 1.5% and reverts back to trend thereafter. After
the switch, agents slowly learn about the transition to the high-growth regime.
Agents’ beliefs about µt, represented by the dotted line in the top-left panel of the
figure, steadily increase from quarter 1 to quarter 20, after which agents become
almost sure that a change in regime has occurred. During this period, we observe
a protracted increase in the value-output ratio. From a quantitative point of view,
a 1.5% increase in TFP growth is associated, at peak, with an 8% increase in the
value-output ratio.
The bottom panel of Figure 3.4 captures the mechanism through which higher
economic growth induces an increase in the value-output ratio. As households
learn about the switch to the high-growth regime, they anticipate higher con-
sumption growth for an extended period of time. This positive wealth effect low-
ers the rate at which households discount corporate payouts, as the bottom-left
panel of the figure shows. Ceteris paribus, the decline in the stochastic discount
factor has a depressive effect on the value of corporations. However, higher TFP
growth changes the expectations that households have regarding future corporate
payouts. Indeed, the bottom-right panel of the figure shows that long-run expec-
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tations regarding the growth rate of corporate payouts slowly increase after the
switch to the high-growth regime. Households have thus an incentive to substi-
tute from current to future consumption by acquiring more securities, generating
upward pressures on the value of firms. Since under our calibration agents are
not too averse to intertemporal substitution, the latter effect dominates and the
value-output ratio rises after a switch to the high-growth regime.
Figure 3.4: IRFs to a Growth Switch
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Note: IRFs are calculated via simulation techniques. We simulate M = 25000 different realization of length
T = 500. Each simulation has the characteristic that the trend growth rate of TFP is in the low state between
period 1 and period 400 and switches to the high regime in period 401. After that, the simulations are not
restricted with regard to the mean. The volatility state is fixed to its low state throughout the simulations. The
above figure report the mean across the Monte Carlo replications as percentages with respect to period 400 for
the expected discount factor and the value output ratio. The growth rate of TFP and corporate payouts is
reported in annualized terms. The average expected growth of corporate payouts over 20 periods is shown
relative to the average dividends in period 400. The black dotted lines report the IRFs for a model with perfect
competition in the markets for intermediate goods (ν =∞).
We can also observe that imperfect competition significantly raises the sensitivity
of asset prices to µt. As we can see from the dotted line in Figure 3.4, the No Rents
model implies a response of the value-output ratio of only 1% at peak, sensibly
smaller with respect to that in our benchmark model. We can rationalize this
difference across models by looking at the behavior of expected corporate payouts
growth in the bottom-right panel of the figure. In our model, corporate payout
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growth is more responsive to µt relative to what happens in the No Rents model.
This result is best understood in terms of the decentralization of the economy
discussed in Section 3.3. In the No Rents model, the value of corporations equals
the value of capital good firms, while in our model the value of corporations also
includes the market value of intermediate good producers. These two sectors of
the economy differ in terms of their competitiveness. Capital good producers
are identical to each other, while intermediate good firms have traits that partly
shield them from competitive pressures. Once the growth rate of TFP increases,
capital good producers have an incentive to invest. As more producers invest, the
marginal product of existing capital for every firms declines, therefore eroding part
of the profits induced by higher TFP growth. Firms operating in the intermediate
good sector, instead, are not affected by these competitive pressures. Thus, their
payouts growth is more responsive to changes in µt.
Figure 3.5 reports the response of the value-output ratio when the economy tran-
sits from the low to the high volatility regime. Higher volatility of TFP growth
is associated with declining asset prices. In particular, the value-output ratio in
our model falls by 3.5%. The bottom panel of Figure 3.5 captures the major
trade-off that higher volatility brings. An increase in σt is associated by agents
with more aggregate risk. As individuals are risk averse, they have stronger incen-
tives to demand shares in order to insure consumption fluctuations. The expected
stochastic discount factor, therefore, increases. However, households also real-
ize that corporate shares are now riskier securities. Indeed, as the bottom-right
panel of Figure 3.5 shows, the covariance between the stochastic discount factor
and equity returns declines.Therefore, households have an incentive to substitute
corporate shares with current consumption, and this puts downward pressure on
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share prices. Since the IES is sufficiently large in our economy, this latter effect
dominates, resulting in a negative association between volatility and asset prices.
It is also clear from the figure that incomplete information is the key model ele-
ment governing the sensitivity of asset prices to σt. Indeed, in the full information
model, the switch to the high volatility regime is associated with a 1% decline in
the value-output ratio, 3.5 times smaller with respect to our benchmark specifi-
cation. This happens because a change in the volatility is perceived differently
by the agents in the two models. In the full information set-up, the increase in
the volatility of the transitory component of TFP growth has almost no influ-
ence on risk, since the stochastic discount factor is hardly affected by transitory
TFP growth shocks. In our model, instead, an increase in σt makes learning over
µt more difficult and raises agents’ uncertainty over long-run growth. As a re-
sult, households demand a higher compensation to hold assets whose expected
discounted payouts are strongly influenced by µt. This variation in risk premia,
absent in the full information model, is the major driver of the response of the
value-output ratio to σt.
3.4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
We now briefly discuss the sensitivity of the results presented in the previous
section to our calibration. In order to do so, we construct the model implied
elasticities of the value-output ratio to µt and σt and study how these elasticities
are affected when changing some key parameters of the model. Let θ′ be a given
value for our parameter vector. Conditional on θ′, we simulate realizations of
length T for µt, σt and for the value-output ratio. Given these simulated series,
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Figure 3.5: IRFs to a Volatility Switch
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Note: IRFs are calculated via simulation techniques. We simulate M = 25000 different realization of length
T = 500. Each simulation has the characteristic that the volatility of TFP is in the low state between period 1
and period 400 and switches to the high regime in period 401. After that, the simulations are not restricted with
regard to the volatility. The mean growth rate is fixed to its high state throughout the simulations. The above
figure reports the mean across the Monte Carlo replications as percentages with respect to period 400 for all
series but the volatility. The black dotted lines report the IRFs for a model with perfect information (σg = 0).
we run the following linear projection:
pt
yt
= a + bµˆt + cσˆt + et.
The coefficients of these linear projections, {b(θ′), c(θ′)}θ′ , are the model coun-
terparts of the elasticities computed in Section 3.2 using U.S. data.30 Moreover,
they are an interesting object to base our sensitivity analysis on since they give
information on the sign and size of the association between the value-output ratio,
economic growth and volatility.
30In our simulations, µˆt and σˆt are the retrospective estimates of households. These differ,
in principle, from what an econometrician would obtain by estimating the system in (2) using
data simulated from our model. We have verified, though, that in practice the two produce
almost identical quantitative results. We have therefore decided to use households’ retrospec-
tive estimates when calculating the model implied elasticities, since it substantially reduces the
computational burden of the procedure.
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We organize our discussion around four key parameters: i) the elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution (Ψ); ii) the elasticity of marginal Q with respect to the
investment-capital ratio (τ); iii) the elasticity of substitution between intermediate
goods (ν); and iv) the persistence of the Markov processes (ρ). Figure 3.6 reports
the value of b when varying these four parameters one at a time, with the red
dotted line marking our benchmark calibration.
The top-left panel shows that b is increasing in Ψ. This is in line with our
discussion in the previous section. Indeed, we have seen how a switch from the
low- to the high-growth regime brings in offsetting wealth and substitution effects
on households. As agents become less averse to intertemporal substitution (Ψ
increases), the substitution effect becomes stronger, and their demand of corporate
shares becomes more sensitive to fluctuations in µt. As a result, a 1% increase in
the trend growth rate of TFP is associated with a stronger increase in the value-
output ratio. Notice that when Ψ is sufficiently small, b becomes negative. In
these situations, the wealth effect dominates the substitution effect, leading to a
negative association between economic growth and the value of corporations.
The next two panels of Figure 3.6 report the sensitivity of b with respect to
τ and ν. We can see that a higher τ is associated with a stronger response of
asset prices to fluctuations in µt, while a higher ν is associated with a smaller b.
When τ is large, adjusting capital is more costly from the perspective of capital
good producers, who then have less incentives to invest. Thus, after a shift in
µt, their profits on existing capital are eroded less from the process of capital
accumulation. This implies that the value of capital good firms is more sensitive
to µt: when τ equals 2.5, a 1% increase in the trend growth rate of the economy
is associated with a 7% increase in the value-output ratio, almost double with
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respect to what we obtain in our benchmark calibration. A similar phenomenon
occurs when decreasing ν. Indeed, we have seen that the present value of rents
is the most volatile component of asset prices in our model. As ν declines, the
share of this component on the total value of corporation increases, thus raising
the sensitivity of the value-output ratio to µt.
Figure 3.6: Sensitivity Analysis: Elasticity of Value-Output Ratio to µt
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Note: For each point in the parameter space, the elasticity of the value output ratio to µt is calculated
according to the procedure in Section 3.4.4. In the simulation, T is set to 25000000. The red dotted line marks
the benchmark calibration.
The last panel of the Figure shows the sensitivity of b with respect to ρ. This is
by far the most important parameter in determining quantitatively the response
of the value-output ratio to fluctuations in economic growth. When the switch
from the low to the high TFP growth regime is perceived to be almost permanent
(ρ = 0.999), a 1% increase in µt is associated with a 12% increase in the value-
output ratio. On the contrary, b is almost 0 when ρ is equal to 0.95. This is in
line with our previous discussion. When ρ is high, households expect the growth
rate of corporate payouts to be high for a long period of time. Since households
are forward looking, they have now stronger incentives to buy corporate shares,
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and this raises the response of the value-output ratio. Notice also that b is highly
nonlinear in ρ around our benchmark parametrization. Even a small increase in
this parameter results in the elasticity of the value-output ratio to double or triple
with respect to our benchmark calibration.
Figure 3.7 reports the same experiment for the elasticity of the value-output
ratio to σt. The Figure confirms the above discussion. Higher Ψ is associated with
a decline in c. Asset prices are marginally more sensitive to volatility fluctuations
when the supply of capital is less elastic (τ is large) or when monopolistic rents
are more relevant (ν small). Again, ρ is the most important parameter governing
the elasticity of the value-output ratio to σt. As ρ passes from 0.99 to 0.999, the
absolute value of c increases by almost 10 times.
Figure 3.7: Sensitivity Analysis: Elasticity of Value-Output Ratio to σt
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3.4.5 Posterior Predictive Analysis
After having analyzed the economic mechanisms governing the relation between
growth, volatility and asset prices, we now assess the model’s quantitative per-
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formance along this dimension. For this purpose, we will ask how far the model
implied elasticities b and c are from the ones we estimated for the U.S. economy
(Column 3 of Table 3.2). Because of the extreme sensitivity of these elasticities to
the value chosen for the persistence of µt and σt, we will rely on posterior predic-
tive analysis. In particular, let θ1 = [µ0, µ1, P
µ
0|0, P
µ
1|1, σ0, σ1, P
σ
0|0, P
σ
1|1] and let θ−1
be the vector collecting the remaining structural parameters of our model, fixed
at their calibration values. Given a series of posterior draws for the TFP pro-
cess parameters, {θm1 }Mm=1, one can calculate {bmodel(θm1 , θ−1), cmodel(θm1 , θ−1)}Mm=1
and use those values to characterize the posterior distribution of the model im-
plied value-output ratio elasticities. Because of the high computational burden
involved when solving our equilibrium model repeatedly, we evaluate the model
implied elasticities at {θm1 }Mm=1 using the following procedure:31
Posterior Draws for Model Implied Elasticities Let {θm1 }Mm=1 be a set of
posterior draws for the TFP growth process.
i) Given {θm1 }Mm=1 we obtain bounds on each parameter so that all elements of
the sequence lie in the set defined by those bounds. We denote this set by
Θ1.
ii) We compute the Smolyak collocation points for Θ1 as described in Krueger
and Kuebler (2003). We denote these collocation points by {θs1}Ss=1.
iii) For each element in {θs1}Ss=1, we compute the model implied elasticities
b(θs1, θ−1) and c(θ
s
1, θ−1) using the simulation procedure described in Sec-
tion 3.4.4.
31In order to reduce the dimensionality of the problem, we estimate the system in (2) by
imposing symmetry on the transition matrices and by fixing µ0 +
1
2µ1 and σ0 +
1
2σ1 to their
sample means. Thus, θ1 is a 4-dimensional object.
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iv) We fit a polynomial through the computed {bmodel(θs1, θ−1), cmodel(θs1, θ−1)}Ss=1.
We then use this polynomial to evaluate the model implied elasticities at the
sequence {θm1 }Mm=1.
Our exercise consists of assessing how far the coefficients of the linear projection
in Table 3.2, obtained from actual U.S. data, lie in the tails of the model implied
distributions for the same objects.
Figure 3.8: Growth, Volatility and the Value of U.S. Corporations: Model
vs. Data
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Note: The histogram reports the model implied elasticities of the value-output ratio to the mean and volatility
of TFP growth relative to their data counterparts. The red dotted lines report the posterior mean of these
statistics. The figures are constructed using 50000 draws from the posterior distribution of θ1.
The left panel of Figure 3.8 reports the posterior distribution of b
model
bdata
× 100. A
value of this statistic equal to 100 tells us that the model predicts the same elas-
ticity estimated in the data, while values smaller than 100 would imply a weaker
association between economic growth and the value-output ratio with respect to
what we have estimated in the data. We verify from the figure that the model
is broadly consistent with the data along this dimension. Indeed, on average the
model captures 20% of the relation between economic growth and the value-output
ratio (red vertical line in the Figure). Moreover, we can also see that for reasonable
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parametrizations of the TFP process,32 the model is able to deliver elasticities of
the value-output ratio to the trend growth rate of TFP that are consistent with
the estimates in Table 3.2.
The right panel of Figure 3.8 plots the posterior distribution of c
model
cdata
×100. The
graph shows that the model is less successful in accounting for the association
between the value-output ratio and the volatility of TFP growth. On average, in
fact, it predicts that the value-output ratio falls by 0.4% following a 1% increase
in the standard deviation of TFP growth, roughly 10% of what we have estimated
in the data. Moreover, the histogram shows that the model can account for at
most 60% of the association between the value-output ratio and the volatility of
TFP growth.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper we have uncovered a striking association between the first two mo-
ments of TFP growth and the value of corporations in postwar U.S. data. Persis-
tent fluctuations in the mean and volatility of TFP growth predict two-thirds of
the medium-term variation in the value-output ratio. This indicator rises strongly
after an increase in the trend growth rate of TFP, while it declines substantially
following an increase in the volatility of TFP growth. A possible explanation for
this association, suggested elsewhere in the literature, is that movements in ag-
gregate productivity influence investors’ expectations of future corporate payouts
as well as the rate at which they discount them. This explanation is put under
scrutiny by us. We developed a general equilibrium model with production fea-
32By reasonable parametrization, we mean regions of the parameter space that have positive
mass in the posterior distribution.
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turing Markov-Switching fluctuations in the mean and volatility of TFP growth,
incomplete information, capital adjustment costs, monopolistic competition and
recursive preferences. Under plausible calibrations, the model is consistent with
the behavior of several U.S. real and financial indicators during the postwar pe-
riod. It accounts on average for roughly 20% (9%) of the association between
the mean (volatility) of TFP growth and the value-output ratio. For reasonable
parametrizations of the TFP process, the model predicts an elasticity of the value-
output ratio to economic growth that is in line with the data, while it predicts an
elasticity of the value-output ratio to the volatility of TFP growth that is 60% of
the data observation.
It is important to stress the ex-post nature of our analysis. This has at least
two important implications. First of all, our estimates for the TFP process are
retrospective and this may contribute to muting some of the channels analyzed in
this paper. This is surely the case for the implications of incomplete information.
Indeed, while a two-state process for the mean of TFP growth fits postwar U.S.
data well, agents may still consider states that never occurred during this pe-
riod when forming their expectations. If that was the case, a model restricted to
two states necessarily bounds the amount of perceived risk over long-run growth,
which dampens the response of risk premia to a change in the volatility of TFP
growth. This particular aspect may explain why the model does not generate a
strong sensitivity of the value-output ratio to second moments. Secondly, agents
in our model have perfect knowledge of the parameters governing the growth and
volatility regimes. This assumption rules out important sources of history depen-
dence. With uncertainty on the persistence of the Markov processes, for example,
agents’ perception about these parameters depends on previous realizations of the
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process. Our approach may thus misrepresent how agents interpreted these fluctu-
ations when solving their decision problem in real time. This may severely affect
our results, since the sensitivity of asset prices to shifts in the first two moments
of TFP growth depends crucially on their perceived duration.
While difficult to discipline empirically, we believe that an analysis that relaxes
these two types of restrictions would further enhance our understanding of the
medium-term movements in the value of corporations.
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Chapter 4
Identifying Neutral Technology
Shocks
4.1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to propose a method to identify neutral labor-
augmenting technology shocks in the data. Classic results, starting with Uzawa
(1961), establish that these shocks drive the long-run economic behavior along the
balanced growth path. They are also the key driving force inducing fluctuations
in real business cycle (RBC) models pioneered by Kydland and Prescott (1982b),
Long and Plosser (1983), and play a quantitatively important role in New Key-
nesian models, e.g., Smets and Wouters (2007b).1 Moreover, the relationships
between various economic variables and neutral technology shocks identified in
the data are routinely used to assess model performance and to distinguish be-
tween competing models. For example, the empirical finding that aggregate hours
1In most models the production function is such that the labor augmenting or Harrod-neutral
technology shocks are isomorphic to the Hicks-neutral shocks that do not affect the marginal
rate of substitution between any factors of production.
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worked fall in response to a technology shock called into question the usefulness
of the RBC model for interpreting aggregate fluctuations.
However, the methods used in the literature to identify the technology shocks
are not designed to measure neutral technology shocks. Consider, for example,
the classic Solow residual accounting procedure. Suppose output is produced with
effective labor input Let = G(L1, ..., Ln, t) aggregating various labor inputs and,
for simplicity, a single capital input according to the following constant returns to
scale production function:
Y = F (K,Z G(L1, ..., Ln, t)), (4.1)
where Z represents the labor-augmenting neutral technology shock we are inter-
ested in identifying. Note that the labor aggregator is allowed to depend on time
to capture non-neutral changes in technology, e.g., changes in relative productiv-
ity or substitutability of various labor inputs. Such changes are thought key for
understanding various issues in macro and labor economics. For example, the vast
literature on skill biased technical change rationalizes the simultaneous increase
in supply and in the relative wages of college educated workers since the 1970s
through the change in the relative productivity of these workers in aggregate pro-
duction (e.g., Katz and Murphy (1992), Acemoglu (2002)).2 Thus, as emphasized
by Solow (1957), one must allow for the possibility that the neutral technology
parameter is only one of many technological parameters that can change over time.
Differentiating the production function with respect to time and dividing by Y we
2The alternative interpretation of the evidence in Krusell et al. (2000) also relies on non-
neutral change in the parameters governing relative productivity of the investment good sector.
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obtain the Solow residual:
(1− ωK)Z˙
Z
+
∂F/∂t
F
=
Y˙
Y
− ωK K˙
K
−
n∑
j=1
ωLj
L˙j
Lj
, (4.2)
where, assuming that factors are paid their marginal products, ωi represents in-
come share of factor i. Clearly, as emphasized in the original Solow (1957) article,
the residual equals neutral plus non-neutral technology changes. Hence its other
name - the total factor productivity. As variables, such as total hours worked, may
react either positively or negatively to a non-neutral shock, their response to an
innovation in the Solow residual is difficult to interpret. Unfortunately, the growth
accounting methodology is not designed to identify the contribution of only the
neutral shock, to which models have a robust prediction regarding the response
of endogenous variables. It also provides no possibility to ascertain the relative
importance of neutral and biased technological innovations in driving aggregate
economic dynamics.
An alternative approach to identifying neutral technology shocks is based on the
assumption put forward by Gali (1999) that only technology shocks have a long-
run effect on labor productivity (output per hour). He implemented this idea in
a business cycle context using structural vector autoregressions (SVAR) identified
with long-run restrictions following Blanchard and Quah (1989). Unfortunately,
this approach is also not designed to identify neutral technology shocks. Denote
by L the total sum of hours worked. Then, using (4.1), output per hour can be
written as
log
(
Yt
Lt
)
= log(Zt) + log
(
Let
Lt
)
+ log
(
F
(
Kt
ZtLet
, 1
))
. (4.3)
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Note that Kt
ZtLet
is stationary in most models (consistent with the stationary interest
rate in the data). However, the long-run changes in productivity can be induced
either by persistent technology shocks or by persistent changes in the effective
labor input per hour worked. In particular, Le/L could change in the long run
either due to the persistent changes in worker composition (e.g., changes in fe-
male labor force participation and their distribution across occupations), changes
in the effective units of labor supplied by various labor inputs (e.g., expecting
longer careers, women invest more in human capital through on-the-job training)
or changes in the production function parameters that govern the relative produc-
tivity or substitutability of various labor inputs (e.g., an increase in the relative
productivity of females due to an increase in the demand for tasks in which they
have a comparative advantage or due to directed changes in technology induced
by an increase in their labor force participation). Any of these changes affecting
labor productivity in the long run will be interpreted as a technology shock by
this methodology. The existing literature provides no guidance on how the neutral
technological changes can be isolated.3
These observations lead us to propose a method for estimating neutral technology
shocks. To do so, we assume a constant returns to scale aggregate production
3The econometric issues underlying this approach have been intensely discussed in the lit-
erature (e.g., Faust and Leeper (1997), Chari et al. (2008), Christiano et al. (2006), Fernandez-
Villaverde et al. (2007b)). Instead, we question the long-run restriction itself. Indeed, any shock
that affects the composition of factors of production or their relative productivity in the long run
will have a long-run effect on labor productivity and will be erroneously interpreted as a neutral
technology shock by this methodology. Several related critiques of this approach appeared in
the literature. Shea (1998) suggests that if low-productivity firms are destroyed in recessions,
there might be a long run effect on productivity. Uhlig (2004) argues that permanently changing
social attitudes to workplace, whereby workers substitute leisure activities at home with leisure
activities at work, will result in mis-measurement of effective work hours and affect measured
productivity in the long run. Francis and Ramey (2005, 2009) note that changes in capital taxes
or low frequency movements in age composition of population also may have a long-run effect
on labor productivity. Fisher (2006) imposes additional restrictions to separate neutral from
investment-specific shocks.
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function and exploit the rich implications of Uzawa’s characterization of neutral
technology on a balanced growth path. We do not assume the economy to be
on the balanced growth path but instead use a weak conditional form of this
assumption. We only require that the impulse responses to a permanent neutral
technology shocks have the standard balanced growth properties in the long run.
This is sufficient to identify the neutral technology shock because we are able to
prove that no other shock (to non-neutral technology, preferences, etc.) satisfies
these restrictions.
To implement this identification strategy we use a state-space model for a set
of variables for which we know the long run effect of neutral technology. These
macroeconomic variables can be represented as a sum of a neutral technology
shock, which is treated as one of the unobserved components driving the system,
and an unobserved state. For example, the log of the wage of workers of a partic-
ular type is written as the sum of the neutral technology shock and an unobserved
component that is partially idiosyncratic to that worker type (in a competitive
framework representing the derivative of the production function with respect to
that labor input).
We do not require orthogonality among the state variables, an assumption com-
monly used to identify these types of models although inconsistent with typical
economic models. Instead we prove that the conditional balanced growth restric-
tions are sufficient to identify neutral technology shocks in the resulting system of
equations collecting various macroeconomic time-series using filtering/smoothing
techniques. Since we do not treat the technology shock as a residual, our method
does not require to specify an explicit function that aggregates heterogeneous labor
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and capital inputs.4 Instead, all this information is summarized in the unobserved
states which we identify without the need to specify the structure behind the dy-
namics of these states. Moreover, our method does not require the parameters of
this function to be invariant over time. The identification methodology relies on
a testable assumption on the time series process for the neutral technology, e.g.,
AR(1) and other unobserved states, e.g., VAR(1). This process is only required to
provide a good statistical approximation and does not have to be consistent with
a structural model since we do not need to assign a structural interpretations to
the other shocks affecting the economy.
To assess the small sample properties of the proposed method, we conduct a
Monte Carlo study using samples drawn from estimated benchmark business cy-
cle models. We consider the RBC and the New-Keynesian models with worker
heterogeneity. We find that the proposed method is successful in identifying neu-
tral technology shocks in the data generated by the models and does not confound
neutral technology with other disturbances such as non-neutral technology, pref-
erence shifts or wage markup shocks.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we develop the method to
recover neutral technology shocks and establish the sufficient conditions for iden-
tification. In Section 4.3 we illustrate the implementation and evaluate the per-
formance of the proposed method in an estimated RBC model. In Section 4.4
we assess the performance of the proposed method in small samples drawn from
an estimated medium scale DSGE model with multiple sources of real and nom-
inal rigidities and numerous exogenous shocks. Finally, in Section ?? we apply
4This is in contrast to attempts to identify neutral technology shocks by fully specifying
the production function and all the associated inputs as in e.g., Nadiri and Prucha (2001) and
Dupuy (2006). The data requirements underlying this approach seem prohibitive.
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our method in the data and estimate a quarterly technology series for the US.
We also describe and analyze the sequence of identified shocks and document its
co-movement with other economic aggregates. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Identifying Neutral Technology Shocks
In this section we propose a method to estimate Harrod-neutral technology shocks.
Section 4.2.1 provides a characterization of these type of shocks. We prove that
Harrod-neutral technical change is the only type of shock that can induce balanced
growth on a set of macroeconomic variables. We next show how we can use this
property to identify neutral technology shocks from the data using benchmark time
series models. Section 4.2.2 present the time series model we use while Section
4.2.3 formally proves that the long run restrictions implied by balanced growth
are sufficient to identify Harrod-neutral technology shocks. Section 4.2.4 discusses
several issues related to the practical implementation of our approach.
4.2.1 Identification: Theory
In this section we build on this classic result and show how to use the insights
from Uzawa’s theorem (see Acemoglu (2009) for an excellent treatment) on tech-
nological progress in the long-run to identify Harrod-neutral technology shocks.
Suppose that aggregate output Yt is produced as follows
Yt = F (K1,t, . . . , KJ,t, ZtL1,t, . . . , ZtLM,t; θt), (4.4)
where Kj,t represent capital input of type j, Lm,t represents labor inputs of type
m, Zt is Harrod-neutral technology progress and θt is a vector collecting other non-
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neutral technological changes. We assume that F is constant return to scale in
capital and labor inputs. Our methodology does not require any further restriction
on the aggregate production function.
We make the following conditional balanced growth assumption, anticipating that
the implementation of the identification methodology in the data will use a state-
space model and thus identify the shock through its impulse response.
Assumption 1 (conditional balanced growth assumption). A time T exists
such that the impulse response of a variable Xt to a Harrod-neutral innovation 
Z
0
(to Z0) of x percent at time 0,
IRXt (x) = E0[Xt | log(Z0 ) = x]− E0[Xt]
equals
IRXt (x) = (e
gXx − 1)E0[Xt]
for all t ≥ T , where gXx is the percent increase in X. If gX = g for output, for
all capital inputs, and for all types of investment and of consumption, then labor
inputs X = Lm do not respond in the long-run to a neutral shock, gX = gLm = 0.
This assumption guarantees convergence of the impulse response for all variables.
In addition, it assumes a linearity property of the long-run response to a neutral
technology shock (i.e. a shock of size 2x has exactly twice the effect of a shock of
size x). History dependence of the impulse response function is not ruled out in
the short run, nor it is for all other economic shocks. fMoreover, this assumption
tells us that if Harrod-neutral shocks induce a common trend in output, capital
inputs, investments and consumption, then they do not influence labor inputs in
the long run.
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We now demonstrate that Harrod-neutral technology shocks are the only one
that can induce a certain pattern of long run responses for a set of macroeconomic
variables. This property will be then used to identify this technical change from
aggregate data. Before stating the main theorem, though, we prove a useful result
Lemma 1. Suppose the conditional balanced growth assumption holds for variables
Xt, X1,t, . . . , XH,t where Xt =
∑H
h=1Xh,t. The long-run response for variable X is
gX and for the components Xh > 0 equal to gXh . Then
gX = gX1 = · · · gXh = · · · = gXH .
The proof is in Appendix D.1.1. Lemma 1 tells us that, for a shock to have a well
defined long run effect on a variable X, it must have the same long run effect on
its components.
Theorem 1. Suppose the conditional balanced growth assumption holds. Then a
permanent Harrod-neutral technological shock is the only shock with the following
(balanced-growth) properties for some time T . An innovation which increases the
level of the shock by x percent at time 0 implies for all t ≥ T
- An increase in aggregate output Y by x percent, IRYt (x) = (e
x − 1)E0[Yt]
- An increase in investment Ij by x percent, IR
Ij
t (x) = (e
x − 1)E0[Ij,t]
- An increase in capital Kj by x percent, IR
Kj
t (x) = (e
x − 1)E0[Kj,t]
- An increase in aggregate consumption C by x percent, IRCt (x) = (e
x −
1)E0[Ct]
- No effect on labor inputs Lm, IR
Lm
t (x) = 0
- No effect on the marginal product of capital FKj , IR
FKj
t (x) = 0
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- An increase in the marginal product of labor FLm by x percent, IR
FLm
t (x) =
(ex − 1)E0[FLm,t]
The proof in Appendix D.1.2 follows the steps in the proof of Uzawa’s theorem
in Acemoglu (2009).
The conditions in the theorem rule out non-neutral technical change. For ex-
ample, they rule out investment-specific shocks (Greenwood et al., 1997), which
are often modeled as a non-neutral shock to the technology for producing capital
equipment. This shock has long run effects on the capital equipment to capital
structures ratio and the capital output ratio, which is inconsistent with the above
properties.
The theorem is not limited, however, to distinguishing between different types
of technical change. Instead, it characterizes Harrod-neutral technology shocks
and thus tells them part from any other economic shock, e.g. preference shocks,
government expenditure shocks or wage mark-up shocks. The logic is as follows. If
output and capital increase by the same percentage rate then constant returns to
scale imply that effective labor input has to increase by the same percentage rate.
Because labor inputs is assumed not to change in the long run, the productivity
of labor has to increase by the same percentage term, i.e. it has to be a Harrod-
neutral technological change.
4.2.2 Implementation: The State Space Model
In this section we show how we can implement the conditional balance growth
restrictions of the previous section using a benchmark time series model. To this
aim, we assume that we observe a vector time series Dt, collecting growth rates
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of a set of macroeconomic variables. Without loss of generality, we write Dt as
the sum of two components
Dt = ∆Zt1n + S˜t, (4.5)
where ∆Zt is the growth rate of the neutral technology series (in logs and 1n is the
n-dimensional vector of ones), and S˜t is a vector of states. Both ∆Zt and S˜t are
unobserved. Clearly, any macroeconomic time-series can be written this way. Two
examples for Dt with a clear economic interpretation, are output growth ∆ log(Yt)
and the growth rate of competitive wages for a worker of type m, ∆ log(Wm,t):
5
∆ log(Yt) = ∆Zt + ∆ log
[
F
(
K1,t
Zt
, . . . ,
KJ,t
Zt
, L1,t, . . . , LM,t; θt
)]
, (4.6)
∆ log(Wm,t) = ∆Zt + ∆ log
(
∂F
∂Lm,t
)
. (4.7)
Thus, the unobserved state S˜t is ∆ log
[
F
(
K1,t
Zt
, . . . ,
KJ,t
Zt
, L1,t, . . . , LM,t; θt
)]
for
output and for wages it is equal to ∆ log
(
∂F
∂Lm,t
)
.
Since we treat the second component as an unobserved state variable, we do not
have to make any assumptions on the shape of the production function. Instead
our approach consists in restricting the time-series behavior of St = [∆Zt, S˜t] and
in exploiting the factor structure of the system in (4.5). In particular, we propose
to estimate the technology series {∆Zt}Tt=0 in a three steps procedure:
i) Assume a time series model for the behavior of [∆Zt, S˜t], indexed by the
vector of parameters Λ.
ii) Estimate the parameters’ vector Λ.
5Wages are competitive here for illustrative purposes only. Our method does not assume
that wages are competitive.
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iii) Conditional on the estimation of Λ and given a time series for Dt, we esti-
mate the realization of ∆Zt using smoothing techniques.
For concreteness, suppose that ∆Zt is an univariate AR(1) process with persistence
parameter given by φzz and innovation variance given by r
2
zz (which we normalize
to one), while the unobserved states follow a VAR(1). None of the results dis-
cussed in this section depend on this parametrization, and richer dynamics can
be allowed for by introducing additional lags and moving average terms. Under
these assumptions we can express the dynamics of Dt in state space form:
n×1︷ ︸︸ ︷[
Dt
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Dt
=
n×(n+1)︷ ︸︸ ︷[
1 I
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
(n+1)×1︷ ︸︸ ︷ ∆Zt
S˜t

︸ ︷︷ ︸
St
(n+1)×1︷ ︸︸ ︷ ∆Zt
S˜t

︸ ︷︷ ︸
St
=
(n+1)×(n+1)︷ ︸︸ ︷ φzz 0′
ΦS˜z ΦS˜S˜

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Φ
(n+1)×1︷ ︸︸ ︷ ∆Zt−1
S˜t−1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
St−1
+
(n+1)×(n+1)︷ ︸︸ ︷ rzz 0′
RS˜z RS˜S˜

︸ ︷︷ ︸
R
n×1︷ ︸︸ ︷ ez,t
e˜t

︸ ︷︷ ︸
et
(4.8)
et
i.i.d.∼ N (0n+1, In+1)
∆Zt is assumed to be an exogenous process in the above system. In particular,
S˜t−1 does not affect current technology once we condition on Zt−1, this explaining
the zeros in the transition matrix Φ. Moreover, the zero restrictions on the R
matrix tell us that the first element of the et vector has to be interpreted as an
innovation to technology. Notice that we allow for contemporaneous correlation
among the innovations to ∆Zt and S˜t since we do not restrict RS˜z to be zero.
This is particularly relevant in our application since technology shocks are likely
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to affect S˜t.
6 Because of this correlation, the state space model is not identified
without further restrictions. Fortunately, as we show in the next section, we can
use Theorem 1 to impose a set of restrictions that are sufficient to identify the
parameters of the model. In terms of notation, we will refer to Dj,t as the j
th
element of the measurement vector Dt while to Sj,t as the j
th element of the state
vector St = [∆Zt, S˜t]
′. We denote by et the vector [ez,t, e˜t]′.
4.2.3 Identification of the State Space Model
We include in the vector of observable variables, Dt, the growth rates of output,
investment and hours as well as of the wages of two groups of workers, (s)killed
and (u)skilled:
Dt = (∆ log (Yt) ,∆ log (It) ,∆ log (Lt) ,∆ log (Ws,t) ,∆ log (Wu,t))
′. (4.9)
From the discussion in Section 4.2.1 we know that these variables are sufficient to
distinguish Harrod-neutral technology shocks from other economic disturbances.
Clearly, one could incorporate in Dt more variables with known balanced growth
restrictions: this would sharpen identification at the cost of increasing the com-
plexity of the model.
We now formally define identifiability of the state space model
Definition 1. Let Λ and Λˆ be two parameterizations of the system in (4.8).
These are observationally equivalent if ΓD(τ,Λ) = ΓD(τ, Λˆ) for all τ ∈ N, where
ΓD(τ,Λ) is the τ
th order autocovariance of Dt under Λ.
Definition 2. The state space model in (4.8) is identifiable from the autoco-
6Both of the examples discussed earlier share this characteristic. A shock to technology
affects labor inputs, this generating correlation between ∆Zt and S˜t.
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variances of Dt at Λ = (Φ,R) if for any admissible parametrization Λˆ = (Φˆ, Rˆ)
we have that Λ and Λˆ are observationally equivalent if and only if Φ = Φˆ and
RR′ = RˆRˆ′
In what follows, we show how the restrictions brought by the conditional bal-
anced growth assumption are sufficient to guaranteee the identification of Λ. Prior
to that, we make an additional technical assumption
Assumption 2. i) The matrix R is invertible.
ii) (−1, 1, . . . , 1)′ is not an eigenvector with eigenvalue φzz of the matrix Φ˜.
In Appendix D.1.3 we prove that this assumption implies that the state space
representation in (4.8) is minimal, i.e. the dimension of the state vector St can not
be reduced. This assumption allows us to cast our problem within the literature
of identification of minimal state space systems (Hannan and Diestler, 1988).
Lemma 2. Let Assumption 2 hold. Then, the state space model in (4.8) is mini-
mal.
Given minimality of the state space in (4.8), lack of identification is known
to be represented by linear transformations of the state vector through invertible
matrices T and U with UU′ = I (see Proposition 1-S in Komunjer and Ng (2011)).
In fact, consider defining the state vector Sˆt = T
−1St and the innovation vector
as eˆt = U
−1et. Then, one can rewrite the system in (4.8) as:
D˜t = BˆSˆt
(4.10)
Sˆt = ΦˆSˆt−1 + Rˆeˆt
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where the new matrices (Bˆ, Φˆ, Rˆ) are related to the original one as follows:
Bˆ = BT
Φˆ = T−1ΦT (4.11)
Rˆ = T−1RU
Clearly, the observationally equivalent parametrization must satisfy the restric-
tions made on (B,Φ,R), narrowing the set of admissible (T,U) matrices. In what
follows we provide a characterization of this set for the system in (4.8).
First of all, notice that since the matrix B is known, one needs to have Bˆ = B.
This implies that the matrix T has the form:
T =

1 + κ1 −κ2 . . . −κn
−κ1 1 + κ2 . . . κn
. . . . . . . . . . . .
−κ1 κ2 . . . 1 + κn
 T
−1 =

1− κ1κ κ2κ . . . κnκ
κ1
κ 1− κ2κ . . . −κnκ
. . . . . . . . . . . .
κ1
κ
κ2
κ . . . 1− κnκ
 (4.12)
for some scalars κ1, . . . , κn and for κ = 1 + (
∑n
l=1 κl). What this means is that if
κ1 = κ2 = κ3 = . . . κn = 0 all the parameters of the system in (4.8) are identified
and T = I: we are then able to identify correctly the parameters Φ and Σ = RR′,
only the ordering of e˜t would not be identified.
In general, we can easily verify that the state vector associated with the T−1
matrix becomes:
Sˆt =

(1− κ1
κ
)Zt +
∑n
l=2
κl
κ
Sl,t
κ1
κ
Zt + S2,t −
∑n
l=2
κl
κ
Sl,t
· · ·
κ1
κ
Zt + Sn,t −
∑n
l=2
κl
κ
Sl,t
 . (4.13)
This parametrization needs to satisfy the restrictions on the transition equation
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in (4.8), namely that the first element of Sˆt follows an AR(1) with innovations
given by the first element of eˆt. This cannot be ruled out given the assumptions
made so far, i.e. without further restrictions, the system in (4.8) is not identified.
This is where we use Theorem 1 which states that the balanced growth properties
identify the neutral technology process.
The balanced growth restrictions for output, investment, hours, skilled and un-
skilled wages can be written as7
1
1
0
1
1

=
1
1− ρzB(I−Φ)
−1R1:(n+1),1. (4.14)
Thus, one can express the long run effect of neutral technology on the variables in
D as a function of the parameters in the matrices Φ and R and restrict it to be
equal to 0 or 1. For example the first row of the restriction in (4.14) states that
the the long-run response of output to a unit increase in εz,t equals 1. Similarly
rows 2, 4 and 5 restrict the long-run response of investment, high skilled and low
skilled wages to be of the same magnitude as well (again scaled by 1
1−ρz ). Row 3
requires the long-run response of hours to be 0.
As Theorem 1 shows, these long-run restrictions uniquely identify the neutral
shock, that is U(1, 0, . . . , 0)′ = (1, 0, . . . , 0)′. This implies that the first column
of U equals (1, 0, . . . , 0)′ and using that UU′ = I then implies that the first row
7∆Zt follows an AR(1) with persistence parameter ρz. A one standard deviation error to the
innovation (which we normalized to one) of the growth rate accumulates to a long-run change
of 11−ρz in the level of z. As the balanced growth restrictions apply to changes in the level of z,
the term 11−ρz multiplies the long-run effect on V .
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equals (1, 0, . . . , 0).
Theorem 2. [Identification] Consider the state space model (4.8) with D in-
cluding the logs of output, investment, hours worked, skilled and unskilled wages
as in (4.9) and with balanced growth restrictions (4.14). Then the parameters Φ
and RR′ are identified. In particular κ1 = κ2 = · · · = κn = 0. Furthermore the
neutral technology shock is identified, i.e.
U =

1 0 . . . 0
0
U˜
0
 . (4.15)
The proof is in Appendix D.1.4.
4.2.4 Discussion
In this section we discuss how we estimate the model, how to obtain impulse-
responses and the choice of the time-series model that we use to implement our
identification procedure. We also discuss how additional restrictions on the state
space can be imposed.
Estimation
Because of the linear-gaussian structure of the state space model, we can evaluate
the likelihood function using the Kalman filter. The model parameters are then
estimated by maximum likelihood. Conditional on the estimated parameters, we
can apply the Kalman smoother and obtain retrospective estimates of Harrod-
neutral technical change, {p(∆Zt|DT)}Tt=1. See Durbin and Koopman (2001) for
an extensive discussion of these methodologies.
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Impulse Response Functions
Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) to a neutral technology shock for variables
included in the data vector Dt can be easily computed using the estimated param-
eters and the state space model in (4.8). We may be also interested in computing
IRFs for variables xt that do not enter the measurement equation. In this case
we proceed by using the estimated technology innovations of {ez,t}Tt=1. We project
{ez,t}Tt=1 and its lags onto xt,
xt = α + β(L)ez,t + εt,
where β(L) are polynomials in the lag operator and they represent the IRFs.
OLS delivers consistent estimates of these parameters to the extent that ez,t is
exogenous. This assumption is natural if we think of xt as being generated by an
underlying equilibrium model and we are willing to assume orthogonality of its
structural shocks.
Choice of Time-Series Model
Our procedure requires to specify a parametric time series model for key macroe-
conomic variables. Because of its generality, we focus here on a linear state space
model, but in principle our analysis could be carried using other linear or nonlinear
time series models. As in the SVAR literature, we need to make several specitica-
tion choices regarding the number of macroeconomic time series to include in the
model and the law of motion of the state variables.
The dimension of the state space St may be limited by the curse of dimensional-
ity. First, the number of parameters increases in the lag length of the VAR for St.
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This problem, common to the SVAR literature, can be partly circumvented with
the use of shrinkage methods that are becoming popular in applied time series
econometrics (Del Negro and Schorfheide, 2010). However, because of the exo-
geneity restrictions on Zt, we can adopt a more flexible specification for its law of
motion without imposing much burden on the estimation. For example, suppose
we assume a more general ARMA(p,q) for neutral technology. Then, the number
of unknown parameters associated with the technology process equals (n+ 1)p+ q
with n being the dimension of St. Second, given a DGP for the vector St, the
number of parameters to be estimated steeply increases in the number of variables
in the measurement equation. For the example described in Section 4.3, the num-
ber of parameters to be estimated equals 2 + 2n(n+ 1) + s(2 + n), where n is the
dimension of the vector Dt and s is the dimension of St. This limits the number
of variables, and associated balanced growth restrictions, that can be allowed for.
The Monte Carlo exercise in the next section is supposed to shed lights on these
issues. We will see that a parsimonious specification of the state space model
considered in this section performs well when data are simulated from reasonably
calibrated business cycle models.
Using Additional Theoretical Restrictions
The method proposed in this paper can easily accommodate additional restrictions
implied by economic theory. While these restrictions are not strictly necessary,
they may help sharpening identification of neutral technology shocks especially
when dealing with short samples. A popular identification scheme in the SVAR
literature are sign restrictions as in Uhlig (2005). These can be easily incorporated
in our set up: for example, we could set R∆wj ,z > 0 to restrict the neutral technol-
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ogy shock to have a positive impact effect on wages. Other types of information
regarding the properties of neutral technology shocks can be easily implemented
by appropriate restriction on the state space form. Aside from these identification
schemes, the state space model considered here can incorporate external informa-
tion without imposing excessive burden to the estimation. For example, suppose
that we have a robust method to identify other types of structural structural
shocks, say a government spending shock {eg,t}Tt=1 which we know a priori to be
orthogonal to neutral technology shocks. Then, we could proceed in two steps: i)
Add {eg,t}Tt=1 to the list of observables in the measurement equation; ii) add an
additional state variables in St that selects one of the non-technology reduced form
innovations; iii) restrict the matrix R so that ez,t and eg,t are orthogonal. Impor-
tantly, this does not result in additional parameters to be estimated, but it helps
the identification of the neutral shock. See also Stock and Watson (2012) for a
discussion of the role of external information (“instruments”) for the identification
of structural shocks in dynamic factor models.
4.3 An Example: A Simple RBC Model
We now illustrate the proposed procedure by means of an example. We study the
basic RBC model with two types of labor, a useful benchmark due to its trans-
parency and widespread use. We use this example to illustrate how our method
for measuring neutral technology shocks can be applied in practice. Using data
simulated from the calibrated model we study the relation between identified tech-
nology shocks and the true structural disturbances. In particular, we consider the
small sample performance of our method and contrast it with the performance of
an SVAR with long run restrictions on labor productivity and with Solow residu-
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als. The transparency of the model allows us to isolate the reasons for the poor
performance of the latter two methods in recovering neutral technology shocks.
4.3.1 The Real Business Cycle Model with Heterogeneous
Labor
We consider a frictionless RBC model with worker heterogeneity. Agents of type
j = {u, s} (unskilled of measure u and skilled of measure 1−u) value consumption,
ct, and dislike labor, ht, according to a type-dependent utility function
Uj(ct, ht) = log(ct)− eAtbj h
1+ν−1j
t
1 + ν−1j
. (4.16)
At is a shock to the disutility of labor parameterizing the labor wedge, commonly
found to play an important role in business cycle accounting. We allow the elas-
ticity of labor supply, νj, to differ across the two demographic groups. Because of
this, aggregate productivity in our model will vary over the cycle due to endoge-
nous changes in the skill compositions of the labor input. Firms in the economy
have access to the production function
Yt = K
α
t (e
ZtLet )
1−α, (4.17)
where Let , the effective labor input, is an aggregator of low and high-skilled labor
Let = L
φt
s,tL
1−φt
u,t .
Note that observed labor input (total hours) equals Lt = Ls,t+Lu,t, where unskilled
labor input equals Lu,t = uhu,t and skilled labor input Ls,t = (1 − u)hs,t. The
relative productivity of skilled workers, φt, changes over time. This is one source
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of non-neutral technical change in the model. The accumulation equation for
investment is expressed as
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + Itqt, (4.18)
where qt represents the current state of the technology for producing new capital
goods, a second source of non-neural technical change. Capital depreciates in
every period at rate δ. The resource constraint equals
Yt = Itqt + Ct + gtYt, (4.19)
where gt is the fraction of final good devoted to government spending.
The laws of motion for economic shocks are standard:8
∆Zt = γ + ρz∆Zt−1 + σzεz,t, (4.20)
At = ρaAt−1 + σaεa,t, (4.21)
log(φt) = (1− ρφ)φ∗ + ρφ log(φt−1) + σφεφ,t, (4.22)
log(gt) = (1− ρg)g∗ + ρg log(gt−1) + σgεg,t, (4.23)
log(qt) = ρq log(qt−1) + σqεφ,t. (4.24)
Firms hire labor and rent capital from households at competitive factor prices, pro-
duce the final good and sell it to households in a competitive market. Households
use labor and capital income to finance their consumption and saving choices. The
equilibrium law of motion for the model’s endogenous variables is defined by a set
8The only novel process here is the one for the skill-biased technical change. Although the
specification we use permits φt > 1, this event has almost zero measure in all our simulations.
We could use a logistic function to preclude that. However, since we study a linearized version
of the model, nothing would prevent the linearized shock to be larger than 1.
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of conditions that describes the optimal behavior of agents, and the evolution of
shocks. Since these equations are standard in the literature, we avoid repeating
them here.
To ensure stationarity, certain model’s endogenous variables need to be nor-
malized. We have estimated the model with an unrestricted persistence of the
preference shock process and found that, to match the high persistence in hours
worked, it is estimated to be unit root.9 Given this, we restrict ρa = 1, and scale
hours worked by a type j household by e
− νj
1+νj
At
, while the other model’s variables
by eZte[φ
∗ νs
1+νs
+(1−φ∗) νu
1+νu
]At .
4.3.2 Identifying Neutral Technology Shocks: Setup
The choice of the variables added to the state vector is guided by the balanced
growth restrictions. We therefore consider the growth rate of output, ∆ log(Yt),
the growth rate of wages of skilled workers, ∆ log(ws,t), and unskilled workers,
∆ log(wu,t), the growth rate of labor productivity, ∆ log(Yt/Lt) and investment,
∆ log(It). As described earlier, we interpret each of these times series as the sum of
two unobserved components: the growth rate in neutral technological component
(common to all variables) and a residual component (specific to each variable).
Thus, defining Dt = [∆ log(Yt),∆ log(ws,t),∆ log(wu,t),∆ log(Yt/Lt),∆ log(It)]
′ the
vector of observables, and by St the vector collecting these unobserved compo-
nents, we can write the measurement equation as
Dt =
[
1 I
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
St. (4.25)
9As in Gali (2005) and Chang et al. (2007c), among others.
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Notice that, under this formulation, ∆Zt is the first entry of the state vector.
Next we must chose the model for the time series behavior of the state vector St.
In the Monte Carlo analysis, we will restrict to the simple VAR(1) model used in
Section 4.2.2:
St =
 ρz 0′
ΦS˜z ΦS˜S˜

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Φ
St−1 +
 rzz 0′
RS˜z RS˜S˜

︸ ︷︷ ︸
R
 ez,t
e˜t
 . (4.26)
We restrict ∆Zt to be exogenous with respect to the other unobserved states:
this is achieved with the “zeros” restrictions on the matrix Φ and R. However,
note that we are not ruling out correlation among the idiosyncratic states.
Balanced Growth Restrictions
The balanced growth restrictions discussed in the earlier section can be easily
implemented in this time series model. For example, consider a one standard
innovation increase in neutral technology. Under balanced growth restrictions, we
know that the effect of this shock on the level of output is equal to σz
1−ρz in the
long run. In the time series model described earlier, the long run effect of the first
element of St (which we label neutral technological growth) on the level of output
equals to:10
lim
m→∞
IR
log(Y )
t+m (ez,t = 1) = [1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]B(I−Φ)−1R1:(n+k),1.
Hence, the balanced growth restriction for output consist in equating the above
10This expression derives from the fact that the long run effect of a shock on variable x equals
the cumulative effect on its growth rates.
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expression to σz
1−ρz . Similar balanced growth restriction can be derived for the
other variables. More specifically, we restrict output per hour and investment to
have the same long run effect of output: this implies, among other things, that
hours worked and the investment-output ratio are not affected in the long run by a
neutral technology shock. Similarly, we restrict neutral technology shocks to have
the same long run effect on the two wages (e.g., relative wages are not affected by
a neutral technology shock in the long run).
From a technical point of view, these are restrictions on the Φ and R matri-
ces that, as discussed in the earlier section, are sufficient to identify the neutral
technology shock.
4.3.3 Estimation and Results
The calibration is standard and described in Appendix D.3. We simulate 100
realizations from the calibrated model, with each sample being composed of 250
quarters. For each realization, we estimate the state space model discussed in
Section 4.3.2, and we study the properties of the retrieved neutral technology
innovations. In addition, we compute technology innovations using the Solow
residual accounting and using SVAR with long-run restrictions as in Gali (1999).
We assess the accuracy of each procedure using the R2 of the following linear
regressions:
εtruej,t = α + βε
identified
z,t + ηt j ∈ {z, a, φ, g, q}, (4.27)
where {εidentifiedz,t } are the technology shocks identified according to the procedure
and {εtruej,t } is structural innovation j in the model economy. These statistics have
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a clear interpretation. Indeed, a method that perfectly identifies the technology
innovations would yield an R2 = 1 with εtruez,t as the dependent variable and an
R2 = 0 for the other structural innovations.11 These R2 are calculated for each of
the Monte Carlo replications.
Table 4.1: True vs. Identified Technology Shocks: RBC Model
εz,t εa,t εφ,t εg,t εq,t
BHM 0.94 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Gali 0.73 0.10 0.09 0.00 0.03
Solow 0.62 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.00
Notes: Each column contains R2 from the regression of the structural innovation εj,t, j ∈ {z, a, φ, g, q} on
technology shock εz,t, identified using the procedure in each row. Results are based on a Monte Carlo studies
with 30 replications. BHM refers to the method proposed in this paper as specified in Section 4.3.2. Gali refers to
the technology shock identified following the procedure in Gali (1999). The Solow residual is calculated applying
Jorgenson correction for labor composition effects.
The results reported in Table 4.1 imply that the method proposed in this paper
performs very well. The identified neutral technology shocks are closely related
to the true neutral technology shocks used when simulating the model (median
R2 = 0.94), and are not systematically related to other structural shocks in the
model. In contrast, the technology shocks identified using the other two methods
are less closely related to the true neutral technology shocks and systematically
pick up other structural disturbances. We now use this simple model to better
understand the reasons for their shortcomings.
Using SVAR with long-run restrictions to identify technology shocks
The second row of Table 4.1 indicates that retrieving technology innovations using
an SVAR with long run restrictions yields a median R2 of only 0.73.12 The reason
11Note that these are theoretical benchmarks. Even if we observed the actual process for
neutral technology, the R2 of the εtruez,t equation would be below 1 because of sampling errors in
the estimation of (ρz, σz), which are needed to measure the innovations ε
identified
z,t .
12Specifically, we follow Gali (1999) and estimate a VAR(4) on the growth rate of labor
productivity and hours worked, and identify technology innovations as the unique shock having
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is that an SVAR with long run restrictions on labor productivity interprets any low
frequency variation in labor productivity as a neutral technology shock. Indeed,
labor productivity can be decomposed as
log
(
Yt
Lt
)
= Zt + α log
(
Kt
eZtLe,t
)
+ log
(
Le,t
Lt
)
.
The idea underlying the use of an SVAR with long-run restrictions to identify z is
that the second term α log
(
Kt
eZtLe,t
)
is stationary and thus is not affected by any
shock in the long-run. If labor is homogeneous, the third term log
(
Le,t
Lt
)
is zero
so that only neutral technology affects output per hour in the long-run.
If labor inputs are heterogeneous, the third term is not zero and will be moved
by shocks other than Zt. There are two key sources inducing such movements in
the simple model studied in this section. Preference shocks induce changes in the
share of hours worked by skilled and unskilled workers due to different labor supply
elasticities of the two groups. This moves labor productivity at low frequencies and
leads the SVAR procedure to erroneously interpret the innovations in preference
shocks as technology shocks. This explains the R2 of 0.1 in the regression of the
preference shock on the technology shock identified using this method. In the next
Section we will study a richer model with more shocks and will observe that any
shock that induces persistent changes in labor composition will be interpreted as
a technology shock in this context.
Even for a counterfactually constant share of hours worked by skilled and un-
skilled individuals, persistent changes in the relative productivity of skilled workers
induced by the skill-biased shock φt will also induce low-frequency movements in
the effective labor input per hour worked. This explains the R2 of 0.09 in the
a long run effect on labor productivity.
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regression of the skill-bias shock on the technology shock identified using this
method. Thus, any such non-neutral shocks will also be identified as technology
shocks by this methodology.
Finally, as is well known from the work of Fisher (2006), without additional
restrictions this method confounds neutral and non-neutral investment-specific
shocks.
The Solow Residual
The Solow residual explains on average only 62% of the variation in actual neu-
tral technology because it is a composite of neutral and non-neutral technological
change. This is clear form Equation (4.2) in the Introduction, which specializes
to
(1− α)Z˙
Z
+ φ˙(1− α) log
(
Ls
Le
)
=
Y˙
Y
− αK˙
K
− φ(1− α) L˙s
Ls
− (1− φ)(1− α) L˙u
Lu
in this model. Thus, the Solow residual picks up the non-neutral skill premium
shock φ and explains on average 26% of its variation. The difference between how
much of the skill premium shock is picked up by the Solow residual and how much
is picked up by the SVAR with long run restrictions depends on the persistence
of the skill premium shock. As the persistence of this shock is estimated to be
less than one in this model, its contribution to the Solow residual - which is
independent of this persistence - is larger.
Note that in contrast to the SVAR procedure, the Solow residual we compute
does not pick up the effects of labor composition induced by the preference shocks.
The reason is that when calculating the Solow residual we applied Jorgenson’s cor-
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rection for labor composition effects pioneered by Jorgenson and Griliches (1967).
The key idea underlying this correction is to disaggregate the labor force into cat-
egories based on education, age, gender, etc. Then, in computing total effective
labor input, each hour is weighted by the observed average wage of the group it be-
longs to, assumed to coincide with the marginal product of that labor input. Then,
adding an additional worker with, say, a college degree would account for more
of an increase in output than would adding a worker with a high school diploma.
While this procedure corrects for pure changes in composition, in Appendix D.2
we show that it does not correct for the biased changes in technology affecting
the relative productivity of labor inputs. Of course, it was never intended to do
so as the growth accounting literature was not interested in measuring neutral
technological innovations.13
4.4 Monte Carlo Analysis using a New Keyne-
sian Model
In this section we assess the performance of our method in a Monte Carlo study
using a calibrated benchmark New Keynesian business cycle model. We use a
medium-scale model with price and wage rigidities, capital accumulation, invest-
ment adjustment costs, variable capital utilization, and habit formation. The
model is based on Christiano et al. (2005b) and Smets and Wouters (2007b). We
13We computing the Solow residual we assumed that the parameter α is known and all in-
puts are observed. More realistically though, suppose that the aggregator Let features richer
heterogeneity, for example three groups l,m, h, Let = L
φ1,t
h,t L
φ2,t
m,tL
1−φ1,t−φ2,t
l,t but the researcher
can distinguish only two groups. This misclassification worsens the ability of the Solow residual
to identify technology shocks substantially whereas our methodology is immune to such misclas-
sifications. The result in Table 4.1 assume a correct classification and thus the Solow residual
performs better than it will likely do in real data where misclassification is present.
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enrich this setting with labor heterogeneity. As in the RBC model analyzed in the
previous section, workers can be of two types: low and high skilled. They are dis-
tinguished by their marginal productivity, defined through the production function
in equation (4.17), and by their Frisch elasticity of labor supply νl 6= νh. Appendix
D.4 contains the full description of the model. In addition to the economic shocks
that were present in the RBC model, this model incorporates monetary policy
shocks, price markup shocks, wage markup shocks and shocks to the discount
factor of households. There are nine economic disturbances in total.
After calibrating the model to match the behavior of post-1984 U.S. business
cycles, we apply our procedure on simulated data and compare our estimates with
the true neutral technology series. The economic significance of deviations between
the actual and estimated technology series is assessed by comparing our estimated
impulse response functions to their theoretical counterparts. We repeat this exer-
cise for technology series estimated using the SVAR with long run restrictions and
the Solow residual accounting procedure. Finally, we perform various robustness
checks by varying the parameter estimates of our benchmark calibration.
4.4.1 Calibration
Most of the model’s parameters associated to preferences and technology are fixed
to conventional values used in the literature. In particular, we use the estimates
(posterior mean) reported by Schorfheide et al. (2010), who consider a version
of the model studied here without wage markup shocks and labor heterogeneity.
The parameters associated to labor heterogeneity come from our analysis of the
RBC model, while those governing the economy’s structural shocks are calibrated
through moment matching. In particular, denote the parameters governing the
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structural shocks by θ, and let mT be a vector of sample moments for selected
time series of length T computed using US data. We denote by mT(θ) their model
counterpart when the vector of structural parameter is θ. θ is chosen to minimize
a weighted distance between model and data moments:
min
θ2
[mT − mˆ(θ)]′WT[mT − mˆ(θ)],
where WT is a diagonal matrix whose nonzero elements are the inverse of the
variance of the corresponding moment. The empirical moments included in the
vector mT are standard measures of cyclical variation and comovement for post
1984 quarterly US data. The time series used are the growth rate in GDP, private
non-durable consumption, private nonresidential investment, total hours worked in
the business sector, total hours of low and high skilled individuals in the business
sector, nominal wages for these two demographic groups, labor productivity, and
an inflation series constructed using the GDP deflator and the Federal Funds
Rate. For each of these time series, we compute the sample standard deviation,
the first order autocorrelation and the cross-correlation with GDP growth. We
collect these sample moments in the vector mT. The associated model’s moments
are calculated via a Monte Carlo procedure. In particular, for each θ, we solve for
the policy functions using first order perturbation. We next simulate a realization
of length T for the model’s counterparts of the above time series and calculate the
vector mˆT(θ). We repeat this procedure M = 300 times, each time changing the
seed used in the simulation. We then take the (component wise) median of mˆ(θ)
across the Monte Carlo replications.
Table A-3 summarizes the procedure used for the calibration of our model and
reports numerical values for the structural parameters. Table A-4 reports the fit
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of our model in terms of the calibration targets. We can verify that the calibrated
model is consistent along many dimensions with the behavior of aggregate time
series at business cycle’s frequencies, although certain features of the data are
missed.
4.4.2 Identifying Technology Shocks in Model-Generated
Data
Suppose that data on output, capital and hours worked etc. have been generated
from the New Keynesian model described above and assume that a researcher
identifies technology using the methodology proposed in this paper (i.e., estimates
the state space model discussed in Section 4.3.2), as the Solow residual or using a
SVAR with long run restrictions on labor productivity. Is the researcher correctly
backing-out the actual realization of technology shocks in the economy? To answer
this question, we perform a simple exercise. Given the parametrization of our
model in Table A-3, we simulate M = 300 realizations of length T = 250 for the
model’s variables, and calculate the series of “technology” innovations identified
using the three methods.14
In order to assess the accuracy of each procedure, as in Section 4.3.3, we consider
the R2 of the following linear regressions:
εtruej,t = α + βε
identified
z,t + ηt j ∈ {z, a, φ, g, q, β, r, p, w},
where {εidentifiedz,t } are the identified technology shocks and {εtruej,t } is structural
14When calculating the Solow residual we use the true parameter α rather than estimating
it. Moreover, we assume that the level of capital utilization is observed by the researcher.
Therefore, the only source of discrepancy between neutral technology shocks and the solow
residual is coming from the time variation in the non nutral technological parameter.
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innovation j in the model economy. The results are presented in Table 4.2.
As in our analysis of the simple RBC model, we find that the shocks identi-
fied using the SVAR with long run restrictions or as the Solow residuals have
little structural interpretation, whereas the proposed method is recovering neutral
technology shocks very well. Indeed, the median R2 of our method equals 0.93.
For comparison, retrieving technology innovations using SVAR with long run re-
strictions yields a median R2 of 0.52, while the Solow residual explains on average
23% of the variation in actual neutral technology. As discussed in Section 4.3.3,
these two methods are not well suited to identify neutral technology shocks in
models with heterogeneous inputs. Indeed, the SVAR with long run restrictions
on labor productivity interprets any low frequency variation in labor productivity
as a neutral technology shock, while the Solow residual is a composite of neutral
and non-neutral skill-biased technical change. This generates biased estimates of
the neutral technology shock, as is clear from Table 4.2. The SVAR procedure
systematically picks up changes in the composition of the labor force induced by
preference and other shocks, which drive labor productivity at low frequencies in
the model. The Solow residual, instead, explains on average 42% of the variation
in the skill premium shock. The procedure proposed in this paper is not subject
to these problems and provides a correct identification of the neutral technology
shock.
Notice also that the correlation between the Solow residual and the Long-Run
shock to productivity is quite high (0.58) and of similar magnitude to the empirical
one reported by Gali (2004). Table 4.3 suggests, therefore, that a high correlation
between these two series is not necessarily a sign of the robustness for either one
of the two procedures.
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Table 4.2: True vs. Identified Technology Shocks: NK Model
Method εz,t εa,t εφ,t εg,t εq,t εβ,t εr,t εp,t εw,t
BHM 0.93 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Gali 0.52 0.08 0.14 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.04
Solow 0.23 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Each column contains R2 from the regression of the structural innovation εj,t, j ∈ {z, a, φ, g, q, β, r, p, w}
on technology shock εz,t, identified using the procedure in each row. Results are based on a Monte Carlo studies
with 300 replications. BHM refers to the method proposed in this paper as specified in Section 4.3.2. Gali
refers to the technology shock identified following the procedure in Gali (1999). The Solow residual is calculated
applying Jorgenson correction for labor composition effects.
4.4.3 Impulse Response Functions
In the previous section we assessed the quality of our method as well as of the
other two methods (Gali and Solow) by considering the correlation between the
true technology series and the identified ones. While indicative of the various
biases induced by the three methods, these correlations do not provide information
on the economic importance of these biases. In this Section we complement this
evidence by computing impulse responses to identified technology shocks. For all
three identified technology series we compute the impulse response of key model
variables - output, consumption, investment, hours, relative wages of skilled and
unskilled and inflation - and compare it to the impulse response for the true
technology series. Figure 4.1 shows the results. The response of each of these
variables is reported in a separate row of the figure. The three columns report
results for, respectively, our method, SVAR with long run restriction on labor
productivity and the Solow residual. In each panel, the dashed line reports the
true impulse response while the solid line the estimated one, with the shaded area
marking the 90% confidence interval for the estimated impulse response.15
15The estimated impulse response and their confidence interval are constructed as via a Monte
Carlo simulation. Specifically, for n = 1 : N , we i) apply the three procedures on time series
simulated from the model; ii) collect the series of estimated technology innovations for the three
procedures; iii) compute impulse response as described in Section 4.2.4. The figure reports the
pointwise median and 90% confidence interval across these Monte Carlo simulations.
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Figure 4.1: Impulse Responses to Identified Technology Shocks
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As already suggested by the high correlation between our identified technology
series and the true technology series, we find in the first column of the figure
that the true and estimated impulse response are very similar as well. With
the exception of investment, we can verify that our estimated impulse response
functions track very closely their model counterpart. Moreover, the true impulse
response always fall in the 90% confidence interval of our estimator. This is
clearly not the case for the SVAR approach: the estimates of the the response of
the model’s variables to a neutral technology shock are, in fact, very imprecise.
From our previous discussion we know that SVARs with long run restrictions on
labor productivity misinterpret low frequency variation in labor supply with a
neutral technology shock. Specifically, a decline in labor supply moves measured
output per worker up, and it is interpreted by this procedure as a technology
improvements. Not surprisingly, the response of hours to this innovation is biased
downward relative to its response to the true technology shock. Because of that,
the response of output, consumption and investment is also biased downward: in
our numerical simulations, a researcher using SVARs with long run restrictions
would conclude that neutral technology shocks are unimportant for business cycle
fluctuations, as these variables hardly move conditional on an increase in the
identified neutral shock. The response to the Solow residual for real variables
are more in line with the true impulse response functions. This reflects the fact
that, under our parametrization, skill premium shocks are fairly unimportant for
business cycle dynamics. The pattern, though, is that the a positive skill bias shock
raises the Solow residual. This shock, in the model, lowers worked hours, increase
output and its components and lowers inflation as it decreases firms’ marginal
costs. These biases can be observed by comparing the true and estimated impulse
response functions in the third column of the figure.
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Beside the average behavior, the figure also documents that our method signifi-
cantly improves in the precision of estimates for the impulse response. Confidence
interval are, in fact, significantly tighter relative to the other two approaches. This
is the result that the technology series we identify is, on average, less noisy with
respect to the other methods.
4.4.4 Sensitivity
We now assess whether these results are sensitive to the particular parameteriza-
tion we used. To do so we vary the value of each potentially relevant estimated
parameter to the upper or lower boundary of its 95% confidence interval. For each
resulting parameterization we report the R2 of the following linear regressions:
εtruez,t = α + βε
identified
z,t + ηt,
where {εidentifiedz,t } are the identified technology shocks and {εtruez,t } is structural
neutral technology innovation. The results are presented in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3 shows results for those parameters where we obtained a different R2
from either increasing it to the lower or upper bound of its confidence interval. In
addition we report results for “technology” parameters such as κ (capital adjust-
ment), γu (capital utilization), the persistence of the price of new investment ρq
and of the skill shock, ρφ that may be thought of easily confoundable with neutral
technology. We find that this is not the case. This conclusion remains also if we
for example increase the persistence of the price of investment q to ρq = 0.99.
Similarly changing the parameters governing the stickiness of prices and wages,
σw, σp, ρw and θw does not alter our conclusions. Although the R
2 slightly moves,
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Table 4.3: Sensitivity to Parameters in New Keynesian Model
BHM Gali Solow
Parameter down up down up down up
θw ∈ {0.15, 0.35} 0.95 0.87 0.46 0.54 0.23 0.23
h ∈ {0.58, 0.72} 0.92 0.92 0.53 0.50 0.23 0.23
γu ∈ {0.14, 0.41} 0.93 0.93 0.55 0.50 0.23 0.23
κ ∈ {0.84, 3.91} 0.93 0.93 0.52 0.50 0.23 0.23
ρw ∈ {0.02, 0.04} 0.93 0.90 0.52 0.46 0.23 0.23
ρq ∈ {0.31, 0.46} 0.93 0.93 0.52 0.52 0.23 0.23
ρφ ∈ {0.04, 0.12} 0.93 0.93 0.52 0.46 0.23 0.24
σw ∈ {0.27, 0.62} 0.93 0.93 0.50 0.53 0.23 0.23
100× σp ∈ {0.09, 0.21} 0.93 0.92 0.51 0.51 0.23 0.23
Notes: Each column contains the R2 from the regression of the structural neutral technology innovation εz,t on
the technology shock εz,t, identified using the procedure in the respective column. The column “down” refers to
lowering the respective parameter to the lower bound of its condifence band and the column “up” refers to the
increase to the upper bound. Results are based on a Monte Carlo study with 300 replications. BHM refers to
the method proposed in this paper as specified in Section 4.3.2. Gali refers to the technology shock identified
following the procedure in Gali (1999). The Solow residual is calculated applying Jorgenson correction for labor
composition effects.
we checked that this change is inconsequential for the impulse responses to the
neutral technology identified using our proposed method.
4.5 Conclusion
Standard methods for identifying technology shocks in the data do not identify
neutral technology in models with heterogeneous inputs. In particular, the pres-
ence of worker heterogeneity invalidates the key identification assumption in Gali
(1999) because not only technology, but virtually all persistent shocks have a long
run effect on productivity in such models. The identification of neutral technol-
ogy shocks using the Solow residual accounting procedure is also biased if the
effects of factor heterogeneity and non-neutral technical changes are not explicitly
accounted for.
Yet, most models have clear predictions for the dynamic responses of variables
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to neutral technology shocks only. Thus, to evaluate such models it is desirable
to be able to separate neutral technology shocks from the multitude of other
shocks in the data and to compare the conditional response of variables to these
neutral shocks in the data to the responses implied by the models. As existing
measures of technology in the data confound neutral technology with non-neutral
technology shocks or even with non-technology shocks, such a comparison would
not be informative on the empirical performance of a model.
In this paper we therefore propose a method to identify neutral technology in
the data. We use Uzawa’s classic characterization on balanced growth, to show
that imposing balanced growth properties on long-run impulse responses uniquely
identifies neutral technology shocks. We implement this identification in the data
using an identified state-space model and establish in Monte Carlo simulations
that neutral technology is very well recovered in business cycle models including
the New Keynesian one. In particular small samples do not lead our methodology
to confound neutral technology neither with non-neutral technology shocks nor
with non-technology shocks, such as wage markup shocks or preference shifts.
In future research we plan to apply our method to identify neutral technology
shocks in U.S. data. In particular, we will describe and analyze the sequence of
identified shocks and document its co-movement with other economic aggregates.
Finally, we will hopefully be able to provide conclusive answers to some of the
classic questions in macroeconomics.
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Appendix A
Appendix to “The Pass-Through
of Sovereign Risk”
A.1 Derivation of Results 1
Combine equation (1.3) and (1.4) to eliminate the demand for deposits from the
decision problem of the banker. The decision problem is then
vb(n; S) = max
aB ,aK
ES {Λ(S′,S) [(1− ψ)n′ + ψvb(n′; S′)]} ,
n′ =
∑
j={B,K}
[Rj(S
′,S)−R(S)]Qj(S)aj +R(S)n,
λ
 ∑
j={B,K}
Qj(S)aj
 ≤ vb(n; S),
S′ = Γ(S).
Guess that the value function is v(n,S) = α(S)n. Necessary and sufficient
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conditions for an optimum are
ES {Λ(S′,S) [(1− ψ) + ψα(S′)] [Rj(S′,S)−R(S)]} = λµ(S) j = {B,K},
(A.1)
µ(S)
α(S)n− λ ∑
j={B,K}
Qj(S)aj
 = 0. (A.2)
Substituting the guess in the dynamic program, and using the law of motion for
n′, we obtain
vb(n,S) = max
aB ,aK
 ∑
j={B,K}
ES
{
Λ(S′,S)[(1− ψ) + ψα(S′)][Rj(S′)−R(S)]
}
Qj(S)aj
+
ES
{
Λ(S′,S)[(1− ψ) + ψα(S′)]}R(S)n.
Note that the first term on the right hand side of the above equation equals
µ(S)α(S)n. Indeed, when the leverage constraint does not bind (µ(S) = 0), ex-
pected discounted returns on assets held by bankers equal the discounted risk free
rate by equation (A.1). This implies that the term equals 0. When the constraint
binds (µ(S) > 0), instead, this term can be written as
λµ(S)
∑
j={B,K}
Qj(S)aj.
Using the complementary slackness condition in (A.2), we can rewrite the ex-
pression λµ(S)
∑
j={b,k}Qj(S)aj as µ(S)α(S)n. Thus, the value function under
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the guess takes the following form:
α(S)n = µ(S)α(S)n+ ES {Λ(S′,S)[(1− ψ) + ψα(S′)]}R(S)n.
Solving for α(S), we obtain
α(S) =
ES{Λ(S′,S)[(1− ψ) + ψα(S′)]}R(S)
1− µ(S) .
The guess is verified if µ(S) < 1. From equation (A.2) we obtain:
µ(S) = max
1− ES{Λ(S′,S)[(1− ψ) + ψα(S)]}R(S)nλ(∑j={B,K}Qj(S)aj) , 0
 < 1.
Finally, notice that financial leverage equals across bankers whenever µ(S) > 0.
This implies that n
λ
∑
j={B,K}Qjaj
is equal to N
λ[
∑
j={B,K}QjAj]
when the constraint
binds.
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A.2 Numerical Solution
A.2.1 Equilibrium Conditions
The state variables of the model are S = [K˜, B˜, P˜ ,∆z, g, s, d]. The control vari-
ables {C˜(S), R(S), α(S), QB(S)} solve the residual equations
ES
[
β
C˜(S)
C˜(S′)
e−∆z
′
R(S)
]
− 1 = 0, (A.3)
ES
β C˜(S)C˜(S′)e−∆z′ [(1− ψ) + ψα(S′)]
 (1− δ)QK(S′) + α Y˜ (S′)K˜′(S)e∆z′
QK(S)
− λµ(S) = 0, (A.4)
ES
{
β
C˜(S)
C˜(S′)
e−∆z
′
[(1− ψ) + ψα(S′)] [1− d′D]
[
pi + (1− pi) [ι+Qb(S′)]
QB(S)
]}
− λµ(S) = 0, (A.5)
α(S)−
(1− ψ) + ψR(S)ES
[
β C˜(S)
C˜(S′)
e−∆z
′
α(S′)
]
1− µ(S) = 0, (A.6)
where QK(S) is the market value of the capital stock and the multiplier µ(S) is
given by
µ(S) = max
1−
ES
{
β C˜(S)
C˜(S′)
e−∆z
′
[(1− ψ) + ψα(S′)]R(S)
}
N˜(S)
λ[QK(S)K˜ ′(S) +QB(S)B˜(S)]
 , 0
 . (A.7)
The endogenous state variables [K˜, B˜, P˜ ] evolve as follows
K˜ ′(S) =
{
(1− δ)K˜ + Φ
[
e∆z
(
Y˜ (S)(1− eg)− C˜(S)
K˜
)]
K˜
}
e−∆z, (A.8)
193
B˜′(S) =
[1− dD]{pi + (1− pi)[ι+QB(S)]}B˜e−∆z + Y˜ (S)
[
g −
(
t∗ + γτ BY˜ (S)
)]
QB(S)
, (A.9)
P˜ ′(S) = R(S)[Qk(S)K˜ ′(S) +Qb(S)B˜′(S)− N˜(S)]. (A.10)
The state variable P˜ measures the detrended cum interest deposits that bankers
pay to households at the beginning of the period and it is sufficient to keep track
of the evolution of aggregate bankers’ net worth. Indeed, the aggregate net worth
of banks can be expressed as
N˜(S) = ψ
{[
QK(S) + α
Y˜ (S)
K˜
e∆z
]
K˜ + [1− dD] [pi + (1− pi) [ι+QB(S)]] B˜ − P˜
}
(A.11)
+ω[QK(S)K˜ +QB(S)B˜].
Using the intratemporal Euler equation of the household, we can express de-
trended output as
Y˜ (S) =
[
χ−1
(K˜e−∆z)α
C˜(S)
] 1−α
α+ν−1
(Ke−∆z)α. (A.12)
The exogenous state variables [∆z, log(g), s] evolve as follows
∆z′ = (1− ρz)γ + ρz∆z + σzεz, (A.13)
g′ = (1− ρg)g∗ + ρgg + σgεg, (A.14)
s′ = (1− ρs)s∗ + ρss+ σsεs, (A.15)
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while d follows
d′ =
1 with probability
es
1+es
0 with probability 1− es
1+es
.
(A.16)
It will be convenient to express detrended state and control variables as log-
deviations from their deterministic steady state. I denote this transformation for
variable x as xˆ.
A.2.2 Algorithm for Numerical Solution
I approximate the control variables of the model using piece-wise smooth functions,
parametrized by γ = {γxd=0, γxd=1}x={Cˆ,αˆ,Qˆb,Rˆ}. The law of motion for a control
variable x is described by
x(d, Sˆ) = (1− d)γxd=0′T(Sˆ) + dγxd=1′T(Sˆ), (A.17)
where Sˆ = [Kˆ, Pˆ , Bˆ,∆zˆ, gˆ, sˆ] and T(.) is a vector collecting Chebyshev’s poly-
nomials.1 Define R(γc, {d, Sˆ}) to be a 4 × 1 vector collecting the left hand
side of the residual equations (A.3)-(A.6) for the candidate solution γc evaluated
at {d, Sˆ}. The numerical solution of the model consists in choosing γc so that
R(γc, {d, Sˆ}) = 0 for a set of collocation points {d, Sˆi} ∈ {0, 1} × S.
The choice of collocation points and of the associated Chebyshev’s polynomials
follows Krueger et al. (2010). The rule for computing conditional expectations
when evaluating R(γc, {d, Sˆ}) follows Judd et al. (2011). To give an example of
this latter, suppose we wish to compute Ed,Si [y(d′, Sˆ′)], where y is an integrand of
interest.2 Given a candidate solution γc, we can compute y at every collocation
1The shocks are expressed as deviation from their mean.
2For example, y could be e
−∆z′
C(S′) in equation (A.3).
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point using the model’s equilibrium conditions. Next, we can construct an implied
policy function for y, {γyd=0, γyd=1}, via a Chebyshev’s regression. Using the law of
total probability, the conditional expectation of interest can be expressed as
Ed,Si [y(d′, Sˆ′)] = (1− Prob{d′ = 1|Sˆi})ESˆi [γyd=0′T(Sˆ′)] +
(A.18)
+Prob{d′ = 1|Sˆi}ESˆi [γyd=1′T(Sˆ′)],
where Prob{d′ = 1|Sˆi} = esi
1+es
i . Judd et al. (2011) propose a simple procedure
to evaluate integrals of the form ESˆi [γ
y
d=1
′T(Sˆ′)]. In proposition 1 of their pa-
per, they show that, under weak conditions, the expectation of a polynomial can
be calculated via a linear transformation I of the coefficient vector γyd , where I
depends exclusively on the deep parameters of the model. The authors provide
general formulas for the transformation I.
The algorithm for the numerical solution of the model goes as follows
Step 0.A: Defining the grid and the polynomials. Set upper and
lower bounds on the state variables Sˆ = [Kˆ, Pˆ , Bˆ,∆z, g, s]. Given these
bounds, construct a µ-level Smolyak grid and the associated Chebyshev’s
polynomials T(.) following Krueger et al. (2010).
Step 0.B: Precomputing integrals. Compute I using Judd et al. (2011)
formulas.
Step 1: Equilibrium conditions at the candidate solution. Start
with a guess for the model’s policy functions γc. For each (d, Sˆi), use γc and
equation (A.17) to compute {Cˆ(d, Sˆi), αˆ(d, Sˆi), Qˆb(d, Sˆi), Rˆ(d, Sˆi)}. Given
the control variables, solve for the endogenous state variables next period
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using the model’s equilibrium conditions. Given the value of control and
state variables, compute the value of every integrand in equations (A.3)-
(A.6) at (d, Sˆi). Collect these integrands in the matrix y.
Step 2: Evaluate conditional expectations. For each d = {0, 1}, run a
Chebyshev regression for the integrand in y, and denote by γyd the implied
policy function for an element y ∈ y. Conditional expectations are calculated
using equation (A.19) and the matrix I.
Step 3: Evaluate residual equations. Given conditional expectations,
compute the multiplier using equation (A.7). Evaluate the residual equations
R(γc, {d, Sˆi}) at every collocation point (d, Sˆi). The dimension of the vector
of residuals equals 4 times the cardinality of the state space. Denote by r
the Euclidean norm for this vector.
Step 4: Iteration. If r ≤ 10−20, stop the algorithm. Else, update the
guess and repeat Step 1-4. 
The specific for the algorithm are as follows
Choice of bounds. The bounds on [∆zˆ, gˆ] are +/- 3 standard deviations
from their mean. The bounds on sˆ are larger and set to [−5,+5]. The
bounds on the endogenous state variables Sˆ = [Kˆ, Pˆ , Bˆ] are set to +/- 4.5
their standard deviations in the model without sovereign risk. The standard
deviation is calculated by simulating a third order perturbation of the model
without sovereign risk. A desirable extention of the algorithm is to select
different bounds depending on whether the economy is in a default state or
not.
Smolyak Grid. For tractability, I choose µ = 3 for the Smolyak grid. This
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implies that I have 389 distinct points in S.
Precomputation of Integrals. I use Gaussian numerical quadrature for
computing the matrix I.
Iterative Algorithm. I find the zeros of the residual equation using a
variant of the Newton algorithm. To speed up computations, numerical
derivatives are computed in parallel.
I denote the model solution by γ∗.
A.2.3 Accuracy of Numerical Solution
I check the accuracy of the numerical solution by computing the errors of the
residual equations (Judd, 1992). More specifically, I proceed as follows. First,
I simulate the model forward for 5000 periods. This gives a simulation for the
state variable of the model {dt, Sˆt}5000t=1 . Second, for each pair (dt, Sˆt), I calculate
the errors of the residual equations R(γ∗, {dt, Sˆt}). As an example, let’s consider
equation (A.4). Then, the residual error at (dt, Sˆt) for this equation is defined as
1−
Edt,Sˆt
{
β C˜(dt,Sˆt)
C˜(S′) e
−∆z′ [(1− ψ) + ψα(S′)]
[
(1−δ)QK(S′)+α Y˜ (S
′)
K˜′(dt,Sˆt)
e∆z
′
QK(dt,Sˆt)
]}
λµ(dt, Sˆt)
,
where the model’s policy functions are used to generate the value for endogenous
variables at dt, Sˆt. Note that, by construction, the residual errors are zero at the
collocation points. This residual equation errors provide a measure of how large
are the discrepancy between the decision rule derived from the numerical algorithm
and those implied by the model’s equilibrium condition in other points of the state
space. Following standard practice, I report the decimal log of the absolute value
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Figure A.1: Residual Equations Errors
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Notes: The histograms reports the residual equations errors in decimal log basis. The dotted
line marks the mean residual equation error.
of these residual errors. Figure A.1 below reports the density (histogram) of those
errors.
On average, residual equation errors are in the order of -4.75 for the risk free
rate, -3.5 for consumption and the price of government securities and -3 for the
marginal value of wealth. These numbers are comparable to values reported in
the literature for models of similar complexity, and they are still very reasonable.
Figure A.2 reports residual equation errors for a sequence of states {St}2011:Q4t=2004:Q1
extracted using the particle filter (See Section 1.4). The figure shows that residual
equation errors are reasonable in empirically relevant region of the state space.
Figure A.2: Residual Equations Errors: Empirically Relevant Region
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A.3 Data Source
A.3.1 Credit Default Swap (CDS) Spread
Daily CDS spreads on 5 years Italian governmet securities (RED code: 4AB951).
The restructuring clause of the contract is CR (complete restructuring). The
spread is denominated in basis points and paid quarterly. The source is Markit,
accessed from the Wharton Research Data Services.
A.3.2 Banks’ exposure to the Italian government
The European Banking Authority (EBA) published information on holdings of
government debt by European banks participating to the 2011 stress test. Five
Italian banks were in this pool: Unicredit, Intesa-San Paolo, Monte dei Paschi di
Siena (MPS), Banco Popolare (BPI) and Unione di Banche Italiane (UBI). Re-
sults of the stress test for each of these five banks are available at http://www.eba.
europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/eu-wide-stress-testing/2011/results.
I measure exposure of each bank to Italian central and local government as gross
direct long exposure (accounting value gross of specific provisions). This informa-
tion is available by maturity of financial instrument, and it reflects positions as
of 31st of December 2010. I match these data on exposure with end of 2010 total
financial assets for each of the five institutions. This latter information is obtained
using consolidated banking data from Bankscope, accessed from the Wharton Re-
search Data Service. Table A.1 reports these information.
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Table A.1: Exposure to Domestic Sovereign by Major Italian Banks: End
of 2010
3Mo 1Yr 2Yr 3Yr 5Yr 10Yr 15Yr Tot. Tot. Assets
Intesa 17.71 9.86 2.82 5.16 8.16 6.64 9.77 60.15 658.76
Unicredit 17.97 10.14 3.04 6.21 4.47 6.39 0.87 49.07 929.49
MPS 5.67 4.99 4.00 3.58 1.45 3.75 9.02 32.47 240.70
BPI 3.89 1.65 1.14 3.64 0.78 0.40 0.25 11.77 134.17
UBI 1.33 3.56 0.30 0.31 0.72 2.53 1.76 10.54 129.80
Total 46.57 30.02 11.30 18.9 13.76 19.71 21.67 164.00 2092.99
Notes: Data is reported in billions of euros.
A.3.3 Construction of the Multiplier
Result 2. In equilibrium, the multiplier on the incentive constraint of bankers is a
function of financial leverage and of the spread between a risk free security traded
by bankers and the risk free rate
µt =
[
Rft−Rt
Rt
]
levt
1 +
[
Rft−Rt
Rt
]
levt
. (A.19)
Proof. Since the asset is risk free, one has that covt(Λˆt+1, R
f
t+1) = 0. Therefore,
using equation (1.25) in the main text, one has:
[
Rft −Rt
Rt
]
=
λ
αt
µt
1− µt .
Equation (A.19) follows from the fact that αt
λ
equals financial leverage when
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µt > 0.
Essentially, Result 2 tells us that the agency friction can be interpreted as a
markup on financial intermediation. To measure this markup, one needs to focus
on returns on assets, traded only by bankers, that have the same risk properties
of households’ deposits. I use the prime interbank rate to measure Rft since the
model of Section 3.3 can be interpreted as having a frictionless interbank market
as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). The time series used in the construction of the
multiplier are the following
Financial Leverage: The definition of financial leverage in the model is banks’
equity divided by the market value of total assets. I use quarterly data from the
Italian flow of funds (Conti Finanziari) to construct these two time series. First,
I match banks in the model with Monetary and Financial Institutions (MFIs).
This category includes commercial banks, money market funds and the domestic
central bank. I use balance sheet information for the Bank of Italy to exclude
the latter from this pool. Second, I construct a time series for bank equity as the
difference between “total assets” and total debt liabilities. This latter is defined
as “total liabilities” minus “shares and other equities” (liabilities) and “mutual
fund shares” (liabilities). Financial leverage is the ratio between equity and total
assets. Data can be downloaded at http://bip.bancaditalia.it/4972unix/.
See Bartiloro et al. (2003) for a description of the Italian flow of funds.
TED Spread: The prime interbank rate (EURIBOR 1yrs.) is obtained from the
ECB Statistical Data Warehouse, under Market Indexes in the section Monetary
and Financial Statistics. The frequency of observation is monthly. Data can be
downloaded at http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/. I match the model’s risk free rate
with the yields on German bonds with a 1 year maturity. A monthly time series
202
for this latter is obtained from the time series database of the Deutsche Bundes-
bank. Data can be downloaded at http://www.bundesbank.de/Navigation/EN/
Statistics/Time_series_databases/time_series_databases.html. I construct
a quarterly measure of the TED spreads by averaging the computed series over
three months.
A.3.4 Other Time Series
GDP growth: Real GDP growth is the growth rate relative to previous quarter
of real gross domestic product (B1 EG). Data are quarterly, 1980:Q1-2012:Q4.
The source is OECD Quarterly National Accounts.
Consumption growth: Consumption growth is the growth rate relative to pre-
vious quarter of real private final consumption expenditure (P31S14 S15 ). Data
are quarterly, 1991:Q1-2012:Q4. The source is OECD Quarterly National Ac-
counts.
Spending-Output Ratio: Spending-output ratio is general government final
consumption expenditure divided by gross domestic product. Both series are sea-
sonally adjusted and in volume estimates. Data are quarterly, 1991:Q1-2012:Q4.
The source is OECD Quarterly National Accounts.
Investment-Output Ratio: Investment-output ratio is gross capital formation
divided by gross domestic product. Both series are seasonally adjusted and in
volume estimates. Data are quarterly, 1991:Q1-2012:Q4. The source is OECD
Quarterly National Accounts.
Labor income share: I obtain annual data (1970-2007) for and labor compen-
sation (LAB) and value added (VA) from EU KLEMS database. Labor share is
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defined as LAB
VA
. Data can be downloaded at http://www.euklems.net/.
Worked hours: Average numbers of hours worked per year by person engaged.
I scale the series by (24− 8)× 7× 52. Data are annual (1970-2007), and obtained
from EU KLEMS. Data can be downloaded at http://www.euklems.net/.
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A.4 Estimating the Model without Sovereign Risk
The model without sovereign risk has five state variables St = [Kˆt, Pˆt, Bˆt,∆zt, gt].
Let Yt be a 2 × 1 vector of observables collecting output growth and the time
series for the multiplier on the leverage constraint. The state-space representation
is
Yt = fθ˜(St) + ηt ηt ∼ N (0,Σ) (A.20)
St = gθ˜(St−1, εt) εt ∼ N (0, I). (A.21)
The first equation is the measurement equation, with ηt being a vector of Gaus-
sian measurement errors. The second equation is the transition equation, which
represents the law of motion for the model’s state variables. The vector εt repre-
sents the innovation to the structural shocks ∆zt and gt. The function fθ˜(.) and
gθ˜(.) are generated using the numerical procedure described in Appendix A.2 ap-
plied to the model without sovereign risk. I characterize the posterior distribution
of θ˜ using full information Bayesian methods. I denote by p(θ˜) the prior on θ˜. In
what follows, I provide details on the likelihood evaluation and on the posterior
sampler adopted.
A.4.1 Likelihood Evaluation
Let Yt = [Y1, . . . ,Yt], and denote by p(St|Yt−1; θ) the conditional distribution of
the state vector given observations up to period t− 1. The likelihood function for
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the state-space model of interest can be expressed as
L(YT |θ) =
T∏
t=1
p(Yt|Yt−1; θ) =
T∏
t=1
[∫
p(Yt|St; θ)p(St|Yt−1; θ)dSt
]
. (A.22)
While the conditional density of Yt given St is known and Gaussian, there is
no analytical expression for the density p(St|Yt−1, θ). I use the auxiliary particle
filter of Pitt and Shephard (1999) to approximate this density via a set of pairs
{Sit , p˜iit}Ni=1. This approximation is then used to estimate the likelihood function.
Step 0: Initialization. Set t = 1. Initialize {Si0, p˜ii0}Ni=1 from the model’s
ergodic distribution and set p˜ii0 =
1
N
∀i.
Step 1: Prediction. For each i = 1, . . . , N , draw Sit|t−1 values from the
proposal density g(St|Yt,Sit−1).
Step 2: Filtering. Assign to each Sit|t−1 the particle weight
piit =
p(Yt|Sit|t−1; θ)p(St|Sit|t−1; θ)
g(St|Yt,Sit−1)
.
Step 3: Sampling. Rescale the particles {piit} so that they add up to
unity, and denote these rescaled values by {p˜iit}. Sample N values for the
state vector with replacement from {Sit|t−1, p˜iit}Ni=1. Call each draw {Sit}. If
t < T , set t = t+ 1 and go to Step 1. Else, stop. 
The likelihood function of the model is then approximated as
L(YT |θ) ≈ 1
N
(
T∏
t=1
[
1
N
N∑
i=1
p(Yt|Sit|t−1; θ)
])
.
Regarding the tuning of the filter, I set N = 20000. The matrix Σ is diagonal,
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and the diagonal elements equal 25% of the variance of the observable variables.
The choice for the proposal density g(St|Yt,Sit−1) is more involved. I sample
the structural innovations εt from N (mt, I). Then, I use the model’s transition
equation (A.21) to obtain Sit|t−1. The center for the proposal distribution for εt is
generated as follows:
- Let St−1 be the mean for {Sit−1} over i.
- Set mt to the solution of this optimization program
argminε
{
[Yt − fθ˜(gθ˜(St−1, ε))]′[Yt − fθ˜(gθ˜(St−1, ε))] + ε′Σ−1ε
}
.
The first part of the objective function pushes ε toward values such that the
state vector can rationalize the observation Yt. The second part of the objective
function imposes a penalty for ε that are far away from their high density regions.
I verify that this proposal density results in substantial efficiency gains relative
to the canonical particle filter, especially when the model tries to fit extreme
observations for Yt.
A.4.2 Posterior Sampler
I characterize the posterior density of θ˜ using a Random Walk Metropolis Hastings
with proposal density given by
q(θ˜p|θ˜m−1) ∼ N (θ˜m−1, cH).
The sequence of draws {θ˜m} is generated as follows
i) Initialize the chain at θ˜1.
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ii) For m = 2, . . . ,M , draw θ˜p from q(θ˜p|θ˜m−1). The jump from θ˜m−1 to θ˜p is
accepted (θ˜m = θ˜p) with probability min{1, r(θ˜m−1, θ˜p|YT )}, and rejected
otherwise (θ˜m = θ˜m−1). The probability of accepting the draw is
r(θ˜m−1, θ˜p|YT ) = L(Y
T |θ˜p)p(θ˜p)
L(YT |θ˜m−1)p(θ˜m−1) .
First, I run the chain for M = 10000 with H being the identity matrix and c =
0.001. The chain is initialized from an estimation of the model using the Method
of Simulated Moments.3 I drop the first 5000 draws, and I use the remaining
draws to initialize a second chain and to construct a new candidate density. This
second chain is initialized at the mean of the 5000 draws. Moreover, the variance-
covariance matrix H is set to the empirical variance-covariance matrix of these
5000 draws. The parameter c is fine tuned to obtain an acceptance rate of roughly
60%. I run the second chain for M = 20000. Posterior statistics are based on the
latter 10000 draws.
3The moments used in this step are: i) mean, standard deviation and autocorrelation for
GDP growth and the multiplier; ii) correlation between GDP growth and the multiplier.
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A.5 Policy Experiments
A.5.1 Refinancing Operations
It is instructive to first consider the stationary problem. The government allows
bankers to borrow up to m at the fixed interest rate Rm, and this intervention
is financed through lump-sum taxation. Moreover, these loans are not subject to
limited enforcement problems. The decision problem of the banker becomes
vb(n; S) = max
aB ,aK ,b
ES {Λ(S′,S) [(1− ψ)n′ + ψvb(n′; S′)]} ,
n′ =
∑
j={B,K}
[Rj(S
′,S)−R(S)]Qj(S)aj +
+[Rm −R(S)]m−R(S)b,∑
j={B,K}
Qj(S)aj = n+ b,
λ
 ∑
j={B,K}
Qj(S)aj −m
 ≤ vb(n; S),
m ∈ [0,m],
S′ = Γ(S).
Assuming that m ≥ 0 does not bind,4 the first order condition with respect to m
is
Es
{
Λ(S′,S)
[
(1− ψ) + ψ∂vb(n
′; S)
∂n′
]}
[R(S)−Rm] + λµ(S) = χ(S)
It can be showed, following a similar logic of Result 1, that vb(n; S) = α(S)n +
x(S), with x(S) ≥ 0. The leverage constraint becomes
4This is not a restriction, as the policy considered involves an Rm substantially below R,
meaning that bankers are willing to accept the loan.
209
∑
j Qj(S)aj
n
≤ α(S)
λ
+
x(S)
λ
+m
Notice that refinancing operations have two main direct effects on banks. First,
they represent an implicit transfer to banks. Indeed, to the extent that (Rm <
R(S)), banks benefit from the policy as their debt is subsidized. This has a positive
effect on the net worth of banks relative to what would happen in the no-policy
case. Second, the policy relaxes the leverage constraint of banks. This happens
because of two distinct reasons: i) the loan from the government does not enter
in the computation of the constrained level of leverage (the m component); and
ii) the value function of bankers increase as a result of the subsidized loan, this
lowering the incentives of the banker to walk away.
A.5.2 Longer Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs)
The LTROs are a non-stationary version of the refinancing operations discussed
above. The government allows banker to borrow up to m in period t = 1, and
they receive the pricipal and the interest in a later period T . Figure A.3 describes
the timing of transfers between government and banks under LTROs.
I assume that the policy was unexpected by agents. At time t = 1, agents are
perfectly informed about the time path of the loans and they believe that the
policy will not be implemented in the future. Note that the decision rules under
LTROs are time dependent: the dynamics at t = 1 will be different from those
at t = T − 1 as in the latter case we are getting closer to the repayement stage
and banks will have a different behavior. In order to solve for the path of model’s
decision rules, I follow a backward induction procedure. From period t = T + 1
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Figure A.3: Timing of LTROs
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Transfers
onward, the decision rules are those in absence of policy. Thus, at t = T , agents use
those decision rules to form expectations. By solving the equilibrium conditions
under this assumption and the repayment of the loan, we can obtain decision rules
for cT (S), RT (S), αT (S), QB,T (S). At t = T − 1 we proceed in the same way, this
time using cT (S), RT (S), αT (S), QB,T (S) to form expectations. More specifically,
the policy functions in the transition {ct(S), Rt(S), αt(S), Qb,t(S)}Tt=1, are derived
as follows:
i) Period T : Solve the model using {c(S), R(S), α(S), q(S)} to form expecta-
tions. The multiplier is modified as follows
µT (S) = max
{
1− ES{ΛT+1(S
′)[(1− ψ) + ψαT+1(S)]}RT (S)(N ′ −m)
λ (Qb,T (S)B′T +Qk,T (S)K
′
T )
, 0
}
Denote the solution by {cT (S), RT (S), αT (S), qT (S)}.
ii) Period t = T−1, . . . , 1: Solve the model using the previous iteration policy
functions to form expectations. 
211
Appendix B
Appendix to “Assessing DSGE
Model Nonlinearities”
B.1 QAR(1,1) Model
This section shows how to derive important moments for the QAR(1,1) model
given by
yt = φ1yt−1 + φ2s2t−1 + (1 + γst−1)σut, ut ∼ iidN(0, 1) (B.1)
st = φ1st−1 + σut, |φ1| < 1 (B.2)
by exploiting the recursively linear structure of the model. The model corresponds
to (2.9) in the main text. To simplify the presentation, we dropped the tildes for
φ2, γ, and s.
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B.1.1 Moments
We now derive the time-invariant mean and autocovariances for yt, assuming the
process is stationary and was initialized in the infinite past. Due to the recursively
linear structure of the model we begin with the derivation of the moments of st.
Moments of st. The process st in (B.2) is linear and has a moving average
representation of the from
st = σ
∞∑
j=0
φj1ut−j.
The mean and the autocovariances of st are given by
E[st] = 0, µs2 = E[s2t ] =
σ2
1− φ21
, E[stst−h] = φh1µs2 .
Since the innovations ut are iid standard normal variates, we obtain the following
third and fourth moments:
E[s3t ] =
∞∑
j=0
φ3j1 E[u3t−j] = 0, E[s4t ] =
∞∑
j=0
φ4j1 E[u4t−j] =
3σ4
1− φ41
.
Mean of yt. Taking expectations on both sides of (B.1) we obtain
E[yt] = φ1E[yt−1] + φ2µs2 + (1 + γE[st−1])σE[ut] = φ1E[yt] +
φ2σ
2
1− φ21
.
Here we used the expression for µs2 obtained previously as well as the fact that ut
and st−1 are independent. In turn,
µy = E[yt] =
φ2σ
2
(1− φ1)(1− φ21)
. (B.3)
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Variance of yt. Consider the centered second moment of yt:
V[yt] = E
[
(φ1(yt−1 − µy) + φ2(s2t−1 − µs2) + σ(1 + γst−1)ut)2
]
= E
[
φ21(yt−1 − µy)2 + φ22(s2t−1 − µs2)2 + σ2(1 + γst−1)2u2t
2φ1φ2(yt−1 − µy)(s2t−1 − µs2) + 2φ2σ(s2t−1 − µs2)(1 + γst−1)ut
+2φ1σ(1 + γst−1)(yt−1 − µy)ut
]
= φ21E[(yt−1 − µy)2] + φ22E[(s2t−1 − µs2)2] + σ2(1 + γ2µs2)
+2φ1φ2E[(yt−1 − µy)(s2t−1 − µs2)].
The time-invariant solution is
V[yt] =
1
1− φ21
[
φ22V[s2t ] + σ2(1 + γ2E[s2t ]) + 2φ1φ2Cov[yt, s2t ]
]
,
where
Cov[yt, s
2
t ] = E
[
(φ1(yt−1 − µy) + φ2(s2t−1 − µs2) + (1 + γst−1)σut)
×(φ21(s2t−1 − µs2) + 2φ1σst−1ut + σ2(u2t − 1))
]
= φ31E[(yt−1 − µy)(s2t−1 − µs2)] + φ21φ2E[(s2t−1 − µs2)2]
+2φ1γσ
2µs2 ,
which implies
Cov[yt, s
2
t ] =
1
1− φ31
[
φ21φ2V[s2t ] + 2φ1γσ2E[s2t ]
]
.
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Interestingly,
Cov[yt, st] = E
[
(φ1(yt−1 − µy) + φ2(s2t−1 − µs2) + (1 + γst−1)σut)(φ1st−1 + σut)
]
= φ21Cov[yt−1, st−1] + σ
2
All other terms drop out because E[ut] = E[st] = E[s3t ] = 0. Thus, solving for the
time-invariant solution leads to the “first-order” variance expression
Cov[yt, st] = E[s2t ] =
σ2
1− φ21
.
Autocovariances of yt. Consider E[(yt − µy)(yt−1 − µy)]:
Cov[yt, yt−1] = E
[
(φ1(yt−1 − µy) + φ2(s2t−1 − µs2) + (1 + γst−1)σut)(yt−1 − µy)
]
= φ1V[yt−1] + φ2Cov[yt−1, s2t−1].
In general, higher-order autocovariances can be computed recursively:
Cov[yt, yt−h] = E
[
(φ1(yt−1 − µy) + φ2(s2t−1 − µs2) + (1 + γst−1)σut)(yt−h − µy)
]
= φ1Cov[yt−1, yt−h] + φ2Cov[yt−h, s2t−1].
The term Cov[yt−h, s2t−1] can also be calculated recursively:
Cov[yt−h, s2t−1] = E
[
(yt−h − µy)(φ21(st−2 − E[s2t−2]) + 2φ1st−2σut−1 + σ(ut−1)2 − 1)
]
= φ21Cov[yt−h, s
2
t−2].
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B.1.2 Initialization and Identification
In order to compute the likelihood function recursively, it is necessary to initialize
s0. We write the joint distribution of observables, initial state, and parameters as:
p(Y0:T , θ, s0) = p(Y1:T |y0, s0, θ)p(y0, s0|θ)p(θ)
and use MCMC methods to generate draws from the posterior
p(θ, s0|Y0:T ) ∝ p(Y1:T |y0, s0, θ)p(y0, s0|θ)p(θ).
We will approximate the distribution of (y0, s0) using a normal distribution y0
s0
 ∣∣∣∣θ ∼ N
 µy
µs
 ,
 Σyy Σys
Σsy Σss
 . (B.4)
The moments of this normal distribution are calculated as follows. We will assume
that the system was in its steady state in period t = −T∗, i.e. s−T∗ = 0 and
y−T∗ = φ0. In principle, T∗ could be infinite, but this will create some problems
if φ1 = 1. In order to simplify the time subscripts a bit, we shift the time index
by T∗ periods. Starting from s0 = 0 and y0 = φ0 we will calculate the first and
second moments of yt, st, and s
2
t recursively, starting with
E[s0] = 0, E[y0] = φ0, V[s0] = 0, V[y0] = 0, (B.5)
Cov[y0, s0] = 0, Cov[y0, s
2
0], V[s20] = 0.
The process for st is linear autoregressive of order one and we obtain
E[st] = φ1E[st−1], V[st] = φ21V[st−1] + σ2. (B.6)
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Since the innovations t are iid standard normal variates, we obtain that the third
moment is zero:
E[s3t ] =
t−1∑
j=0
φ3j1 E[3t−j] = 0.
Now consider
V[s2t ] = E[(s2t − V[st])2] (B.7)
= E[(φ21(s2t−1 − V[st−1]) + 2φ1st−1σt + σ2(2t − 1))2]
= φ41V[s2t−1] + 4φ21σ2V[st−1] + 2σ4.
A formula for the mean of yt is obtained by taking expectations of the observation
equation:
E[yt] = φ0(1− φ1) + φ1E[yt−1] + φ2V[st−1]. (B.8)
The covariance between yt and st is given by
Cov[yt, st] = E[(yt − E[yt])st] (B.9)
= E
[(
φ1(yt−1 − E[yt−1]) + φ2(s2t−1 − E[s2t−1]) + (1 + γst−1)σt
)(
φ1st−1 + σt
)]
= φ21Cov[yt−1, st−1] + σ
2.
All other terms drop out because the first and third moments of st−1 and t are
equal to zero. The covariance between yt and s
2
t is given by
Cov[yt, s
2
t ] = E[(yt − E[yt])(s2t − V[st])] (B.10)
= E
[
(φ1(yt−1 − E[yt−1]) + φ2(s2t−1 − V[st−1]) + (1 + γst−1)σt)
×(φ21(s2t−1 − V[st−1]) + 2φ1σst−1t + σ2(2t − 1))
]
= φ31Cov[yt−1, s
2
t−1] + φ
2
1φ2V[s2t−1] + 2φ1γσ2E[s2t−1].
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The variance of yt can be computed as follows:
V[yt] = E
[
(φ1(yt−1 − E[yt−1] + φ2(s2t−1 − V[st−1]) + σ(1 + γst−1)t)2
]
(B.11)
= φ21V[yt−1] + φ22V[s2t−1] + σ2(1 + γ2V[st−1])
+2φ1φ2Cov[yt−1, s2t−1].
We can iterate Equations (B.6) to (B.11) forward for T∗ periods to obtain the
moments for the initial distribution of (y0, s0) in (B.4).
Note that for γ = φ2 = 0 s0 and y0 become perfectly correlated conditional on θ
since for a linear model y0 = s0 + φ0. This may affect our posterior sampler when
we include s0 into the parameter vector. To avoid the singularity we add a small
constant to the covariance matrix of (y0, s0).
B.1.3 MCMC Implementation
The RWM algorithm mentioned in Section 2.3.3 is used to implement the posterior
inference. Using a preliminary covariance for the proposal distribution in the RWM
algorithm that is constructed from the prior variance of the QAR parameters we
generate an initial 100,000 draws from the posterior. Based on the last 50,000
draws we compute a covariance matrix that replaces the preliminary covariance
matrix of the proposal distribution. We then continue the chain, generating an
additional 60,000 draws, retaining the last 50,000 to construct summary statistics
for the posterior.
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B.1.4 Detailed Estimation Results
Table A-1: Prior Distribution for QAR(1,1) Model, Samples Starting in
1960
GDP Growth Wage Growth Inflation Fed Funds Rate
φ0 N
(
0.48, 2
)
N
(
1.18, 2
)
N
(
2.38, 2
)
N
(
2.50, 2
)
φ1 N
†(0.36, 0.5) N †(−0.02, 0.5) N †(0.00, 0.5) N †(0.66, 0.5)
σ IG(1.42, 4) IG(0.82, 4) IG(1.87, 4) IG(0.58, 4)
φ2 N(0, 0.1) N(0, 0.1) N(0, 0.1) N(0, 0.1)
γ N(0, 0.1) N(0, 0.1) N(0, 0.1) N(0, 0.1)
Notes: (†) The prior for φ1 is truncated to ensure stationarity. The IG distribution
is parameterized such that pIG(σ|ν, s) ∝ σ−ν−1e−νs2/2σ2 .
Table A-2: Prior Distribution for QAR(1,1) Model, Samples Starting in
1984
GDP Growth Wage Growth Inflation Fed Funds Rate
φ0 N
(
0.43, 2
)
N
(
1.58, 2
)
N
(
4.38, 2
)
N
(
6.08, 2
)
φ1 N
†(0.28, 0.5) N †(0.34, 0.5) N †(0.85, 0.5) N †(0.94, 0.5)
σ IG(1.33, 4) IG(0.88, 4) IG(1.83, 4) IG(1.45, 4)
φ2 N(0, 0.1) N(0, 0.1) N(0, 0.1) N(0, 0.1)
γ N(0, 0.1) N(0, 0.1) N(0, 0.1) N(0, 0.1)
Notes: (†) The prior for φ1 is truncated to ensure stationarity. The IG distribution
is parameterized such that pIG(σ|ν, s) ∝ σ−ν−1e−νs2/2σ2 .
219
Table A-3: Posterior Estimates for QAR(1,1) Model, 1960:Q1-1983:Q4
Data φ0 φ1 φ2 γ σ s0
GDP 0.42 0.28 -0.02 -0.05 1.16 1.42
[0.11 , 0.69] [0.11 , 0.46] [-0.14 , 0.09] [-0.17 , 0.06] [0.91 , 1.53] [1.02 , 1.85]
WAGE 1.75 0.41 -0.05 0.04 0.52 0.89
[1.49 , 1.98] [0.23 , 0.58] [-0.13 , 0.04] [-0.05 , 0.15] [0.40 , 0.68] [0.63 , 1.15]
INFL 4.24 0.87 -0.01 0.16 1.52 -1.97
[2.28 , 5.84] [0.80 , 0.95] [-0.08 , 0.07] [0.04 , 0.27] [1.08 , 2.12] [-4.68 , 0.79]
FFR 4.84 0.92 0.02 0.38 0.62 -1.56
[0.86 , 6.75] [0.88 , 0.96] [-0.05 , 0.05] [0.30 , 0.47] [0.41 , 1.00] [-4.21 , 0.14]
Notes: We report posterior means and 90% equal-tail-probability credible sets in brackets.
Table A-4: Posterior Estimates for QAR(1,1) Model, 1960:Q1-2007:Q4
Data φ0 φ1 φ2 γ σ s0
GDP 0.48 0.29 -0.02 -0.06 0.69 1.37
[0.33 , 0.63] [0.16 , 0.41] [-0.07 , 0.04] [-0.13 , 0.01] [0.58 , 0.82] [1.19 , 1.56]
WAGE 1.41 0.44 -0.03 0.12 0.48 1.22
[1.25 , 1.59] [0.33 , 0.55] [-0.09 , 0.02] [0.05 , 0.20] [0.40 , 0.57] [1.00 , 1.42]
INFL 3.51 0.85 -0.01 0.23 1.06 -1.31
[2.74 , 4.47] [0.79 , 0.91] [-0.06 , 0.05] [0.16 , 0.31] [0.81 , 1.38] [-2.90 , 0.31]
FFR 2.96 0.96 0.04 0.44 0.28 -0.74
[2.16 , 4.16] [0.95 , 0.97] [0.02 , 0.06] [0.37 , 0.52] [0.22 , 0.42] [-1.27 , 0.45]
Notes: We report posterior means and 90% equal-tail-probability credible sets in brackets.
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Table A-5: Posterior Estimates for QAR(1,1) Model, 1960:Q1-2012:Q4
Data φ0 φ1 φ2 γ σ s0
GDP 0.45 0.33 -0.03 -0.07 0.68 1.41
[0.28 , 0.60] [0.22 , 0.44] [-0.08 , 0.03] [-0.14 , 0.00] [0.58 , 0.81] [1.19 , 1.61]
WAGE 1.29 0.43 -0.01 0.08 0.54 1.31
[1.12 , 1.46] [0.32 , 0.53] [-0.06 , 0.04] [0.01 , 0.15] [0.46 , 0.63] [1.11 , 1.50]
INFL 3.23 0.84 0.02 0.22 1.09 -1.26
[2.55 , 4.16] [0.78 , 0.90] [-0.04 , 0.09] [0.15 , 0.30] [0.87 , 1.36] [-2.82 , 0.22]
FFR 3.54 0.96 -0.01 0.41 0.22 0.43
[2.29 , 5.06] [0.94 , 0.97] [-0.02 , 0.00] [0.33 , 0.50] [0.13 , 0.37] [-0.94 , 1.47]
Notes: We report posterior means and 90% equal-tail-probability credible sets in brackets.
Table A-6: Posterior Estimates for QAR(1,1) Model, 1984:Q1-2007:Q4
Data φ0 φ1 φ2 γ σ s0
GDP 0.57 0.26 -0.07 0.01 0.25 1.06
[0.44, 0.70] [0.10 , 0.44] [-0.13 , -0.02] [-0.10 , 0.11] [0.20 , 0.32] [0.91,1.21]
WAGE 1.09 0.24 -0.06 0.07 0.41 0.10
[0.93,1.21] [0.06,0.42] [-0.12,0.02] [-0.03,0.17] [0.32,0.53] [-0.09,0.29]
INFL 2.72 0.63 -0.06 0.07 0.68 2.42
[2.30,3.13] [0.48,0.78] [-0.14,0.04] [-0.06,0.19] [0.52,0.89] [1.76,2.93]
FFR 9.80 0.91 -0.16 0.08 0.22 0.79
[8.68,11.56] [0.87,0.93] [-.23,-.10] [-0.03,0.17] [0.15,0.32] [-0.26,1.64]
Notes: We report posterior means and 90% equal-tail-probability credible sets in brackets.
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Table A-7: Posterior Estimates for QAR(1,1) Model, 1984:Q1-2012:Q4
Data φ0 φ1 φ2 γ σ s0
GDP 0.53 0.36 -0.09 -0.07 0.28 1.09
[0.38 , 0.66] [0.22 , 0.52] [-0.15 , -0.03] [-0.17 , -0.00] [0.23 , 0.35] [0.87 , 1.28]
WAGE 0.98 0.18 -0.04 0.03 0.48 0.20
[0.83 , 1.14] [0.02 , 0.36] [-0.10 , 0.04] [-0.06 , 0.12] [0.38 , 0.60] [0.03 , 0.37]
INFL 2.51 0.63 -0.02 0.07 0.76 2.54
[2.12 , 2.93] [0.48 , 0.77] [-0.10 , 0.06] [-0.03 , 0.19] [0.61 , 0.97] [1.80 , 3.00]
FFR 10.00 0.92 -0.17 0.01 0.19 1.00
[8.72 , 11.43] [0.90 , 0.94] [-0.25 , -0.12] [-0.05 , 0.11] [0.15 , 0.29] [0.05 , 1.40]
Notes: We report posterior means and 90% equal-tail-probability credible sets in brackets.
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B.2 The DSGE Model
B.2.1 First-Order Conditions
Intermediate Goods Producers. Taking as given nominal wages, final good
prices, the demand schedule for intermediate products and technological con-
straints, firm j chooses its labor inputs Ht(j) and the price Pt(j) to maximize
the present value of future profits. After using the production function to substi-
tute our Yt(j) from the present value of future profits in (2.24) (see main text) we
can write the objective function of the firm as
Et
[ ∞∑
s=0
βsQt+s|t
(
Pt+s(j)
Pt+s
(
1− Φp
(
Pt+s(j)
Pt+s−1(j)
))
At+sHt+s(j)− 1
Pt+s
Wt+sHt+s(j)
)]
. (B.12)
This objective function is maximized with respect to Ht(j) and Pt(j) subject to
At+sHt+s(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−1/λp,t
Yt+s.
We use µt+sβ
sQt+s|t to denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with this con-
straint. Setting Qt|t = 1, the first-order condition with respect to Pt(j) is given
by
0 =
1
Pt
(
1− Φp
(
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
))
AtHt(j)− Pt(j)
PtPt−1(j)
Φ′p
(
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
)
AtHt(j) (B.13)
− µt
λp,tPt
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−1/λp,t−1
Yt + βEt
[
Qt+1|t
P 2t+1(j)
Pt+1P 2t (j)
Φ′p
(
Pt+1(j)
Pt(j)
)
At+1Ht+1(j)
]
.
Taking first-order conditions with respect to Ht(j) yields
Wt
Pt
=
Pt(j)
Pt
(
1− Φp
(
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
))
At − µtAt. (B.14)
Households. The first-order condition with respect to consumption is given by
Ptλt =
(
Ct(k)
At
)−τ
1
At
. (B.15)
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We define
Qt+1|t =
λt+1Pt+1
λtPt
. (B.16)
Using this definition, the first-order condition for bond holdings becomes
1 = βEt
[
Qt+1|t
Rt
pit+1
]
. (B.17)
Member k is a monopolistic competitor with respect to his wage choice. Taking
into account the demand for labor of type k the relevant portion of the utility
function for the wage decision is
t
[ ∞∑
s=0
βs
(
· · · − χH 1
1 + 1/ν
(
Wt+s(k)
Wt+s
)−(1+1/ν)/λw
H
1+1/ν
t
)]
,
The relevant portion of the budget constraint after substituting Ht+s(k) by the
labor demand schedule is
· · · = Wt+s(k)
(
Wt+s(k)
Wt+s
)−1/λw
Ht+s
(
1− Φw
(
Wt+s(k)
Wt+s−1(k)
))
+ · · · ,
where the demand for aggregated labor services Ht+s is taken as given. Taking
first-order conditions with respect to Wt(k) yields
0 =
χH
λwWt
(
Wt(k)
Wt
)− 1+1/νλw −1
H
1+1/ν
t + λt
(
Wt(k)
Wt
)−1/λw
Ht
(
1− Φw
(
Wt(k)
Wt−1(k)
))
− λt
λw
Wt(k)
Wt
(
Wt(k)
Wt
)−1/λw−1
Ht
(
1− Φw
(
Wt(k)
Wt−1(k)
))
(B.18)
−λt Wt(k)
Wt−1(k)
(
Wt(k)
Wt
)−1/λw
HtΦ
′
w
(
Wt(k)
Wt−1(k)
)
+βEt
[
λt+1
W 2t+1(k)
W 2t (k)
(
Wt+1(k)
Wt+1
)−1/λw
Ht+1Φ
′
w
(
Wt+1(k)
Wt(k)
)]
.
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B.2.2 Equilibrium Relationships
We consider the symmetric equilibrium in which all intermediate goods producing
firms, as well as households, make identical choices when solving their optimization
problem. Therefore, we can drop the index k and j. In slight abuse of notation
let ∆Xt = Xt/Xt−1 and pit = ∆Pt. We use wt = Wt/Pt to denote the real
wage. Since the non-stationary technology process At induces a stochastic trend
in output, consumption and real wages, it is convenient to express the model in
terms of detrended variables yt = Yt/At, ct = Ct/At and w˜t = wt/At.
Intermediate Goods Producers. Using the above notation, multiplying (B.13)
by Pt, and replacing Yt by Atyt we can simplify the first-order condition for Pt(j)
as follows
0 =
(
1−Φp(pit)
)
Atyt−pitΦ′p(pit)Atyt−
µt
λp,t
Atyt+βEt
[
Qt+1|tpit+1Φ′p(pit+1)At+1yt+1
]
.
Dividing by Atyt and replacing At+1/At by γ exp(zt+1) we obtain
0 =
(
1− Φp(pit)
)− pitΦ′p(pit)− µtλp,t + βEt[Qt+1|tpit+1Φ′p(pit+1)∆yt+1γ exp(zt+1)].
We proceed by rewriting (B.14) as
w˜t =
(
1− Φp(pit)
)− µt. (B.19)
Households. In terms of detrended consumption we can express Qt+1|t as
Qt+1|t =
(
ct+1
ct
)−τ
1
γ
exp(−zt+1). (B.20)
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The consumption Euler equation remains unchanged:
1 = βEt
[
Qt+1|t
Rt
pit+1
]
. (B.21)
We now divide (B.18) by λt and replace λt by c
−τ
t /(AtPt):
0 =
χH
λw
1
w˜t
cτtH
1+1/ν
t +Ht
(
1− Φw(pit∆wt)
)− 1
λw
Ht
(
1− Φw(pit∆wt)
)
−pit∆wtHtΦ′w(pit∆wt) + βEt
[
Qt+1|tpit+1∆w2t+1Ht+1Φ
′
w(pit+1∆wt+1)
]
.
Aggregate Resource Constraint. The aggregate production function (in terms
of detrended output) is
yt = Ht. (B.22)
The intermediate goods producers’ dividend payments to the households are given
by
Dt =
(
1− Φp(pit)
)
Yt − wtHt. (B.23)
Combining the household budget constraint and the government budget constraint
and detrending all variables leads to aggregate resource constraint
ct + ζyt =
(
1− Φp(pit)
)
yt − w˜tytΦw(pit∆wt),
where ∆wt = ∆w˜tγ exp(zt).
The model economy has a unique steady state in terms of the detrended variables
that is attained if the innovations R,t, g,t, and z,t are zero at all times. The steady
state inflation pi equals the target rate pi∗ and
R =
γ
β
pi∗, µ = λp, c =
(
(1− λp)(1− λw)g− 1ν
χH
) 1
τ+1/ν
, y = gc˜, H = y, w˜ = (1− λp).
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B.2.3 Posterior Simulator
We first estimate a log-linearized version of the DSGE model using the Random-
Walk Metropolis (RWM) algorithm described in An and Schorfheide (2007). Us-
ing the same covariance matrix for the proposal distribution as for the linearized
DSGE model, we then run the RWM algorithm based on the likelihood function
associated with the second-order approximation of the DSGE model. The covari-
ance matrix of the proposal distribution is scaled such that the RWM algorithm
has an acceptance rate of approximately 50%. We use 80,000 particles to approx-
imate the likelihood function of the nonlinear DSGE model, while the variance
of measurement errors is set to 10% of the sample variance of the observables.
We generate 120,000 draws from the posterior distribution of the nonlinear DSGE
model. The summary statistics reported in Table 2.2 in the main paper are based
on the last 100,000 draws of this sequence.
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Table A-8: Posterior Estimates for DSGE Model Parameters: Linear
Model
1960:Q1-2007:Q4 1984:Q1-2007:Q4
Parameter Mean 90% Interval Mean 90% Interval
400
(
1
β
− 1
)
0.48 [0.06, 1.01] 1.31 [0.60, 2.17]
piA 3.46 [2.94, 3.97] 2.80 [2.33, 3.29]
γA 1.86 [1.39, 2.34] 1.88 [1.53, 2.24]
τ 6.54 [4.37, 9.24] 4.78 [2.57, 8.70]
ν 0.09 [0.06, 0.13] 0.08 [0.03, 0.15]
κ(ϕp) 0.01 [0.01, 0.02] 0.18 [0.09, 0.30]
ϕw 62.33 [44.48, 83.14] 14.89 [6.15, 25.88]
ψw N/A
ψp N/A
ψ1 1.45 [1.24, 1.68] 2.67 [2.10, 3.30]
ψ2 0.80 [0.54, 1.09] 0.76 [0.41, 1.11]
ρr 0.77 [0.73, 0.82] 0.71 [0.61, 0.79]
ρg 0.97 [0.96, 0.98] 0.96 [0.93, 0.98]
ρz 0.26 [0.10, 0.41] 0.07 [0.01, 0.19]
ρp 0.99 [0.98, 0.99] 0.93 [0.87, 0.98]
100σr 0.18 [0.14, 0.22] 0.18 [0.13, 0.25]
100σg 0.65 [0.44, 0.95] 0.76 [0.39, 1.34]
100σz 0.75 [0.64, 0.85] 0.47 [0.37, 0.56]
100σp 15.28 [12.66, 18.18] 7.63 [5.96, 9.48]
Notes: As 90% credible interval we are reporting the 5th and 95th percentile of
the posterior distribution.
228
Appendix C
Appendix to “Risk, Economic
Growth and the Market Value of
U.S. Corporations”
C.1 Empirical Analysis
C.1.1 Data Definition and Sources
TFP Growth
Quarterly data on output growth and hours growth for the U.S. Business Sector
are from the BLS, respectively Series id PRS85006042 and PRS85006032. We
construct an annual series for the growth rate of the U.S. Business Sector capital
stock using NIPA Tables. In particular, from Table 6.2, we calculate the growth
rate of real private fixed assets for the following sectors:
- Corporate
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- Sole Proprietorships
- Partnerships
We use Table 7.2A and 7.2B from NIPA to construct the growth rate of real
fixed assets of government sponsored enterprises (GSE). We construct the growth
rate of real fixed assets for the Business Sector as follows:
∆kbus = θcorp∆kcorp + θpropr∆kpropr + θpart∆kpart + θgse∆kgse,
where θj is the share of subsector j in total fixed assets of the Business Sector.
1
Next, we use the following formula to calculate TFP growth for the Business
Sector:2
∆zt =
∆yt − α∆kt − (1− α)∆lt
1− α
We choose a value of α equal to 0.30, as it is customary in the macroeconomic
literature.3
1That is, we take fixed assets measured at current cost in sector j, divide by the same figure
for the entire Business Sector, and average over the time period considered.
2In order to reconcile the frequency of output and hours with those of capital, we linearly
interpolate the growth rate of capital and convert it at quarterly frequencies.
3We also considered a version of TFP growth with time-varying factor shares. Data on labor
shares for the Business Sector are from BLS, Series id PRS85006173. Our results did not change,
both from a qualitative and quantitative standpoint.
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Market Value of U.S. Corporations
Our indicator of value is the sum of two components, the value of equities and
the value of net debt for the U.S. corporate sector. We use data from the Federal
Reserve’s Flow of Funds Accounts to obtain these two time series. In particular:
- Market value of Corporate Equities: We take the data from Table L.213 of
the Flow of Funds (“Market Value of Domestic Corporations”).
- Net Debt: We construct a net debt series for all domestic sectors issuing
corporate equities. The sectors issuing corporate equities can be obtained
from Table F.213 of the Flow of Funds. These are:
– Non Financial Corporate Business (Table L.201).
– Domestic Financial Corporations (Tables L.110, L.114, L.115, L.121,
L.126, L.122, L.127, L.128, L.129).4
We define net debt as the difference between total debt liabilities and to-
tal debt assets, where “debt” includes any financial instrument that is not
corporate equity, mutual funds holdings that are equity and the equity com-
ponent of “miscellaneous claims.”5 We then aggregate to obtain the net debt
series. Notice that the net debt series computed consists of instruments that
are recorded mainly at book value in the Flow of Funds.6
4Domestic financial corporations issuing equities are, in order: i) U.S. chartered depository
institutions; ii) property-casualty insurance companies; iii) life insurance companies; iv) close-
end funds and exchange traded funds; v) REITS; vi) government-sponsored enterprises; vii)
brokers and dealers; viii) holding companies; and ix) funding companies.
5We follow the procedure described in the online appendix of McGrattan and Prescott (2005)
in order to deduce the equity component of mutual funds holdings and miscellaneous claims. For
this purpose, we use Flow of Funds Tables L.229, L.230, L.231.
6Hall (2001) proposes a procedure to correct for this issue. McGrattan and Prescott (2005)
show that correcting for this issue results in only minor changes to the sample 1960-2001 (see
Figure A.3 in their online appendix).
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C.1.2 Univariate model
We model TFP growth as follows:
∆Zt = µt + φ [∆Zt−1 − µt−1] + σtεt
µt = µ0 + µ1s1,t
σt = σ0 + σ1s2,t
εt ∼ N (0, 1) s1,t ∼MP(Pµ) s2,t ∼MP(Pσ)
We collect in θ = [µ0, µ1, σ0, σ1, φ, P1,1,µ, P2,2,µ, P1,1,σ, P2,2,σ] the parameters to be
estimated. We use Bayesian methods to conduct inference over θ. Given prior
information on the parameters, represented by the distribution p(θ), and given
the likelihood function p({∆Zt}Tt=2|θ,∆Z1), the posterior distribution of θ is found
using Bayes’ rule:
p(θ|{∆Zt}Tt=1) =
p(θ)p({∆Zt}Tt=1|θ)
p({∆Zt}Tt=1)
The parametrization of the prior distribution is given in Table 3.1. Functional
forms are chosen for tractability. We center the prior on µ0 and µ1 so that, on
average, the growth rate of TFP is 2% at an annual level. In the low-growth
regime, TFP growth is 60% of the high-growth regime. We center the prior on
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σ0 and σ1 so that the the standard deviation of TFP growth is on average 4%.
In the low volatility regime, the standard deviation of TFP growth is on average
60% that of the high volatility regime. We center the prior of φ at zero, reflecting
beliefs of low autocorrelation of TFP growth. Finally, the prior on the transition
probabilities is centered so that the expected duration of a regime is approximately
15 years. A better way of interpreting our prior is to look at Table A-1, which
reports prior predictive checks. Essentially, our prior is that TFP growth has very
low autocorrelation, with small and very persistent time variation in the mean.
Moreover, we can verify from the table that our prior is quite diffused, as the
standard deviations of the statistics show.
We use a Random Walk Metropolis Hastings (RWMH) algorithm to sample from
the posterior of θ. We follow common practice in choosing the following proposal
density:
θproposal ∼ N (θi, cH−1),
where θi is the state of the Markov Chain at iteration i and H−1 is the inverse
Hessian of the log-posterior density evaluated at the posterior mode. The scaling
factor c is chosen so that our RWMH algorithm has an acceptance rate of approx-
imately 30%. We generate N = 100000 draws and discard the first 20000 when
computing posterior statistics.7
7We perform several tests confirming that our choice of N yields an accurate posterior
approximation.
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Table A-1: Prior Predictive Checks
Statistic MS-Model
Mean(∆Zt)
2.00
(1.10)
Stdev(∆Zt)
4.42
(4.50)
Acorr(∆Zt)
0.05
(0.53)
Expected Duration of Regimes
10
(80)
Note: Prior Predictive Checks are calculated as follows: 1) generate a random draw of the model’s parameters
θm from p(θ); 2) given θm, use the Markov-Switching model to compute a realization (T = 10000) for ∆Zt; 3)
compute statistics on the generated sample; 4) repeat this procedure M = 10000 times and report mean and
standard deviation (in parenthesis) of each statistic computed in 3). Expected duration of a regime is reported
in years.
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C.1.3 Multivariate Model
The multivariate analysis is based on the following model:
 ∆Zt
∆Yt
 =
 µt
µt
+ Φ
 ∆Zt−1 − µt−1
∆Yt−1 − µt−1
+ Σtet
µt = µ0 + µ1s1,t
Σt = Σ0 + Σ1s2,t
εt ∼ N (0, 1) s1,t ∼MP(Pµ) s2,t ∼MP(Pσ)
We include in ∆Yt the growth rate of aggregate consumption per hour and the
growth rate of real compensation per hour in the Non Farm Business Sector. We
follow Cogley and Sargent (2005) in parametrizing the matrix Σt as follows:
Σt = BΣˆ(s2,t)
with B being a lower triangular matrix with ones on the main diagonal and
Σˆ(s2,t) a diagonal matrix whose (j, j) element evolves as follows:
σj,t = σj,0 + σj,1s2,t
Given these restrictions, the parameters to be estimated are 25. As in the pre-
vious section, we use Bayesian methods to estimate the above model. In partic-
ular, we sample from the posterior distribution of the model’s parameter using a
Metropolis-within-Gibbs algorithm. Our posterior simulator has four main steps:
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i) Sample {s1,t, s2,t}Tt=1 given the data and the model’s parameters using the
Kim-Hamilton smoother (Kim and Nelson, 1999);
ii) Sample Φ conditional on {s1,t, s2,t}Tt=1 and the other model’s parameters from
a standard linear Bayesian regression with conjugate priors;
iii) Sample the lower diagonal elements of B conditional on {s1,t, s2,t}Tt=1 and
the other model’s parameters from a system of unrelated regressions with
conjugate priors, see Cogley and Sargent (2005);
iv) Sample the parameters [µ0, µ1, {σj,0, σj,1}3j=1, P1,1,µ, P2,2,µ, P1,1,σ, P2,2,σ] using
a Metropolis step, with proposal density constructed in the same way as in
Appendix C.1.2
The prior for the parameters governing µt and σj,t is the same as the one de-
scribed in the previous section, while the priors on the remaining parameters are
fairly diffuse. We generate 100000 draws from the posterior and discard the first
20000 when computing posterior statistics.
C.2 Equilibrium and Auxiliary Planner’s Prob-
lem
In this appendix, we are going to
- formally define an equilibrium for our model;
- characterize some of its properties that are useful for the computation;
- describe the Auxiliary Planner’s Problem utilized in the numerical solution;
- explain how we choose the state variables during computation to minimize
236
the computational burden.
C.2.1 Equilibrium
An equilibrium of our economy are sequences (depending on realizations of the
stochastic process) of quantities 8
(kt, (kj,t)j∈[0,1], it, (lj,t)j∈[0,1], (dj,t)j∈[0,1], (yj,t)j∈[0,1], (yˆj,t)j∈[0,1], (ωj,t)j∈[0,1], yt, ct, ωt)∞t=0,
prices (rt, wt, (Pj,t)j∈[0,1], (pj,t)j∈[0,1], p¯t, pkt , dt)∞t=0, value functions (Vt)∞t=0 and dis-
count factors (Λ0,t)
∞
t=0 such that
- (Vt)
∞
t=0, ((ωj,t)j∈[0,1], ωt)
∞
t=0, (ct)
∞
t=0 solves the household’s problem given
(wt, (dj,t)j∈[0,1], (Pj,t)j∈[0,1], pkt , dt)∞t=0:
max
(V˜t)∞t=0,((ω˜j,t)j∈[0,1])
∞
t=0,(c˜t)
∞
t=0,(d˜t)
∞
t=0
V˜0
s.t. V˜t = [(1− β)c˜
1−γ
η
t + βEt[V˜
1−γ
t+1 ]
1
η ]
η
1−γ
c˜t +
∫
Pj,tω˜j,t+1dj + ωt+1pkt = wt +
∫
(Pj,t + dj,t)ω˜j,tdj + ωt(dt + pkt )
and a no Ponzi condition for ω and finiteness for V˜t;
- ∀j (dj,t, kj,t, lj,t, pj,t)∞t=0 solve intermediate good producer j’s problem given
(rt, wt, pi,t)i∈[0,1]\{j}, p¯t)∞t=0, (Λ0,t)
∞
t=0 and (yˆj,t)j∈[0,1]:
max
(d˜j,t,k˜j,t,l˜j,t,p˜j,t)∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
Λ0,td˜j,t
s.t. d˜j,t = yˆj,t(p˜j,t)
p˜j,t
p¯t
− wtl˜j,t − rtk˜j,t
8yˆj,t is the demand function for good j and not a number.
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- (kt+1, it)
∞
t=0 solves the capital good producers problem given rt:
max
(˜it,k˜t+1)∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
Λ0,trtk˜t − i˜t
k˜t+1 = (1− δ)k˜t +G
(
i˜t
k˜t
)
- ∀t (yt, yj,t)j∈[0,1] given p¯t, (pj,t)j∈[0,1] solve the final good producers problem
max
y˜t,(y˜j,t)j∈[0,1]
p¯ty˜t −
∫
pj,ty˜j,tdj
y˜t ≤
[∫
y
ν−1
ν
j,t dj
] ν
ν−1
and
(yˆj,t)j∈[0,1]
are consistent with pointwise maximization of the final good producer given
any chosen price p ∈ Rt by intermediate producer j given p¯t, (pj,t)j∈[0,1]\{j}
- markets clear: ∀t, h ∫
lj,tdj = 1∫
ωj,tdj = 1
ωt = 1
yˆj,t(pj,t) = yj,t
ct +
∫
ij,tdj = yt
kt =
∫
kj,tdj
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- The discount factor of the firm fulfills Λ0,t = Π
t−1
s=0Λs,s+1 where Λt,t+1 =
β
(
ct+1
ct
)− 1
ψ V
(1−γ)(1− 1η )
t+1
Et[V
1−γ
t+1 ]
1− 1η
.9
We will focus on a symmetric equilibrium in the following. It then implies that
prices and capital service choices are the same for all intermediate good producers.
C.2.2 Partial Characterization and Auxiliary Planner’s Prob-
lem
It is well known in the literature and easy to check that the final good producer
problem results in the following demand for intermediate good i in equilibrium:
pj,t
p¯t
(
pj,t
p¯t
)−ν
Y¯t, where Y¯t is demand and equal to output in equilibrium and p¯t =[∫ 1
0
p1−νj,t dj
] 1
1−ν
. Imposing this in any intermediate good producing firm’s problem
and combining it with the problem of a capital good producer,10 we get as a
representative firm’s problem
max
kj,t,ij,t,lj,t,Pj,t
E0
∑
t=0
Λ0,t[
pj,t
p¯t
(
pj,t
p¯t
)−ν
y¯ − ij,t − wtlj,t]
s.t.
(
pj,t
p¯t
)−ν
y¯t = F (kj,t, Ztlj,t)
kj,t+1 = (1− δ)kj,t +G( ij,t
kj,t
)kj,t.
We continue by taking first-order conditions (We drop the j index for now.). Let
λt be the multiplier on the first constraint and µt on the second.
9This condition could be easily derived from assuming there is a full set of Arrow securities
in zero net supply. In order not to further expend the notation, we directly impose the condition
on the discount factor.
10A intermediate good producer’s problem is static and the market for capital services is
competitive. In addition, we assume a symmetric equilibrium so that the capital stock and
capital and labor services are the same across firms. Therefore, we can combine the two problems
without changing equilibrium allocations.
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FOC:
(pt) Et[Λ0,t(1− ν)
(
pt
p¯t
)−ν
y¯t
p¯t
− λt(−νpt
(
pt
p¯t
)−ν
y¯t)] = 0
(it) Et[−Λ0,t + µtG′( it
kt
)] = 0
(kt) Et−1[−{µt−1}] + Et−1[λtFK,t + µt(1− δ +G( it
kt
)−G′( it
kt
))
it
kt
] = 0
(lt) Et[Λ0,t{−wt}+ λtFL,t] = 0
FK,t and FL,t denote the derivatives of F with respect to K and L given period t
inputs. Imposing a symmetric equilibrium (all intermediate prices are the same)
and using qt =
1
G′t
:
(pt) Et[−(1− ν)
ν
Λ0,t] = Et[λt]
(it) Et[−Λ0,t + µt
qt
] = 0
(kt) Et−1[−{µt−1}] + Et−1[λtFK,t + µt(1− δ +G( it
kt
)−
it
kt
qt
] = 0
(lt) Et[{−wt} − (1− ν)
ν
FL,t] = 0
Combining further and dropping the expectation operators where not necessary:
wt =
(ν − 1)
ν
FL,t
Λ0,tqt = µt
−(1− ν)
ν
Λ0,t = λt
qt−1 = Et−1[Λt−1,t[
ν − 1
ν
FK,t + qt(1− δ +G( it
kt
))− it
kt
]]
The last equation is the Euler equation for capital accumulation which we will
target in the computation. The reader should notice the distortion terms ν−1
ν
for
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capital and labor compared to the ”‘standard”’ Euler equation in a competitive
model. The price of the final good in each period is set to one for simplicity.
The total profits of the two types of firms combined can be seen to be (assuming a
Cobb-Douglas production function) F (kt, Ztlt)∗(α+ 1−αν )−It. It is easy to see that
1−α
ν
F (kt, Ztlt)−It is the share of the profit collected by the capital good producers
while the remaining part of the 1
ν
F (kt, Ztlt) is the profit of each intermediate good
producer.
After these derivations it is easy to see now that the auxiliary planner’s problem
defined in the main text leads to the same Euler equation as the one of the firm
if we impose symmetry. Given that also the resource constraints are the same we
see that the symmetric equilibrium and the planner’s problem result in the same
allocations. If we solve the latter we can as usual use first order conditions to
obtain prices.
C.2.3 State Space Selection for the Computation
In order to solve the model numerically using the planner’s problem, we normalize
all quantities that grow over time - consumption, investment and capital - and
the value function in period t by Zt. To be more specific, if Xt is the value of
X ∈ {c, i, k¯, k} in period t, we define X˜t = XtZt . Normalizing this way we get the
following first-order conditions for the planner’s problem, where we also normalize
the multipliers accordingly.11
wt =
(ν − 1)
ν
FL(K˜t, Lt)
11Assuming F is Cobb-Douglas and of degree 1, FL, FK are of degree 0. It is also the case
that i˜t
k˜t
= itkt , which takes care of normalizing q.
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Λ0,tqt = µt
−(1− ν)
ν
Λ˜0,t = λ˜t
qt−1 = Et−1Λ˜t−1,t[
ν − 1
ν
FK + qt(1− δ +G( i˜t
k˜t
))− i˜t
k˜t
]
Λ˜t,t+1 = β
(
Zt+1
Zt
c˜t+1
c˜t
)− 1
ψ
V˜
(1−γ)(1− 1
η
)
t+1
Et[V˜
1−γ
t+1 ]
1− 1
η
k˜t+1
Zt+1
Zt
= (1− δ)k˜t +G( i˜t
k˜t
)
y˜t =
1
ν
˜¯kαt +
ν − 1
ν
k˜αt
V˜t = [(1− β)c˜
1−γ
η
t + βEt[
Zt+1
Zt
V˜ 1−γt+1 ]
1
η ]
η
1−γ .
It should be noted that Zt drops out everywhere beside in the ratio ∆Zt+1 =
Zt+1
Zt
.
Furthermore, ∆Zt+1 factors out in the discount factor and the value function. It
follows that Zt does not influence the value of the normalized variables solving
the equations beyond the effect it might have on the expectation for ∆Zt+1. We
therefore use the beliefs after updating using Zt, gt and s2,t as a state variable.
This allows us to drop Zt and gt as states when solving the model in its normalized
form. We have to incorporate the possible realizations of the shocks and beliefs into
the transition probabilities only when taking expectations. We are left with both
capital stocks ˜¯kt, k˜t, updated beliefs µˆt and the state of the volatility shock s2,t.
But once the Euler equation for capital was derived while correctly distinguishing
the two capital stocks, we can impose K˜t = k˜t without changing the results. This
allows us to drop one capital stock in computing the solution, leaving us with two
continuous and one discrete state variable for the purpose of numerically solving
the normalized problem of the planner.
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C.3 Computation - Projection
We follow Krueger and Kuebler (2003) by applying a Smolyak collocation method.
Our system of state variables contain the capital stock in the beginning of a period
and the belief about the state of the long run component of technology growth
after observing the shock and the signal. In addition, we have a state variable tak-
ing two values for the variance, and we therefore use two sets of polynomials, one
for the high and one for the low volatility regime, to approximate policy and value
functions.12 We outline the applied procedure in the following with references to
more detailed descriptions. To solve for the coefficients of the polynomials, we use
a time iteration procedure for the investment decision and the value function.
- Step 0: Define a tolerance (we used 10−5 but checked for the benchmark cal-
ibration that the results do not change significantly, if we use 10−6 instead).
Select an upper and lower bound for capital and the belief to define the in-
tervals the approximation should focus on. Compute the collocation points
as described in Krueger and Kuebler (2003). For the baseline problem, we
need to fit the investment policy function and the value function. As an ini-
tial guess, we use constant functions at the deterministic steady-state levels
of these variables (we later used the approximations obtained from previous
solutions as an initial guess). Denote this initial guess by V 0p,i and I
0
p,i for
i = 1, 2, where i = 1 is the low variance state and i = 2 the high variance
state. Set n=1, Norm=10. Go to Step 1.
- Step 1: Enter iteration n. Calculate Inp,i(x) by using the normalized Euler
equation for capital of the planner imposing equilibrium conditions (espe-
12We refer the reader to the model appendix for the arguments on why these states suffice.
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cially k = K) in each point x of the grid and using In−1p,i to determine policy
choices in the next period. For the computation of the expectation, see
below. Go to step 2.
- Step 2: Use Inp,i(x) to obtain V
n
p,i(x) using the budget constraint and the
definition of V and V n−1p,i for the values in the next period. Go to step 3.
- Step 3: Use the interpolation rule as described in Krueger and Kuebler
(2003) to obtain the approximation polynomials V np,i and I
n
p,i for i = 1, 2. Go
to step 4.
- Step 4: Compute Norm as the maximum norm of the difference of the values
in the collocation for this and the previous approximation normalizing by
the previous approximation. If the Norm is smaller than the tolerance end,
otherwise set n=n+1 and go to Step 1.
After solving for the investment policy function, the value function and the law
of motion for K, we compute Euler equation errors on a grid different from the
one used to solve the model to check the quality of the approximation. For taking
the expectation, we used that conditional on the beliefs and the realization of
the volatility state the distribution of productivity growth shocks is normal and
applied a five point Gauss Hermite Quadrature formula ((Judd, 1998) pages 261-
263). We also checked with more points resulting only in very mild changes in
the results. To obtain the full approximation, we use the transition matrix for
the stochastic volatility and Bayes’ rule to update beliefs given technology growth
shocks and signals. In practice we use an accelerator method as described in Judd
(1998) to speed up the computation.
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Finally, we also need to compute asset pricing functions. In order to do this,
we follow the same procedure as before for investment and value functions. We
fix those solutions and then iterate on the price using the Euler equations for the
specific asset we want to value until convergence.
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Appendix D
Appendix to “Identifying Neutral
Technology Shocks”
D.1 Proofs and Derivations
D.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Consider a variable Xt =
∑M
i=1Xit, with long-run response gX for variable X and
gXi for the components Xi 6= 0. By the definition of the impulse response
IRXt (x) = (e
gXx − 1)E0[Xt] =
H∑
h=1
IRXit (x) =
H∑
h=1
(egXhx − 1)E0[Xh,t]
and therefore after canceling terms
egXxEt[Xt] =
H∑
h=1
egXhxE0[Xh,t]
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Taking the l′th derivative w.r.t. x yields
glXe
gXxE0[Xt] =
H∑
h=1
glXhe
gXhxE0[Xh,t]
and dividing by glX ,
egXxE0[Xt] =
H∑
h=1
(
gXh
gX
)l
egXhxE0[Xh,t]
This implies that gXh ≤ gX since otherwise the RHS converges to ∞ for l → ∞.
Then, since
exp(gXx)E0(Xt) =
H∑
h=1
exp(gXhx)E0(Xht),
gX = gX1 = · · · gXh = · · · = gXH .
D.1.2 Proof of Theorem 1
The argument has two parts. The first part is to show that a neutral technological
shock has the properties stated in the theorem and the second part is to show that
any other shock with these properties is a neutral shock. In order to prove the
first part, note that the resource constraint implies
IRYt (x) = IR
I
t (x) + IR
C
t (x),
where I is total investment and C is total consumption of output Y . Equivalently
egY xE0[Yt] = e
gIxE0[It] + e
gCxE0[Ct].
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Dividing by egY x yields
E0[Yt] = e
(gI−gY )xE0[It] + e(gC−gY )xE0[Ct].
Taking derivatives w.r.t. x:
0 = (gI − gY )e(gI−gY )xE0[It] + (gC − gY )e(gC−gY )xE0[Ct].
Since this holds for all x, it must be the case that gY = gI = gC . Capital
accumulation implies that
IR
Kj
t+1(x) = IR
Kj
t (x)(1− δj) + IRIjt (x)
and equivalently
egKjxE0[Kj,t+1] = e
gKjxE0[Kj,t] + e
gIjxE0[Ij,t].
This yields
egKjx{E0[Kj,t+1]− (1− δj)E0[Kj,t]} = egKjxE0[Ij,t] = egIjxE0[Ij,t],
and thus gKj = gIj . By Lemma 1, it must be the case that gIj = gI , and thus
gKj = gI ∀j. This implies gY = gC = gIj = gKj = g. By Assumption 1, this also
means that gLj = 0 ∀j. Since the production function features constant return
to scale, we hve g = 1. Constant returns to scale also implies that the marginal
products of capital is not influenced by the shock in the long run
FKj(e
xK1,t, . . . , e
xKJ,t, e
xZtL1,t, . . . , e
xZtLN,t; θt) (D.1)
= FKj(K1,t, . . . , KJ,t, ZtL1,t, . . . , ZtLN,t; θt),
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and that the marginal product of labor increases by x percent,
FLn(e
xK1,t, . . . , e
xKJ,t, e
xZtL1,t, . . . , e
xZtLN,t; θt) (D.2)
= exFLn(K1,t, . . . , KJ,t, ZtL1,t, . . . , ZtLN,t; θt).
For the impulse responses we thus get
IR
FKj
t (x) = 0
IR
FLj
t (x) = (e
x − 1)E0(FLj).
This proves the first part of the characterization theorem.
The second part of the proof shows that any other shock with these properties
is the neutral technology shock, which establishes that no other shock has these
properties. To this aim, consider an innovation to a non-neutral permanent shock
θi of x percent at time 0 and consider how this changes a variable Xt. The impulse
response compares variables in two scenarios: one where the shock happens and
one where it does not. Denote variables Xt with a˜(i.e. X˜t is conditional on the
shock) in the first scenario and without a ,˜ Xt in the second scenario. The impulse
response of a variable Xt therefore equals
E0(X˜t)− E0(Xt),
and for t ≥ T :
Y˜t = exp(x)Yt, K˜jt = exp(x)Kjt, L˜jt = Ljt, θ˜i(t) = exp(x)θi(t)
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Using this notation we get on the one hand
Y˜t = F (K˜1,t, . . . , K˜J,t, ZtL˜1,t, . . . , ZtL˜N,t; (θ1(t), . . . , θ˜i(t), . . .) (D.3)
= F (exp(x)K1,t, . . . , exp(x)KJ,t, ZtL1,t, . . . , ZtLN,t; (θ1(t), . . . , exp(x)θi(t))
and on the other hand that
Yt = F (K1,t, . . . , KJ,t, ZtL1,t, . . . , Z0LN,0; (θ1(t), . . . , θi(0), . . .)). (D.4)
Constant returns to scale and Y˜t = exp(x)Yt imply that
Y˜t = exp(x)Yt (D.5)
= F (exp(x)K1,t, . . . , exp(x)KJ,t, exp(x)ZtL1,t, . . . , exp(x)ZtLN,t; (θ1(t), . . . , θi(t)))
Equating the last two expressions for Y˜t gives for all x and t ≥ T that
F (exp(x)K1,t, . . . , exp(x)KJ,t, ZtL1,t, . . . , ZtLN,t; (θ1(t), . . . , exp(x)θi(t))) (D.6)
= F (exp(x)K1,t, . . . , exp(x)KJ,t, exp(x)ZtL1,t, . . . , exp(x)ZtLN,t; (θ1(t), . . . , θi(t))).
Thus the first line - the effect of a x percent shock to θi - is equivalent to the latter
line which is the effect of a x percent shock to neutral technology (Z˜t = exp(x)Zt).
Since this identity holds for all x, θi is a neutral technology shock.
Note that the proof at no point uses that the shock θ directly enters the produc-
tion function, i.e. it applies also to non-technology shocks, e.g. preference shocks,
government expenditure shocks or wage mark-up shocks.
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D.1.3 Proof of Lemma 2
In order to check that our state space is minimal, one needs to verify the observ-
ability and controllability conditions are satisfied in our state space model. The
observability matrix is given by:
On(n(n+k−1))×(n+k) =

B(n+k−1)×(n+k)
BΦ(n+k)×(n+k)
. . .
BΦn(n+k)×(n+k)
 .
The observability condition is satisfied if On(n(n+k−1)×(n+k) is of full rank. First
notice that B is of rank n+ k− 1. Now, suppose that the observability condition
is violated. That would imply the existence of a n + k dimensional vector ξ 6= 0
such that:1
Bξ = 0 = BΦξ
Given our knowledge of the B matrix, that would imply that the vector ξ is
equal to
ξ = (χ,−χ, . . . ,−χ︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1 elements
, 0, . . . , 0)tr
for some χ 6= 0. The last k elements, corresponding to the ξ vector are equal to
1The nullspace of B is one-dimensional, that means it is generated by a non-zero vector x.
The nullspace of BΦ is one-dimensional as well. If the observation matrix has rank n + k − 1
then the nullspace of these of two matrices are identical and generated by the same vector x.
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zero since these variables are observable. As a result we have
Φξ = χ
(
φ1,1 −
n∑
l=2
φ1,l, . . . φj,1 −
n∑
l=2
φj,l, . . . , φn,1 −
n∑
l=2
φn,l, 0, . . . , 0
)tr
,
which equals using that the off-diagonal elements in the first row (φ1,j = 0) are
zero,
Φξ = χ
(
φ1,1, . . . , φj,1 −
n∑
l=2
φj,l, . . . , φn,1 −
n∑
l=2
φn,l, 0, . . . , 0
)tr
(D.7)
Multiplying this vector with B maps it to zero, so that we get the set of equations:
−φ1,1 = φj,1 −
n∑
l=2
φj,l ∀2 ≤ j ≤ n, (D.8)
contradicting Assumption 2 ii). Thus, by contradiction we must have that ξ is
not in the nullspace of BΦ. Thus, the observability matrix is of full rank and the
system is observable.
The controllability matrix is given by:
Cnn+1×(n)2 =
[
R(n+1)×nΦR(n+1)×n . . .ΦnR(n+1)×n
]
.
That the controllability matrix in our state space system is of full rank follows
from Assumption 2 i).
As a result, our state space realization is observable and controllable, hence
minimal.
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D.1.4 Proof of Theorem 2
Suppose the state space is described by the matrices (Bˆ, Φˆ, Rˆ) which are related
to the original one as follows:
Bˆ = BT
Φˆ = T−1ΦT (D.9)
Rˆ = T−1RU
We show now that T is the identity matrix and that U is as described in the
theorem.
Let χi = (0, . . . , 1︸︷︷︸
i
, . . . , 0)′ be the unit vector with the i′th entry equal to 1
and other entries equal to zero. Consider the long-run effect of χ1, that is the
long-run effect of a neutral technology shock, which equals
BT−1(I−Φ)−1RUχ1 = B(I−Φ)−1RUχ1
since BT−1 = B. Let
Uχ1 =
n+1∑
i=1
ui1χi,
where ui1 is the (i, 1) entry of U. Then the long-run effect of χ1 equals
n+1∑
i=1
ui1vi,
where vi is the true long-run effect (i.e. for the state space described by the true
matrices (B,Φ,R) of χi:
vi = B(I−Φ)−1Rχi.
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We impose the balanced growth restriction which states that the long-run effect
of χ1 equals v1, so that
v1 =
n+1∑
i=1
ui1vi,
The RHS is the long-run response to the shock Uχ1 which equals the long-run
response of neutral technology (χ1) on the LHS (v1). Theorem 1 implies that only
neutral technology has this property so that Uχ1 = χ1, i.e. first column of U is
the vector (1, 0, . . . , 0)′. Since UU′ = I this implies that the first row of U equals
(1, 0, . . . , 0). Finally we use that the first row of
T−1RU
is (1, 0, . . . , 0). Using the properties of U, we also know that the first row of
T−1R
is (1, 0, . . . , 0). Since R˜ is invertible, we have that κ2 = κ3 = . . . = κn = 0.
Furthermore since rzz = 1 we also have κ1 = 0, so that Rˆ = RU, what completes
the proof since RˆRˆ′ = RUU′R′ = RR′.
D.2 Standard Approaches to Controlling for In-
put Heterogeneity
D.2.1 Jorgenson’s Correction
The fact that inputs heterogeneity complicates the measurement of technology is
a well known problem in the growth accounting literature. Here we discuss the
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most widely accepted procedure that was developed by Jorgenson (1966). An
alternative but closely related procedure due to Hansen (1993) is discussed in
Appendix D.2.2. Central to these approaches is the approximation of the growth
rate of Let in terms of a weighted sum of the hours worked by different groups of
individuals:
∆ log(Let ) ≈
J∑
j=1
aj,t∆ log(Lj,t). (D.10)
The procedures differ in the way the weights {aj,t} are computed. Jorgenson
uses the following Tornqvist aggregator:
aj,t =
νj,t + νj,t−1
2
, where νj,t =
wi,tLi,t∑
j wj,tLj,t
. (D.11)
As shown in Diewert (1976), this would be the right correction to make in the
case that Let is a deterministic homogeneous translog function of the J groups
considered, log(Let ) = f(log(Lt)), where Lt is the vector of hours worked by the
J groups.2 Using the properties of quadratic function (e.g., translog as defined in
footnote 2), one obtains:
∆ log(Let ) = f(log(Lt))− f(log(Lt−1)) (D.13)
=
1
2
[∇f(log(Lt)) +∇f(log(Lt−1))]
′
(log(Lt)− log(Lt−1)),
where the matrix ∇f(log(Lt)) collects the partial derivatives of f(.). Under the
2 Defined by
lnf(x) = α0 +
K∑
k=1
αklnxn +
1
2
K∑
m=1
K∑
l=1
γmllnxmlnxl, (D.12)
where
∑K
k=1 αk = 1, γml = γlm and
∑K
l=1 γml = 0 for j = 1, 2, . . . ,K.
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additional assumption that prices equal marginal products at all points in time,
the Jacobian ∇f(log(Lt)) is equal to wi,tLi,t∑
j wj,tLj,t
. Thus, equation D.10 is exact for
a homogeneous translog aggregator when the weights are Tornquivst indexes of
labor shares of different groups. All other functional forms, e.g., CES aggregator,
will generate a bias.
A fundamental problem of this strategy arises when hours in efficiency units is
not a deterministic aggregator of hours worked. An implicit assumption in this
procedure is that the parameters of the aggregator have to be constant, making
it for example difficult to explain movements in the skill premium. Thus even if
the aggregator satisfies the functional form requirements at every point of time
but parameters are changing over time, technology is measured with a bias. In
order to make this point explicit, suppose that log(Let ) = f(log(Lt),Θt), where
Θt is a vector of time varying observable or unobservable factors and parameters.
In this environment, one immediately verifies that equation D.14 is an incorrect
expansion for Let as it neglects changes in Θt.
D.2.2 Hansens’ Correction
Hansen (1993) measures the efficiency units of labor as
∑
i
αiLi,t, (D.14)
where αi is the constant weight of group i. The weights αi are the average hourly
earnings
αi =
HEi
HE
, (D.15)
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where HEi is average hourly earnings for group i and HE is average hourly earn-
ings.
We first compute a log-linear approximation of log(
∑
i αiLi,t) with respect to
log(Li,t):
log(
∑
i
αiLi,t) ≈
∑
i
αiLi∑
j αjLj
log(Li,t), (D.16)
where Li is the average labor supply of group i. In addition to this approximation,
a second difference between Hansen and Jorgensen is that they use different coef-
ficients. Jorgensens uses νj,t, an average of two adjacent periods whereas Hansen
uses
αiLi∑
j αjLj
, (D.17)
a time average for the full sample. This means the second bias in the measurement
due to differences in computing averages of wages equals
νj,t − αiLi∑
j αjLj
. (D.18)
After these approximations, Hansen measurement is equal to Jorgenson and thus
is unbiased if and only if the aggregator is a homogeneous translog function (with
constant coefficients).
D.2.3 Estimation of Solow Residual in Practice
The current the state-of-the-art measurement of Solow residual in the data is based
on IV-regression methods described in Basu et al. (2006). As their methodology
differs from the Solow residual construction we used in the main text, a few details
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should be mentioned. First, it is well-known that if there might be increasing
returns to scale, time-varying factor utilization, or if factors are not paid their
marginal products, tfp measured as Solow residual will be biased. To overcome
this limitation, Basu et al. (2006), following the insight in Hall (1988, 1990),
treat Equation (4.2) as a regression. As input choices are likely endogenous to
innovations in the technology estimated as the residual, the regression is estimated
using instrumented variables. The instruments are required to affect the input
choice but to be uncorrelated with innovation in technology. The authors use
oil prices, growth in real government defense spending, and “monetary shocks”
from a non-structural VAR. Their estimates are based on the data described in
Jorgenson et al. (1987) that controls for changes in labor composition using the
Jorgenson’s correction.
D.3 Calibration of the Simple RBC Model
The vector of structural parameters of our model is given by:
θ = [β, δ, α, h∗s, h
∗
u, u, φ
∗, ν, γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
θ1
, ρφ, σφ, xl, ρz, σz, σa, ρq, σq, ρg, σg︸ ︷︷ ︸
θ2
].
Model period is one quarter. We use quarterly post-84 data on the US economy
in order to calibrate the vector θ. The parameters in θ1 are pinned down using
long run average for selected time series. In particular, the parameters β, α and δ
are chosen so that, in a deterministic steady state of the model, the real interest
rate, the depreciation rate of capital and a labor income share are respectively
1%, 2.5% and 66%, values that are common in the business cycle literature. The
growth rate of neutral technology shocks, γ, is chosen so to match an average
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growth rate of GDP per capita equal to 2%. The parameters h∗u, h
∗
s, u and φ
∗ are
chosen so that the model matches a fraction of 0.29 hours worked by low-skilled
individual, 0.36 by high-skilled individuals, a fraction of low-skilled individuals
over total population of 0.64 and a skill premium equal to 1.7. These numbers are
calculated using CPS quarterly data (1979-2006) on wages and hours worked by
education level.3 Finally, we fix the average Frisch elasticity ν to 1.
The remaining parameters in θ2 are calibrated via a Simulated Method of Mo-
ments (SMM) algorithm. In particular, let mT be a vector of sample moments for
selected time series of length T computed using US data. We denote by mT(θ)
their model counterpart when the vector of structural parameter is θ. θ is chosen
to minimize a weighted distance between model and data moments:
min
θ2
[mT − mˆ(θ)]′WT[mT − mˆ(θ)],
where WT is a diagonal matrix whose nonzero elements are the inverse of the
variance of the corresponding moment. The empirical moments included in the
vector mT are standard measures of cyclical variation and comovement for post
1984 quarterly US data. The time series used are the growth rate in GDP, private
non-durable consumption, private nonresidential investment, total hours worked in
the business sector, total hours of low and high skilled individuals in the business
sector, nominal wages for these two demographic groups, labor productivity. For
each of these time series, we compute the sample standard deviation, the first
order autocorrelation and the cross-correlation with GDP growth. We collect
these sample moments in the vector mT. The associated model’s moments are
calculated via a Monte Carlo procedure. In particular, for each θ, we solve for the
3We define high-skilled individuals as those possessing college education and low-skilled
individuals as those with no college education. See Appendix D.5.
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policy functions using first order perturbation. We next simulate a realization of
length T for the model’s counterparts of the above time series and calculate the
vector mˆT(θ). We repeat this procedure M = 300 times, each time changing the
seed used in the simulation. We then take the (component wise) median of mˆ(θ)
across the Monte Carlo replications.
Table A-1 summarizes the procedure used for the calibration of our model and
reports numerical values for the structural parameters. Table A-2 reports the fit
our model in terms of the calibration targets. We can verify that the calibrated
model is consistent along many dimensions with the behavior of aggregate time
series.
Table A-1: Calibrated Parameter Values: RBC Model
Parameter Value Source
α 0.33 Labor Income Share
δ 0.025 Depreciation of Capital Stock
β 0.99 Real Interest Rate
γ 1.004 Average GDP growth per capita
h∗s 0.36 Weekly Hours per Individual (College)
h∗u 0.29 Weekly Hours per Individual (no College)
u 0.64 % of Individuals without College
µφ 0.39 Skill Premium
ν 1.00 Fixed
xs 0.85 Calibrated
ρφ 0.74 Calibrated
ρa 1.00 Calibrated
ρz 0.26 Calibrated
ρg 0.97 Calibrated
ρq 0.99 Calibrated
σa × 100 1.14 Calibrated
σφ × 100 1.32 Calibrated
σz × 100 0.74 Calibrated
σg × 100 0.18 Calibrated
σq × 100 0.12 Calibrated
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D.4 A New-Keynesian Model with Heterogeneous
Labor
In this section we describe the New-Keynesian model which we use in the main
text. The model is identical to Christiano et al. (2005b) and Smets and Wouters
(2007b), except that we have two different type of labor (u)nskilled and (s)killed
labor. There is a mass one of workers (on the unit interval), unskilled workers
on the interval [0, u] and skilled workers on [1 − u, 1]. We also have a richer
specification of uncertainty. The sources of uncertainty in the model are shocks
to TFP, investment, the disutility of labor, discount factor, the wage markup, the
price markup, the skill premium, government spending and monetary policy.
D.4.1 Final-Good Firms
The final consumption good Y is a composite made of intermediate goods Yj and
is sold in a perfectly competitive market at price Pt and equals
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Y
1
1+λf,t
jt dj
]1+λf,t
, (D.19)
where λf,t is an exogenous shock whose law of motion will be specified later, and
Yjt is intermediate good i. The inflation rate pit = Pt/Pt−1. Bonds pay a return
ebR, where eb is a risk-premium shock on the nominal return R.
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D.4.2 Intermediate-Goods Firms
A monopolist produces intermediate good j ∈ [0, 1] using the following technology:
Yjt =
 Kαjt[eZtLejt]1−α − ZtF if ≥ F0 otherwise , (D.20)
where 0 < α < 1,
Lejt = L
φ
s,jtL
1−φ
u,jt
and Ls,t = shs,t is total hours worked by skilled individuals, and Lt = Ls,t +Lu,t is
total hours worked. Here, Lejt and kjt denote the time t labor and capital services
used to produce the jth intermediate good. The fixed cost of production are
denoted F > 0. Intermediate firms rent capital and labor in perfectly competitive
factor markets. Profits are distributed to households at the end of each time
period. Let Rkt and Wt denote the nominal rental rate on capital t services and
the wage rate, respectively. A firm’s real marginal cost is st = δSt(Y )/δY , where
St(Y ) = min
K,Ls,Lu
rktK + w
u
t Lu + w
s
tLs (D.21)
Y given by (D.20) (D.22)
where rkt = R
k
t /Pt, w
s
t = W
s
t /Pt and w
u
t = W
u
t /Pt. Given our functional forms,
we have
st =
(
1
α
)α [(
1
φ(1− α)
)φ(
1
(1− φ)(1− α)
)1−φ]1−α
(rkt )
α
[
(wst )
φ(wut )
1−φ]1−α eZt(α−1)(D.23)
Price setting by firms is as in Calvo (1983) with a constant probability, 1− θp, of
being able to reoptimize its nominal price.
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D.4.3 Households
There is a continuum of households, indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. As in Christiano et al.
(2005b) and Smets and Wouters (2007b) all households - skilled and unskilled -
are homogeneous with respect to consumption and asset holdings but are hetero-
geneous with respect to the wage rate they earn and the hours they work. The
utility function of the jth household of type T ∈ {u, s}
Ejt−1
∞∑
l=0
βl−t
[
u(ct+l − hct+l−1)− e
At+l
1 + νT
h1+νTj,t+l
]
. (D.24)
Here, Ejt−1 is the expectation operator, conditional on aggregate and household
j′s idiosyncratic information up to, and including, time t − 1; ct denotes time t
consumption; hjt denotes time t hours worked. The household’s stock of physical
capital, kt, evolves according to
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + eqt
[
1− S
(
It
It−1
)]
It (D.25)
The physical rate of depreciation is denoted δ, It denotes time t investment, and S
is the adjustment cost function, with the following properties: S(eγ) = 0, S ′(eγ) =
0 and S ′′(eγ) = κ, where γ is mean growth rate of Zt.
Capital services, kt, are related to the physical stock of capital by kt = utkt. Here,
ut denotes the utilization rate of capital, which at cost a(ut)kt (in consumption
goods) is set by the household. We assume that u∗ = 1 in steady state, that
a(1) = 0 and we define γu = a
′′(1).
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D.4.4 The Wage Decision
Households are monopoly suppliers of a differentiated labor service, hu,jt for un-
skilled and hs,jt for skilled workers. They sell this service to a representative,
competitive firm for skilled/unskilled workers that transforms it into an aggregate
labor input, Ls,t and Lu,t respectively, using the following technologies:
LT,t =
[∫ 1
0
h
1
1+λw,t
T,jt dj
]1+λw,t
, (D.26)
for T ∈ {s, u}. In each period, a household faces a constant probability, 1 − θw,
of being able to reoptimize its nominal wage.
D.4.5 Monetary Policy
We assume that monetary policy is described by an interest rate rue given by
Rt
R∗t
=
(
Rt−1
R∗
)ρR [( pit
pi∗
)rpi ( Yt
Y ∗t
)ry]1−ρR
exp(rt ), (D.27)
where R∗ is the steady state nominal gross interest rate, pi∗ is steady state inflation
rate, and Y ∗t is the natural level of output, i.e. the output level in the flexible price
and wage economy.
D.4.6 The aggregate resource constraint
The aggregate resource constraint is
ct + gt + ut + a(ut) ≤ Yt, (D.28)
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where gt is government expenditure.
D.4.7 Stochastic Structure
In addition to monetary policy there are eight additional sources of uncertainty.
The law of motion for these shocks are given by:
zt − zt−1 = γ + ρz(zt−1 − zt−2) + εz,t (D.29)
rt = εr,t (D.30)
At = ρaAt−1 + εa,t (D.31)
φt = ρφφt−1 + εφ,t (D.32)
gt = ρggt−1 + εg,t (D.33)
qt = ρqqt−1 + εq,t (D.34)
bt = ρbbt−1 + εb,t (D.35)
λwt = ρwλwt−1 + εw,t (D.36)
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λft = ρwλft−1 + εf,t (D.37)
The innovations follow a standard normal random vector.
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D.5 Data Construction
GDP growth: Log difference of gross domestic product in per capita term
(chained dollars). Data are quarterly, 1979:Q1-2012:Q4. The source is Bureau
of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts Tables, Table 7.1.
Consumption growth: Log difference of personal consumption expenditures in
per capita term (chained dollars). Data are quarterly, 1979:Q1-2012:Q4. The
source is Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts
Tables, Table 7.1.
Investment growth: Log difference of nonresidential gross private domestic in-
vestment (chained dollars). Data are quarterly, 1979:Q1-2012:Q4. The source
is Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts Tables,
Table 1.1.6.
Inflation: Log difference of GDP deflator. Data are quarterly, 1979:Q1-2012:Q4.
The series is downloaded from the FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis (GDPDEF).
Federal Funds Rate: Quarterly averages of monthly effective Federal Funds
Rate. Data are quarterly, 1979:Q1-2012:Q4. The series is downloaded from the
FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FEDFUNDS).
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